Daily Report

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Akhromeyev on Pact, NATO Disbandment

LD0611123989 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 6 Nov 89

[Text] One of the Soviet military leaders, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, has pointed out that disarmament to a great extent depends on the United States. In an interview with the TIME magazine he said that the Soviet Union was ready to continue unilateral disarmament actions but the United States should realize that it will not receive one-sided military advantages.

Marshal Akhromeyev referred to the notion about Washington's hopes to exploit the difficulties in the Soviet Union to obtain one-sided benefits in detriment to the USSR's national security. Such hopes are baseless, Marshal Akhromeyev remarked.

On the attitude of the USSR towards the antagonistic military alliances, that is, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, Marshal Akhromeyev voiced Soviet readiness to get down to negotiations on their simultaneous disbandment immediately.

Force Reductions in Europe, Mongolia Outlined

PM0411204589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Nov 89 Second Edition p 6

[Article by N. Sautin under the "Military Policy" rubric: "Will the Russians Go for the English Channel?"]

[Text] Given the current rate at which Soviet troops are being cut, that task is becoming an extremely risky one for them, according to American congressmen. The latest report by the USSR Armed Forces General Staff confirms the purely defensive nature of perestroyka in our army.

Glasnost in the military sphere does not come easily. Even in recent years, when the process of arms limitation and reduction talks has rendered normal the exchange of a large amount of military information between the Soviet Union and the United States, this information has, as a rule, remained innaccessible to the public at large. The setting up of the armed forces and arms reduction Public Monitoring [nablyudeniye] Group has helped to some extent to breach this excessive secrecy, which has not benefited relations between the army and the public.

Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, has helped representatives of the monitoring group—scientists, journalists, and USSR people's deputies—to visit the Soviet groups of forces and the forces in Mongolia. Last week, as PRAVDA reported, the group monitored the withdrawal of a submarine from the Navy's fighting strength.

What conclusion, then, do representatives of "people's diplomacy" draw? "By carrying out its unilaterally adopted decisions the Soviet Union is," according to A. Kokoshin, chairman of the group and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, "demonstrating the practical implementation of the principle of defensive sufficiency. And—particularly important—this process can actually be monitored by representatives of the public."

As of 1 November, according to figures obtained at the General Staff, the Armed Forces strength had been reduced by 235,500 men. Around 65,000 officers and more than 20,000 warrant officers have been discharged. Two military districts—the Central Asian and the Ural—and the directorates of four army corps have been disbanded. The 13th, 25th, and 32d Guards Tank Divisions and one air regiment withdrawn from the Western and Southern Groups of Forces have been disbanded. One tank division and three air defense brigades have been withdrawn from Mongolia, and one air division, one air regiment, and three separate helicopter detachments have been disbanded.

This is how the cuts in Soviet Armed Forces outside the USSR look today:

Groups of Forces	Tanks	Guns	Aircraft	Personnel
Western Group	1,988	247	126	11,620
Central Group	192	22	20	1,500
Southern Group	447	176	76	10,800
Northern Group	87	16	88	3 500
Mongolia	404	307	41	22,900
Total for groups of forces and Mongolia	3,118	768	351	50,320

In all, there has been a reduction of 7,120 tanks, 2,964 artillery systems, and 735 aircraft in the course of the cuts made in the number of Soviet armaments in Europe.

What are the consequences of these cuts? Yes, the Warsaw Pact's offensive potential in Central Europe has been reduced. This primarily relates to the so-called operational maneuver groups, about which Western propaganda has made such a fuss, frightening people with the specter of "Russian Cossacks bent on dipping their tanks in the English Channel." Military confrontation has been reduced not just in Central Europe, but also in the Far East. The Soviet Armed Forces' defensive potential has substantially increased, and their antitank defense potential has been particularly strengthened. Extra manpower resources have been released for the national economy.

The U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee delegation headed by Les Aspin, which paid a visit this August at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security, noted in the report it issued 2 weeks ago that "the cuts

proposed by Gorbachev will considerably reduce the strength of Warsaw Pact forward-based forces and make an attack intolerably risky from the Soviet Union's standpoint...."

"The first signs of a practical response by NATO countries to the Soviet Union's unilateral cuts have appeared," according to Doctor of Historical Sciences S. Rogov, chief of the Military Policy Research Department at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada. "The United States plans to cut armed forces numbers by 30,000 men in fiscal 1990-1991. It has been decided not to deploy the 15th carrier group, and the aircraft carrier 'Coral Sea' has been withdrawn from the fighting strength 2 years ahead of schedule (after the entry into service of a new aircraft carrier). Some 14 obsolete destroyers have been written off early. The purchase of F-14 and F/A-18 aircraft for the Navy has been reduced. The program for the V-22 Osprey assault transport planes for the Marine Corps worth $27 billion has been cancelled. Plans to equip units which previously maintained Pershing-2 medium-range missiles with self-propelled 155-mm howitzers or salvo-fire missile systems have been canceled. The decision to deploy new B-2 bombers has been deferred.

"A decision has been taken to reduce the FRG Armed Forces by 33,000 men and the number of Bundeswehr brigades, from which 800 tanks of old types will be withdrawn, is coming down from 48 to 42. And Canada has abandoned a plan to build a fleet of 10-12 multirole nuclear submarines at an overall cost of $8 billion."

True, according to the scientist, it is rather a slowing down in the pace of the arms race than a reduction that is involved here. For the time being the basic military programs of the United States and the other NATO countries continue to be implemented.

Bogachev Says U.S. Record in CW Talks 'Odious'

LD0511074389 Moscow TASS in English 0734 GMT 5 Oct 89

["Chemical Weapons Ban and Binary Round—TASS Comments"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 5 TASS—By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev:

Five-day Soviet-American consultations on the chemical weapons ban issue ended in New York on Friday.

They were aimed at bringing the two countries' positions on the issue closer together and thereby facilitating the negotiating process in Geneva in preparation of a convention on a total ban on these weapons of mass destruction and the elimination of their stocks.

The two countries' delegations did not comment on the results of the consultations, saying only that data on their results will be referred to the participants in the Geneva Conference on disarmament.

Recent months saw negotiating developments which now inspired hopes for a positive solution to the issue as soon as possible, now disappointed millions of people.

At the September meeting in Wyoming, the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state reaffirmed the two countries' determination to press for a ban on chemical weapons and for the elimination of the stocks of these weapons. They signed a memorandum of understanding concerning a bilateral experiment on control and exchange of data on the military chemical capabilities of the sides.

The Soviet Union and the United States agreed on cooperation regarding methods for the destruction of chemical weapons and on the exchange of information about past, present or planned actions to eliminate these weapons. They also made other decisions promoting the removal of obstacles to the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons.

However, there still are substantial differences in the Soviet and U.S. positions on chemical weapons. The Soviet Union insists on an immediate ban on the production of toxic agents by all countries.

It announced the termination of the production of chemical weapons and the start of a unilateral destruction of toxic agents in the country before a chemical weapons ban convention is signed.

On the other hand, the United States suggests extending the elimination of chemical weapons for 10 years following the signing of a respective international convention.

Washington is prepared to eliminate the last two per cent of its chemical weapons stocks only two years after all countries join the convention. Moreover, the present U.S. Administration now insists on its right to produce new binary chemical weapons even after a convention on full ban on chemical weapons is signed.

This is a radical departure from the already agreed draft convention which envisages full termination of the production of chemical weapons from the moment the treaty is signed.

Washington explains this departure from the previous stand by saying that binary munitions are 'safer' than the now existing toxic agents.

Really, the binary round consists of two non-toxic components which when mixed turn into a deadly nerve gas only during the flight of a bomb or shell. They are possibly safer to the American attending personnel, too. However they are extremely dangerous to the rest of mankind.

An acceptance of American proposals would signify a sharp complication of a procedure to verify compliance with the chemical weapons ban convention, since components of binary munitions can be produced at factories which turn out pesticides and other civilian products.

No inspections will be capable of determining whether chemical products are intended for peaceful purposes or for U.S. deadly binary munitions.

U.S. experts also admit with one accord that it is by far easier to monitor compliance with a hundred per cent ban on chemical weapons than a limitation on their production.

Washington's record in the field of chemical arms talks over the past 65 years is rather odious. Specifically, the United States ratified the Geneva protocol banning the use of chemical weapons fifty years after it was signed.

U.S. military leaders apparently entertained illusions and continue to do so up to now that chemical weapons may be used only at long distances from U.S. shores.

Pact Staff Chiefs, Deputy Foreign Ministers Meet

LD0311195389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1702 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow, 3 Nov (TASS)—It was announced here that a meeting of the chiefs of general (main) staffs and deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states took place in Sofia on 2- 3 November.

The meeting discussed matters concerning the progress of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and measures to strengthen trust and security, participation in the Vienna seminar on military doctrines, and "open skies" proposals, including openness in the field of military activity.

The meeting passed off in a businesslike, constructive atmosphere and enabled the positions on these issues to be made specific and precise.

Taking part in the work of the meeting were representatives from the staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, as well as the heads of delegations of the allied socialist countries at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and measures to strengthen trust and security.

CEMA Science Fair Held in Moscow

Attracts Few Visitors

PM0311095789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 89 First Edition p 4

[L. Chausov "Notes from International Exhibition and Fair": "Not Missing Out"]

[Excerpts] A supercomputer that can perform one billion operations per second, which has been created by Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, and Soviet scientists. Genetic engineering compounds for the treatment of serious human diseases. Gallium arsenide is a wonder material, the creation of the Soviet-Bulgarian "Interkristall" enterprise....

What riches are on display at the "CEMA Countries' Comprehensive Program of Scientific-Technical Progress in Action" exhibition and fair, where there are over 1,300 exhibits, including ones which are not just interesting, but unique in their own way.

Equally interesting is the opportunity to seek partners which has been granted to the participants in the international review of scientific and technical achievements taking place in Moscow.

"Benefit," "Commerce," "Commitment"—these are the key words that define the working atmosphere today in the new USSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements pavilion, where the first exhibition of its kind is taking place.

You notice immediately that many of the exhibits have labels attached to them: "For sale," "looking for partners," "for export." Perhaps this alone reflects the nature of the changes, the transfer of cooperation to a specific commercial footing.

The aim is to initiate commercial information activities to introduce the developments of the Comprehensive Program of Scientific-Technical Progress. [passage omitted]

The Comprehensive Program has been criticized for slow assimilation, for an incomplete innovation cycle, for the fact that the results of scientific research and experimental design work are not being introduced rapidly and on a grand scale—and, therefore, are not yet resulting in tangible structural changes in the CEMA countries' economies. In some cases the planned level of developments leaves something to be desired: They have not managed to "raise the bar" to the height of the world's best models.

How to speed up the solution of all these problems—this, it seems to me, is the main question at the exhibition and fair, which is also strikingly commercial in nature: Time is money, one must not lose time and miss an opportunity. [passage omitted]

There is one worrying factor. The exhibition area is large (6,000 square meters!), but the public is rather thin on the ground in the vast pavilion. The voice over the loudspeakers sometimes sounds like a voice in the wilderness.

What is the problem? Was this major event in CEMA's life not properly advertised? Or maybe some ministries and departments are not in much of a hurry to "graft" their production plans onto high-technology products? [passage omitted]

Ryzhkov Attends

LD0511181789 Moscow TASS international Service in Russian 1620 GMT 5 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow, 5 Nov (TASS)—Nikolay Ryzhkov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Council of Ministers chairman, today visited the "Complex Program of Scientific and Technical progress of CEMA Member Countries—In Action" exhibition which opened at the VDNKH, Main Committee for Exibition of Achievements of the National Economy. The results of scentific and experimental design projects, which are being carried out in the Soviet Union and CEMA countries in accordance with the above program, are being demonstrated at the VDNKH.

It was with great interest that those participating in the view familiarized themselves with the layout of the exhibition, at which more than 1,300 exhibits, which reflect the 4-year joint work of organizations and enterprises of the CEMA member countries and the SFRY in 5 priority areas of the complex program. Conversations took place with Soviet specialists and their colleagues from other CEMA countries on ways of raising the

effectiveness of scientific and technical links and on the assimilation of the output of various types of production on the basis of completed developments. Special attention was paid to the production of media of computer technology, including personal computers to satisfy requirements in various fields and primarily in the field of education, and also to the use of developments directed at ensuring the reliability and safety of nuclear power stations. Questions of the application of new materials and means of automation and biotechnological processes in agriculture and health care were discussed with the specialists.

TASS Reports Perfilyev News Briefing 3 Nov

Decommissioned Baltic Fleet Submarines

LD0311143289 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow, 3 Nov (TASS)—The elimination of missile- carrying submarines in the USSR naval forces which has begun testifies to the USSR's real move to a defensive doctrine based in the principles of reasonable sufficiency. At a briefing today Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the Information Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented in this way on the ceremony for the decommissioning of the diesel B-372 missile- carrying submarine from the Baltic fleet, which took place on Tuesday.

He recalled that the Soviet Union decided to unilaterally fully eliminate all six submarines of this class known in the west as "Golf," by the end of 1990.

"It is considered in the Soviet Union," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represntative declared, "that this goodwill gesture opens up good possibilities for engaging all nuclear powers and the Baltic states in substantive talks on effective guarantees for the nuclear- free status of the Baltic Sea." This unilateral act on the part of the USSR also creates a favorable atmosphere for the start of a dialogue on naval forces with the participation of all interested states and, primarily, of the countries possessing the greatest potential in this field, Vadim Perfilyev said.

Soviet-U.S. UN initiative

LD0311153689 Moscow TASS in English 1454 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—The new joint Soviet-American initiative for international peace, security and international cooperation is designed to strengthen the tendency toward cooperation between different groups of states in all spheres of United Nations activities, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told reporters here today.

The initiative will be tabled today at a press conference in New York by Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy and United States Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton.

The Soviet-American proposal will be introduced as a draft resolution before the United Nations General Assembly.

This move will banish the influence of cold war and confrontation that sometimes affected the work and effectiveness of the United Nations, Perfilyev said.

"The initiative was prompted by positive changes in Soviet- American relations, including by the discussions of the role and place of the United Nations in the modern world during the meeting in Wyoming," he said. The Soviet-American initiative will be a concrete example of the effectivenes of a broad dialogue on the strengthening of the role of the world community.

This process was begun by the socialist countries' proposals for a comprehensive approach to the promotion of peace and security on the basis of the United Nations Charter, the spokesman said.

Afghanistan Situation

LD0311164489 Moscow TASS in English 1624 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Pakistan and the United States continue to supply weapons to Afghan rebels, supervise their military training at camps in Pakistan, dispatch armed detachments to Afghanistan and plan their combat operations, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

Foreigners are directly involved in fighting against the Afghan Army, he continued. Some 3,500 citizens from other countries, including pakistani tribal militiamen and servicemen, Arab gunmen, advisers from Arab and Western countries, directly participate in organising combat operations in Afghanistan.

The rebel strategy to capture the cities of Jalalabad and Khowst failed to materialise, Perfilyev noted. This is due to the efficient actions of Afghan Armed Forces in Repulsing eight major enemy offensives on Jalalabad and 12 on Khowst.

Nevertheless, the extremists have not given up the idea of storming the cities and are massing large detachments near them.

On the eve of winter, the armed opposition is enforcing an economic blockade of cities by sealing off highways and shelling cities and villages, trying to cause panic.

Perfilyev said that traffic on the Khairaton [name as received]-Kabul highway, the main supply line of the capital, has been restored. He noted that more than 600 trucks with supplies got through to Kabul along it in the past three days.

Namibia, Dubcek Interview

LD0311171589 Moscow TASS in English 1632 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—The new joint Soviet-American initiative aimed at strengthening international peace, security and international cooperation will consolidate the growing trend for greater cooperation between various groups of states in all areas of U.N. activities, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

He said that the new initiative would be launched today at a news conference in New York, which will be

attended by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton.

The start of the elimination of Soviet missile-carrying submarines indicates the Soviet Union's transition to a defensive doctrine based on the principles of reasonable sufficiency.

This is how Perfilyev commented on the decommissioning of the Baltic Fleet's first diesel B-372 submarine. He noted that the USSR decided to destroy unilaterally all the six submarines of this class, known in the West as Golf subs, by the end of 1990.

Perfilyev then moved to to recent statements by South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha who said that SWAPO armed detachments are crossing from Angola into Namibia. As a result, the South African Armed Forces have been put on alert.

The spokesman stressed that such actions by Pretoria are whipping up tension in Namibia on the eve of the elections and are aimed at discrediting SWAPO and generating doubts among voters as to its commitment to the U.N. plan.

Asked about an interview with former Czechoslovak Communist Party leader Alexander Dubcek recently aired by Leningrad television, Perfilyev said that the interview "was not officially authorised".

He was suprised by the appearance of such telecasts, since they deal with important political issues.

The Soviet position on relations with fraternal socialist countries is well known, the spokesman continued. The Soviet Union does not interfere in the affairs of other states, including the socialist countries.

The Soviet side proceeds from the fact that these countries decide for themselves all questions concerning their policies and give their own assessments of their past and present, he noted.

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Nicaragua

LD0411184889 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS—The Soviet Union is concerned about the situation inside and around Nicaragua which has been aggravated by armed opposition groups that are penetrating from Honduras, their increasing terrorist actions and retaliatory steps taken by the Nicaraguan Government, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said in a statement issued here today.

At the same time, he pointed to some positive trends which are raising the hope that a mutually aceptable way out of the current situation would be found shortly.

First of all, representatives of Nicaragua, Honduras and the armed opposition as well as the international commission for monitoring and control are going to meet in New York under an agreement reached on the initiative of the Nicaraguan Government.

The meeting is expected to discuss a cease-fire, the withdrawal of opposition troops from Nicaragua and the implementation of the decision to demobilize the contras adopted by the presidents of Central American states.

A positive solution to these issues will, undoubtedly, contribute to establishing peace in Nicaragua and creating necessary conditions for continuing the process of normalising the situation in Nicaragua and the entire region.

European Environmental Meeting Ends in Sofia

LD0311214289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The Eco-Forum—the first all-European conference on environmental protection—came to an end in Sofia today.

[Correspondent D. Golovanov] [passage omitted: List of environmental issues] For 3 weeks, representatives from 35 countries, experts from the UN's European Economic Commission and from other international organizations connected with ecology, have been studying various aspects of our environment and thrashing out common approaches.

A concluding document was to be adopted at the final session of the forum. It was supposed to contain a series of recommendations addressed to the UN European Economic Commission. Unfortunately, the document was not supported by all 35 countries: The Romanian delegation voiced its disagreement with individual provisions in the document. In particular, they did not agree that separate individuals, groups, or organizations involved in environmental protection should have the right to freely express their views, set up associations with others, hold (?peaceful) assemblies, or obtain, publish, and disseminate information on these problems.

Europe's first ecology forum has come to an end, but the document has not been adopted. What's your view of this?

[Ye. Minayev, leader of Soviet delegation, identified by caption] Well, although there was no consensus on the document among the 35 countries, 34 of them adopted it. The most important thing, however, is that ways have, nonetheless, been found and concrete stances have been formulated for the drawing up of framework agreements on industrial accidents and pollution of border rivers and international lakes. Methods for future work with chemically dangerous substances have also been determined. I would not say that the conference has been a failure. [video shows conference proceedings, interview with minayev]

United States & Canada

U.S., USSR To Submit Joint UN Resolution

LD0311195189 Moscow TASS in English 1915 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] New York November 3 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton held a joint news conference at the United Nations today.

They presented a draft resolution on strengthening world peace, security and international cooperation in all spheres in accordance with the U.N. Charter. This is the first initiative advanced by the two countries at the United Nations.

The joint Soviet-U.S. document which will be submitted for consideration of the 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly urges all countries to increase their efforts to achieve world peace and security in all its aspects through cooperation in accordance with the U.N. Charter.

The resolution again stresses the importance of the U.N. Charter and calls on all states to observe it and respect the principles of sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. It also calls on them to abstain from the use of force and threats to use force, to settle all disputes peacefully, to adhere to the principles of equality and self-determination and respect human rights and cooperation among nations.

Further on Joint UN Resolution

LD0311202189 Moscow TASS in English 1950 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] New York November 3 TASS—The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed jointly to cosponsor a new resolution on peace, security, and international cooperation. The resolution calls on member states to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining peace and security and to respect the principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter. This resolution will be introduced in this session of the U.N. General Assembly.

The two countries have been working together on this new draft to underline our intent to cooperate in improving the efficacy and efficiency of the U.N., and to demonstrate that the commitment to work together expressed in Wyoming by Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be evident in the U.N. Our joint efforts to improve the U.N. are an attempt to explore an area of mutual advantage.

We are working together in the Security Council to ensure the Council does everything it usefully can to preserve peace and restore order. We are working together throughout the U.N. system to promote budgetary reform and the elimination of duplication of effort. Most importantly, we are committed to work together throughout the U.N. system to depoliticize its proceedings and promote an atmosphere of realism and practicality.

Perhaps the most important thing about this resolution is not its specific language, but what it symbolizes as a new beginning at the U.N.—a new spirit of constructive cooperation. We hope that it may offer an example to other member states that it is possible to set aside the tendentious polemics that have been too common in the U.N. in the past.

'Text' of U.S.-Soviet Draft UN Resolution

LD0311195489 Moscow TASS in English 1919 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] New York November 3 TASS—Follows the full text of the draft resolution—Enhancing International Peace, Security and International Cooperation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:

The General Assembly, desiring to strengthen further the role and effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security for all states on the basis of full and universal respect for its charter and through better international cooperation in resolving international problems of a political, economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, mindful of the potential of the United Nations to be even more effective in achieving international cooperation:

1. Calls upon all states to intensify their practical efforts towards ensuring international peace and security in all its aspects through cooperative means in accordance with the charter,

2. Reaffirms its support for the validity and relevance of the charter and urges all states to abide by it and in particular to respect the principles of sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of states, and non-intervention in internal affairs, refrain from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the charter, peacefully settle disputes, adhere to the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, cooperation among states, and comply in good faith with their obligations assumed in accordance with the charter.

3. Encourages member states to consult and cooperate within the framework of the United Nations, the Security Council, the General Assembly and their appropriate subsidiary bodies, in order to find multifaceted approaches to implement and strengthen the principles and system of peace, security and international cooperation laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

Shevardnadze Comments on U.S.-USSR Relations

PM0611122889 Moscow PRAVDA in English Second Edition 6 Nov 89 p 7

["In the Spirit of the New Thinking": "Answers by E.A. Shevardnadze, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Foreign Minister, to Questions From a TASS Correspondent"]

[Text] Question: The joint proposal of the USSR and the USA to the United Nations to put on the agenda of the 44th session of the General Assembly the question of the consolidation of international peace, security and international cooperation in all their aspects in accordance with the United Nations Charter evoked broad response of news organisations in the USSR and abroad. A draft decision has also been submitted. This initiative is described as historic by many. Would you agree with this appraisal? What is the importance of the two countries' joint proposal?

Answer: One can go along with this appraisal. The Soviet-American initiative in the United Nations is indeed of much importance.

For the first time in all the 44 years of the United Nations existence, two major states that were at the origins of this world organisation jointly made a large-scale proposal for enhancing its role and prestige in every aspect.

The proposed draft resolution urges United Nations members to exert efforts to ensure peace and security by means of cooperation.

The emphasis is placed on the United Nations Charter and the need for stringent observance of its principles that form the basis for civilised international communication in conditions of the peaceful period setting in.

In other words, the task is set to enhance the United Nations effectiveness as a centre of coordinated actions of states on a basis of a comprehensive, all-embracing approach.

The line is thus drawn under the epoch connected with the cold war, when the United Nations was actually paralysed by excessive declarativeness and confrontational polemics.

A real opportunity opens to concentrate the efforts of the United Nations organisation and all its members on practical actions for a collective quest of realistic solutions to specific international problems.

A method for such work is determined: consultations and cooperation to find many faceted approaches to the consolidation of a system of peace, security and cooperation in common interests.

It will not be an overstatement to say that a new quality is being imparted to a dialogue in all United Nations bodies—the Security Council, the General Assembly and specialised institutions.

This initiative is a result of positive changes taking place in Soviet-American relations, and at the same time an evidence of the noble effect of the Wyoming spirit on the entire course of international development.

Mikhail Gorbachev in his well-known UN addresses declared for new thinking in foreign policy and for conduct of states in international affairs with reliance on the United Nations prestige and possibilities.

A joint intiative of the USSR and the U.S. in the United Nations has become possible due to the fact that both sides have been meeting each other halfway. As a result it has been agreed in Wyoming to tackle jointly the task of enhancing the United Nations effectiveness.

We believe that the Soviet-American initiative is also a patent example of effectiveness of a broad international dialogue whose development is the purpose of joint proposals of socialist countries, also in the United Nations. It is in the interests of states in any system of political-geographic coordinates—East- West, North-South, South-South.

Question: How does the joint initiative in the United Nations relate to the forthcoming meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the U.S. in the Mediterranean?

Answer: The relationship is direct. This initiative is part of the Soviet-American dialogue. It shows again the possibility and feasibility of cooperation of the USSR and the U.S. in international affairs during the development of constructive parallelism of Soviet-American and multilateral interaction, also in international organisations.

We talked a great deal about the possibility of such a meeting with President George Bush in Washington and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Wyoming.

The unofficial nature of the summit does not preclude its discussing large-scale questions that are concerns not only of the USSR and the USA, but also of the entire international community. It will be an important conversation on essential matters. It will be a milestone also in asserting the adherence of the two countries to the United Nations goals and principles, to common human values.

I am confident that despite its unofficial character, the Mediterranean meeting will be of milestone importance. It will largerly determine the importance and substance of the official summit talks to be held late in spring—early in summer next year.

Kondrashov Reflects on Gorbachev-Bush Summit

PM0611125389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Stanislav Kondrashov article under the rubric "Political Observer's Opinion": "So That the Ships Do Not Pass Each Other By... M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush Speed Up the Timetable of Their Meetings"]

[Text] In planning a summit meeting for the late spring or early summer next year, M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush have now decided to meet 6 months earlier—unofficially, as both sides stressed. This surprise, which was kept a close secret until Tuesday, stirred up the political world and forced it to ask about the reasons for this. In general, the answer is clear: Circumstances transcend personalities, the international situation which is developing is "putting pressure" on the leaders, compressing the schedule of their meetings. The speed of the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has become a central fact in the picture.

From all sides authoritative voices can be heard talking about the end of the "cold war," and the methods of the former—as it were, frozen—East-West diplomacy are increasingly clearly not suitable for the new times which are opening up unusual opportunities. How can Bush carry on almost 1 and ½ years into his presidency (if one takes the previous plan for the summit meeting) without a direct face-to-face dialogue with the Soviet leader, when M.S. Gorbachev in just 6 months met with his leading partners Kohl, Thatcher and Mitterrand? The president of the West's main power will not be understood either in West Europe or at home, where the rival party—the Democrats— is increasingly vigorously reproaching him for inertia, which may be followed by politically unsafe accusations of missed opportunities.

Bush, as Reagan before him, stated firmly that he would not begin an unprepared meeting with M.S. Gorbachev without agreements which had been worked out first and already been approved [zavizirovannykh]. Now journalists are blaming him for departing from this principle, recalling, incidentally, how his predecessor stumbled by agreeing to the Reykjavik improvisation, where the Soviet leader almost "foisted" on him unawares his radical plan for a nuclear-free world.

The parallel between the expanses of sea near Malta which are warm even in December and the cold October in Reykjavik is incorrect, as they say. Reykjavik took place in the 2d year of Soviet perestroyka, the Mediterranean meeting—in the 5th. The 3 years which have passed have made an enormous difference.

The international situation has substantially (I would say—qualitatively) improved. The shadow of a nuclear disaster has receded because the nuclear superpowers have found mutual understanding on key questions of arms control, and from this—the prevailing formula today—have switched to cooperation. It has already been expressed in the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles which is being implemented successfully. After the Shevardnadze-Baker September meeting in Wyoming, it can be said that the way is clear for a treaty on a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. But in this respect the two leaders are in no hurry, giving the negotiators time to hone the appropriate documents while themselves retaining the ceremonial right to sign them at the same—prepared!—summit meeting which is to take place in Washington in late spring-early summer 1990. In a short period, which even a year ago might have seemed fantastic, the main parameters of an agreement at the Vienna talks among the 23 states on the radical reduction of conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals have been determined; if the optimistic forecast is realized, the appropriate agreement can be signed next year.

So, the possibility of military confrontation has become far less acute. The goals of disarmament have still not been reached, but disarmament problems themselves have ceased to be exclusively dominant in East-West political contacts. This in itself gives cause for discussion about the end of the "cold war." M.S. Gorbachev, speaking recently in Helsinki, gave a detailed description of the new era, calling it a "peaceful period." The tough cautious pragmatist Brent Scowcroft, assistant to the U.S. president for national security affairs, stated a few days ago: "Over the last 40 years we lived in a postwar world and were a postwar generation... Now the world has started to stir. The postwar world is a thing of the past."

Characterizing East-West relations, Scowcroft stressed that "the most major changes are taking place at the present time in the Soviet Union." It is precisely these changes, Scowcroft thinks, which made President Bush the "first president since World War II to operate in completely new international conditions" and which moved his policy beyond the framework of the postwar "deterrence strategy."

We have a single word for the phrase "most serious changes" in our country. Perestroyka.... The new, perestroyka approach to foreign policy and military building has, in the general opinion, been the prime cause, the main motivating force behind the changes in the international arena enumerated above, as well as other changes (take regional conflicts, for example, or the question of human rights). Perestroyka, its problems, its whole fate, its success or failure now hold—whether we like it or not—a central place on the changed international agenda, even squeezing out the question of armaments, because, to a certain extent, even this question is merely a derivative of the question of the fate of perestroyka.

Is there any need to remind our reader of the rapid, uneven pace at which perestroyka is moving? Its problems are also clearly visible—albeit on a more general level—to foreign politicians and observers. In these conditions, should the U.S. president allow himself the luxury (or the shortsightedness) of not meeting with the main leader of restructuring for 1 and ½ years?! That is the obvious explanation (if one is needed) for the "naval" summit planned for December: informal, without any fixed agenda, totally free, and without the impediments of excessive protocol and a siege by the press. At his press conference Bush admitted that he has been working on this idea since July and has met with complete understanding on the Soviet side. It can be said

that it is not diplomatic resourcefulness but historical necessity that dictates new contact and a new form of dialogue.

However, people are still being diplomatic in their choice of expression, of course. Perestroyka is the internal affair of the Soviet Union, and the rules of etiquette must be observed when showing an interest in it at summit level. A direct question by a journalist: "What is your opinion of Gorbachev's reforms? Do you think that he is having difficulties?" Bush's polite, evasive answer: "I would like to talk to him about the Soviet economy, about our economy, and about various problems. I have said more than once that we want to see perestroyka succeed. And they know this...."

Essentially, the U.S. president is taking the line initiated by Shevardnadze, who, when announcing the forthcoming meeting, asked in one of his replies that correspondents did not use the term "help the Soviet Union in perestroyka."

It is true that it is our people's responsibility to implement the task of perestroyka and that it is a question of their life and dignity to see this task through to a successful conclusion. It is also true that no foreign tug can pull such a vast country as ours into a safe harbor.

But, whereas it is hard to reconcile our national pride with the concept of assistance, the concept of support referred to by Bush and the concept of cooperation are perfectly acceptable. Whereas some of us do not like these arguments, it is evidently worth pointing out that, as far as the other side, the American side is concerned, all this—support, cooperation, and maybe even assistance—is part of the broader concept of enlightened self-interest: After all, by helping us, they are helping themselves. Even in the most practical sense—that of dollars.

If the progress of perestroyka has determined favorable changes in the international arena, its failure is quite possibly fraught with the return and intensification of the state of military confrontation, with the concomitant danger of the renewal of a ruinous arms race of increased savagery. As far as the East European countries are concerned, particularly Poland and Hungary, which are now being paid such close, interested attention by those across the ocean and by Western capitals in general, their development along the path of democratic pluralism is also linked to the development of democratic processes in the Soviet Union and the evolution of the Warsaw Pact from a military-political grouping into a political-military alliance, in which the free voice of every participant will grow.

Attempting to find an expressive definition, Bush described the reason for the forthcoming meeting and his attitude to it as follows: "I do not want two gigantic ships to pass in the night because of a breakdown in communication."

A fitting image. And the ships in it are very apt.

'Top Priority' Program Examines Summit Plans

LD0511002589 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 3 Nov 89

["Top Priority" program presented by Pavel Kuznetsov with Radomir Bogdanov and Andrey (Kortunov)]

[Text] [Kuznetsov] On 2 and 3 December off the coast of Malta in the Mediterranean there will be an informal interim meeting between President George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. The announcements, made simultaneously in Washington and Moscow, took many people, including some seasoned observers, by surprise. It's obvious that in 2 days the two leaders won't be able to accomplish much, all the more so since the American side would like for this meeting to be a very low key affair. But I think nevertheless it is going to be a very important event, especially since the meeting was initiated by President Bush and we know that for almost a year there have been rifts and disagreements within the Bush administration as to what kind of political line to pursue towards the Soviet Union. My question to begin with, my question is this: What is the interest of each side in engaging the other one in this kind of diplomacy? Why is this meeting important? Radomir?

[Bogdanov] Pavel. I have a temptation to please our listeners by this statement: It's great, it's historical, this is something extraordinary.

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Yeah, you did it very often, you did it very often in the past. But...

[Bogdanov] But I won't I won't do that. Yeah, but I won't do that because I would like to say this is businesslike, this is a real businesslike meeting. Why, this is what I'm thinking. Why...

[Kuznetsov] Yeah, when you call it a businesslike meeting, I mean it's a get-together and no arms accords are in the offing.

[Bogdanov] Yes, yes, yes, but today it is not, it is not even as important as it was in the previous times, to end a meeting by some concrete agreement. I believe that if we take into consideration the political environment which has been shaping for the last maybe 2, 3 months you will see how it is important for the two leaders to meet just to exchange their views on the political situation. What I mean...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Especially as we had a good example in the past under the Reagan administration when we had annual summits starting from 1985.

[Bogdanov]...annual, annual summits. But annual summits to my mind, Pavel, are not enough today. Look at the political map. The events are so fast that one summit by year is not enough, it's not enough. Look what happened in Eastern Europe. Look what is happening in Western Europe, look what is happening in the Soviet Union. Events are moving with such a velocity that you really need to be in touch. That's my point number one.

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Are you proposing more than one summit a year or what?

[Bogdanov] Oh yes, more than one...

[Kuznetsov]... Two or three summits a year...

[Bogdanov] Not summits. Why, why should we call it a summit? Why you should call, [as heard] because it is just a businesslike meeting when two leaders meet just to exchange views without any decisions. Maybe, maybe, what they exchange as views is what in a month or so would be, would be a base of very important decisions [words indistinct as Kuznetsov interrupts]

[Kuznetsov] I'll tell you why I call it a summit. Because this is the meeting of the two leaders of the two superpowers and the summit means a peak of a mountain...

[Bogdanov] Yes, but I believe [words indistinct]

[Kuznetsov] That is, that any meeting at the highest level is a summit [words indistinct as Bogdanov interrupts]

[Bogdanov] Pavel, I'm sorry to say, I'm sorry to say it's obsolete. Summit, this is something very like, like a (?piste), something like that. But this is a high time to talk about businesslike relations. Number two, you mentioned, you mentioned the American line, what line the president has taken, the secretary of state line, or...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Yeah, (?there) was a long reevaluation of American policy toward the Soviet Union.

[Bogdanov] [Words indistinct] long reevaluation. But I, I just would like to introduce into all that one element that we should not miss. Big pressure from the Democratic Party, from the Democratic Congress. And the president has to accept that pressure and he has to satisfy not only his own party's appetites but he has to satisfy the opinion of the Democratic...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Andrey, let's go back to my question about what is the particular interest of either of the sides in engaging the other one in these kind of policies. What is the American interest, except that President Bush is, has been under pressure as Radomir Bogdanov said, from the Democratic Party which controls the United States Congress? Are there any other...?

[(Kortunov)] Well I would say that there can be some specific goals, for example to discuss the situation in Eastern Europe, or let us say (?if) possible the settlement in Afghanistan, or in the Middle East. One can argue that Bush wants to make sure that Gorbachev has the situation at home under his control but my guess is that going beyond that there is a, well, a somewhat philosophical aim and goal of the American administration, to see how we can go beyond containment, beyond a (?post) world war international structure.

[Kuznetsov] Yes. This is the name of President Bush's doctrine, going beyond containment with Moscow and trying to incorporate the Soviet Union, too, in the world community of nations. Yes, that's true. Let's go back to...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] I, I'm sorry but just a very short comment. I don't believe that this particular meeting is meant for these big things. I believe that this particular meeting is meant for the operational, political decisions, if you like. Or, operational...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Like what? How do you mean? Can you be more specific?

[Bogdanov] I mean, I mean. Yes, I can be more specific and I, and I agree with Andrey. And I have already mentioned that my view is that this meeting is initiated by the velocity of the developments in Eastern and Western Europe. [words indistinct as Kuznetsov interrupts]

[Kuznetsov] So, they have, in other words, what you are trying to say is that they have a wide range of issues to discuss.

[Bogdanov] Yes, yes, yes.

[Kuznetsov] And of course to get to know each other.

[Bogdanov] Yes.

[Kuznetsov] To be able to look each other in the eye which sometimes in big politics works miracles.

[Bogdanov] Right.

[Kuznetsov] Alright. Let's go back to the situation in the United States. Within the Bush administration, like we said there's been a long process of a reassessment of American policy toward the Soviet Union and if I am, if I'm wrong, please correct me, the Bush administration to this day seems to be split into two camps. I wouldn't call them warring camps, I wouldn't call them hawks versus doves.

It's just people who don't really believe in the positive outcome of perestroyka. But some of them are moderates, others are less moderate. Moderates like, and when I use this word moderate I borrow it from the American press, moderates like U.S. Secretary of State James Baker believe that the United States should use this unique opportunity presented by perestroyka to realize many American interests—national security interests, foreign policy interests—and also to help to end the cold war. People like, officials like Vice President Quayle, don't think that perestroyka will succeed. They believe that ultimately it will fail, that new people, new leaders will come to power. They will go back to the confrontational days and ways and, which will make matters for the United States even worse, because they argue that by that time the Soviet Union will have restructured and improved its economy and with it its military capabilities. So, does this announcement by President Bush mean that this moderate trend has got the upper hand in the administration, or is it just a compromise, like Radomir has just suggested, a compromise struck with

the United States Congress? Let's look deeper into this announcement, which I think is the hottest selling news item these days.

[(Kortunov)] Well, I would say that I think at least that since late fall there was a constant trend that favored these moderate approaches in the Bush administration, despite, still, you know, there is some ambiguity in the statements of top American leaders. I think that we can say that Bush himself is more in favor of such, well I would call it also moderate, (?approach) to the Soviet Union. Even if perestroyka in the Soviet Union is very fragile, even if the chances of Gorbachev's success are low, why shouldn't the United States use these chances? I think that Bush wants to do what he can do and he doesn't want to lose opportunity, even if this opportunity is not too great. It, you know, it would run counter (to) American principles.

[Kuznetsov] Don't you think that...?

[Bogdanov] Should we, should we forget it that, Andrey, the attitude of American allies? Should we not keep in mind that the Americans' Western allies are much ahead of America in establishing and improving their relations with the Soviet Union? Don't you think this is a positive factor which is (?impacted) on the American mind in, in...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] And not only America's allies but as far as I understand there was some urging on the part of Poland and Hungary...

[(Kortunov), interrupting] But I find it quite understandable because European nations are more directly involved in perestroyka. They depend more on the success or failure of perestroyka. You know, Americans can afford [words indistinct as Kuznetsov interrupts].

[Kuznetsov] But since we mentioned the fate of perestroyka, because I think that's an aside, an addition to Soviet-American agenda in the area of arms control and disarmament, which is emphasized by the fact that the two presidents will be spending the night, the 2-day meeting on their heavily armed naval vessels. This symbolizes the need for our leaders to see each other more often. The more they talk the less the chance is that they'll press the button. Perestroyka is, I think, another major reason for this meeting. I think that in terms of military power we are indeed a superpower to this day, but we are no longer an economic giant as we used to be sometime ago, and we're slipping backwards. This trend presists and according to some estimates will, by the end of the century and in the next century,—may turn out to be technologically behind a whole group of nations big and small, so we really need Western assistance. So my question is this, what kind of assistance do we need? Is it massive aid to bail us out of this economic predicament, or is it more modest assistance that we expect that could be used as a signal to the antiperestroyka forces that if perestroyka fails, if we go back to the old days and practices, to the times of lawlessness, the Soviet Union will be isolated and perhaps there will be a new round of a very, very costly arms race which will do us in? What is your opinion about this? [words indistinct]

[(Kortunov)] Well, we keep some officials from the Bush Administration think they are ready to offer some advice, some technical assistance. What kind of assistance, beyond credit?

[Bogdanov] (?Honestly), this is a very difficult question and to be frank with you and with our listeners I am not ready to give a definite answer.

[Kuznetsov] But do you see international support for perestroyka as a factor which would hold our opposition in check or just a warning—could be used as a warning. Don't attack perestroyka otherwise the world will be—

[Bogdanov] Yes, to some extent, but I believe that if we have a real opposition, if we have a real, and we have, they will fight with the hope...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Help, with the rest of the world?

[Bogdanov] With the rest of the world, and they are so stubborn people, and they—I am sorry to say, they are so stupid people, I'm sorry to say, that I wouldn't like even to link that possibility with their position because I know them quite well.

[(Kortunov)] Well, but I would add that, you know, it depends how you define aid. You know, most of the state aid programs were extremely unsuccessful. I think what can help perestroyka in the economic sense of the word is investments. Investments in private sector, investments in cooperative sector, that could help to create social infrastructure of perestroyka. That could strengthen the positions of those—

[Kuznetsov] And the political structure of the Soviet Union...

[(Kortunov), interrupting] And the political.

[Kuznetsov] Because the private investments mean something totally different from the previous practices in this country. We are [words indistinct].

[Bogdanov] And, mind you, if you have private investments in the big scale you should provide political guarantees, (?Andrey), that's the problem.

[(Kortunov)] Well, that...

[Bogdanov] Political guarantees.

[(Kortunov)] Certainly I think that cannot happen overnight, but I think in general if, you know, the private sector feels that there is a major support from abroad and that it can boost, you know, its economic power and political importance, it will be, you know, quite a (?buffer) to conservative forces seeking power.

[Kuznetsov] Speaking of the economy, which keeps deteriorating, and I think that most of us, and not only

us, but the most serious economists in the Soviet Union agree that, we are increasingly focussing on the economic side of perestroyka. We've had a seminar sponsored—economic seminar sponsored by the Communist Party Central Committee, and shortly we are going to have a national conference of economists, managers, and officials and, as far as I understand 1,200 from all over the country are going to attend, so what do you think, watching the debates in the parliament, what do you think are the most urgent steps that should be taken [words indistinct]

[Bogdanov] I am sorry, I am sorry. These have [as heard] a number of excellent suggestions, what you call steps, but what is making consensus and I believe that the most important goal of that conference you have mentioned, just to find out [words indistinct] what does it mean, a consensus? There, if you have a consensus you can have a united platform, an economic platform, that you can offer to dictate to for discussion, but if laymen hears a hundred different voices, a hundred different suggestions, he has to pick up himself you know, like a menu, this dish or this dish, but people not so well educated in economical problems, they should have a real good problem with what to do and how to do it.

[Kuznetsov] Yeah, I would agree with that because over here very often we hear all sorts of labels being stuck to this or that proposal. Okay, that is going back to capitalism, which is bad, and this is a good proposal because it supports socialism. But what's in a name, I mean the situation, we should be more serious about it, and I would support what Radomir has just said about reaching consensus at that conference because we must have a united platform to move perestroyka in. What is—I interrupted, you wanted to add something.

[(Kortunov)] Well, no, I would like to add that what we are lacking, I think that we lack political will on the part of top political leadership. Now Gorbachev is the master of compromise, but the time for compromise is over. We need a really radical solution and we cannot afford just to step forward and then to step back. We should take really radical solutions and really very painful solutions, and...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] But other people insist that radical solutions are not going to help, that perhaps we should try to combine various sorts of economies that exist in this world and, say, try to have a [words indistinct] say a little bit from the Western [words indistinct].

[(Kortunov)] Nobody's succeeded in that, and I don't think it is possible to combine a horse and a car, you know. It is impossible, from my point of view.

[Kuznetsov] In conclusion, we know that this interim informal meeting isn't going to replace a full-scale meeting which is scheduled to take place next year between May and June. Do you think it will speed up those solutions we expect from that full-scale meeting, especially in the area of arms control?

[Bogdanov] In any case I hope so, in any case I hope so.

[Kuznetsov] What is your opinion?

[(Kortunov)] Well, I think that it can speed some progress in specific areas, but what is more important is genuine understanding between the two leaders.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you, gentlemen, our time is up.

China

China After Tiananmen Events Examined

PM0311123489 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 44, 29 Oct 89 p 12

[Viktor Loshak dispatch: "The Echo of Tiananmen Square"]

[Text] Harbin-Beijing—The echo of Tiananmen Square is everywhere apparent in China: in restrained conversations and facial expressions, in the newspaper, on television, in government decisions, even in the emptiness of hotels, and the many taxi drivers looking for tourists.

It has been estimated that the events in Tiananmen Square, or rather in Beijing and tens of other cities, have already cost China some two to three billion dollars. The world was instantly indignant over the blood spilt, and alarmed: fewer tourists, fewer business people, some investments frozen. The estimates are mostly approximate, but Aeroflot's general representative in the PRC, Viktor Dvoryankin, can give the exact figures: Aeroflot will have lost at least 1.5 million roubles in profit by the end of the year, as fewer foreigners will be flying to China.

I was in China just a year before, so I can compare the bustling tourist trade and business in Beijing then with the dark windows of its hotels today. But more striking are the cautious glances and unwilling smiles.

Foreigners who claim to understand fully the events in China in late spring and early summer are naive. You can, of course, dismiss the whole thing by writing just a few lines about student unrest, without taking into account the fact that workers and intellectuals took part in it, as happened in our newspapers; you can also try to present a picture of the whole country drowned in blood—such overstatements were made in the world press. But, following the first meeting with the press arranged by the new leadership of the CPC Central Committee, many I am sure, put down the words of General Secretary Jiang Zemin: "The counter-revolutionary revolt, which took place in early July in Beijing, was determined by the international and internal climate, and was inevitable."

The press conference added a few details to the new CPC leader's short biography which had portrayed him

meeting with workers, even queuing at workers' canteens. It turned out that, prior to the formation of the PRC, he himself had taken part in the student movement in Shanghai. An electrical engineer by education, the former First Secretary of the Shanghai City Party Committee speaks fluent English, and when parting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during his May visit to China, was even able to ask him about his Shanghai impressions in Russian, thus betraying his knowledge of yet another foreign language...

Let us hope that Jiang Zemin will break the sad traditions of recent Chinese history when the role of the second dignitary after the political leader tended to be fatally short-lived. this happened to the today's leader Deng Xiaoping, now 85, in the mid-1970s, to other very different politicians like Liu Shaoqi and Hu Yaobang, and now it is happening to Zhao Ziyang, 70, the retired General Secretary accused of supporting the riots and splitting the Party.

Only quite recently a forward looking reformer, who suffered in the "cultural revolution" and then skilfully implemented economic changes in Sichuan Province in the very heart of China, Zhao Ziyang has been included among the leaders of counter-revolutionary forces. As Premier of the State Council, he was a zealous support of "four modernizations" and of an open policy, who even wore European clothes to emphasize the new style. Today nespapers are concentrating on his meeting at the close of last year with an "archliberal American economist", and on the fact that, at an important moment after the riots had started, he went to play golf instead of attending an emergency meeting of the Politbureau. Finally, they are also talking about the six conditions which the square proposed for ending disorders: "troop withdrawal, an end to martial law, the resignation of Li Peng (Premier of the PRC State Council—V.L.), the retirement of Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun (the 82-year-old Chairman of the People's Republic of China—V.L.), a resumption of Zhao Ziyang's activities".

Addressing the Standing committee of the National People's Congress, Chen Xitong, the mayor of Beijing described the key moment when Zhao Ziyang, taking advantaged of the May 16 meeting with the Soviet leader "deliberately turned the spear of struggle against Comrade Deng Xiaoping", who officially holds only the post of Chairman of the PRC Military Council.' He said: "When meeting with the guest, Zhao Ziyang said at the very beginning: In the solution of the most important issues we still need Comrade Deng Xiaoping...In passing decisions on the most important issues we have constantly notified Deng Xiaoping and turned to him for advice.' He added that 'for the first time' he was making this CPC 'decision' public."

As the Mayor of Beijing said the day after a declaration appeared in the square stating: "The government has lost its responsibility and humaneness because a despot is vested with unlimited power..." The square shouted itself coarse: "Down with the policy of old men."

The retired general secretary's fate continues to be the source of keen interest for all journalists accredited in Beijing. Recently they were told that Zhao Ziyang was still a member of the Communist Party and that, during investigations, he had not been deprived of all material benefits.

Four months after his retirement Zhao Ziyang can only be seen, perhaps, in the cinema hall of the Museum of Military History of the People's Revolution, where a film about Tiananmen runs all day long for visitors. Here we see Zhao Ziyang speaking through a microphone to the crowd: his spectacles slipping down, the upper loop of his service jacket unbuttoned, young people stand close to him listening. Next to the cinema hall is a special exposition, at the entrance to the museum. The street is lined with charred trucks, buses, armoured carriers and tanks with pieces of street railings stuck between the tracks of their caterpillars, the remains of petrol bombs sticking out here and there. About a thousand military vehicles were set on fire and destroyed during the May-June events in Beijing, 120 busses were turned into barricades.

At the exhibition there are many servicemen, pupils and even organized groups of children of preschool age. On photos in different halls we see the leaders of the Union of Beijing Student (young people on a hunger strike sleeping under tents made of sheets) and soldiers who died putting down the revolt. The latter were honoured and the new title of "fighting men of the Republic". There's a lot of burned army equipment, and broken helmets. There are also samples of the weapons and rebels were armed with: incendiary bottles, pistols, knives, even a sabre. There is even a light Suzuki motorcycle—proof of foreign support for the revolt—used, apparently, by one of the youth leaders to "attack state bodies" and drive to enterprises and military units.

According to the official figures, more than 200 people, including 36 students, were killed and about 3,000 injured during the revolt. The exhibition's organizers believe that Dazibao (leaflets), liberal newspapers and documents—everything that used to stir young minds—are irrefutable evidence against the advocates of "bourgeois liberalization". Perhaps the main advocate is the well known astrophysicist Fang Lizhi who, together with his wife Li Shuqing, is now hiding in the American Embassy. On one stand is magnified proof of his guilt: a letter, dated January 1989, requesting amnesty for the editor of the bourgeois-democratic magazine Search. Fang Lizhi's appeal was followed by another 43 from leading cultural workers.

...Accompanied by a noisy crowd of children, we come down the stairs of the museum. In the hall we catch the glance of a familiar face—the moustached generalissimo is seeing us off from a large portrait.

Months have passed since 1 a.m. on June 4, when the troops entered Tiananmen Square. Months of apparent lull when only the soldiers standing to attention under coloured umbrellas at the entrances to bridges, the armed guards in the capital's main square where the Statue of Liberty built by the students has been replaced by a group sculpture of a soldier, a worker, a peasant and a girl student, remind one of the martial law. Far more serious are the internal processes currently underway in the country under the flag of combatting "bourgeois liberalization".

It is interesting to note that, when Zhao Ziyang was promoted to the first post in the CPC Central Committee two years ago, his predecessor, Hu Yaobang, came forward with biting self-criticism accusing himself presisely of not having been firm enough to repulse "bourgeoise liberalization".

It looks as if the disrupted precarious balance of political and economic reforms came to a head most painfully during and after the events in Tiananmen Square.

Deng Xiaoping's well-known thought about combining the political and economic reforms—"The colour of the cat doesn't matter...so long as it is good at catching mice"—is, I believe, not quite relevant today. The cat's colour, or rather, world outlook is coming to the fore.

Various commissions charged with upholding discipline are working to the full. The stress is on patriotic education, in which Mao Zedong's life and ideas have a special part to play. Going abroad is now directly linked to a person's loyalty. All citizens are duty bound to expose counter-revolutionary rebels and inform the authorities about them. Sometimes rewards are given.

The impression is that the threat of "bourgeois liberalization" has still ben exaggerated somewhat. They consider some Soviet films—"Tomorrow There Was War" amd "Little Vera"—to have traces of it and they have been banned.

"There is no need to look for labels," I was told in Harbin by Song Minbiao, dean of the Russian language department of the local pedagogical institute. "Our youth has most likely simply been misled: during their short lives they have witnessed both the remains of the 'cultural revolution' and its direct opposite—the open door policy. The YCL got lost, even the Party committees adopted an unclear position in relation to the youth. And it is not just the students alone who lost their bearings."

While passing harsh judgement on the participants in the Tiananmen events, it seems to have been admitted in Beijing that their sharp criticism of the bureaucracy was not altogether groundless. A growing wave of leaders are subjecting themselves to self-criticism at meetings. And this is not an easy thing—there is nothing worse for a Chinese than to "lose face" in public. A Chinese driver or cyclist will agree to any fine rather than be subjected to a public condemnation penalty.

New rules are now being drafted in Beijing for the setting up of an incorruptible government. For the time being, as Li Peng, Premier of the PRC State Council, has said the children of members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and of leading State Council members have been told to leave the companies involved in finance; posh imported cars for the top leadership have already been replaced with ordinary cars; special food supplies to leaders of central institutions have been cancelled; the State Council has laid down special rules concerning trips abroad for officials.

Criticism of presumptuous officials of the apparat appears sporadically in different publications. Some report the dismissal of the governor of the free economic zone on Hainan island whose son got fat in the car trade and whose wife sold a house for a large profit. Another paper writes that in Shanghai alone about 1,500 criminal cases involving bribe-taking and other economic crimes have already been investigated this year, and that leading executives have been implicated in 32 of them. Recently it became known that the State Council had confiscated the luxurious building which China's Ministry of the Light Industry had built for itself overstepping the budget estimate threefold. Finally, a recent decision has cancelled leave for career officials.

Delivering blows at liberals and high-handed functionaries, the Chinese leaders must understand how all these developments are sized up by the business world abroad, for which political stability is the guarantee of economic rapprochement with the PRC. The country still remembers well how, some 30 years ago, political slogans like "The class struggle every day!" went hand in hand with semistarvation and a desire to outstrip the world in steel smelting by setting up a little blast furnace in each peasant household. The past decade has clearly shown that the economic engine only works according to its own rules, and that nothing good ever comes of announcing as the PRC did during the "Great Leap Forward": "3 years of shock labour—10,000 years of happiness". In the case of the Soviet Union, the five-year plans were called "decisive". From one of the first statements by the new General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, you understood that an unchangeable economic and foreign policy was being adopted.

True, seen at close range, the shock in Hong Kong is evidently stronger than the confidence in the new leadership. It is common knowledge that, in 1997, Britain will return Hong Kong to China. From that moment on a unique experiment will be started by Deng Xiaoping: "One state—two social systems". After Tiananmen, says the London financial Times, the fear of transition has gripped everyone in Hong Kong. The forecasts for next year: 60,000 emigres. The example of the Australian Consulate is given. Before the events, it received 80 applications for emigration daily. During the events in China the number reached 1,700.

...We were flying from Beijing one sunny day. In the morning preparations for the holiday were in full swing

in Tiananmen: dancing pairs—3,000 young boys and girls—were rehearsing. The soldiers looked superfluous. You obviously needed to know the inner thinking to understand the official conclusion concerning the tragedy in the Chinese capital: the onset of this storm "was inevitable and did not depend on people's will".

Northeast Asia

Japanese Defense White Paper Viewed

PM0311150589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Nov 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Rodin under the rubric "Facts Against Lies": "Counter to Reality"]

[Text] The Soviet Union's course toward reducing military tension in Asia and the Pacific Ocean is meeting with support in the countries of that region. The statements of a number of statesmen, politicians, and public figures assess highly the USSR's specific proposals for confidence building in the military sphere. Thus, the USSR's desire to follow the principle of defense sufficiency and the structural changes in the Soviet Armed Forces connected with it and also the unilaterally adopted commitments to reduce its troops and naval forces in the Far East and to restrict the region of its military activity did not go unnoticed. All these measures are rightly assessed as practical steps by the Soviet Union to reduce the level of military confrontation in the Asian and Pacific region.

Under these conditions the position adopted by official Tokyo, set forth in detail in the "White Paper on Questions of Japan's defense" for 1989, prepared by the country's military department, cannot fail to cause surprise. It emerges from this book that the Japanese leadership is continuing to rely on the stereotypes of the time of confrontation based on the thesis of the "Soviet military threat." A thesis based on the deliberate distortion of the truth about the USSR's military policy.

Thus, for instance, the Soviet leadership's decision on the adoption of a defensive doctrine is presented as "another propaganda ruse not backed up by specific measures" and the occasional rehearsal of training tasks in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk by Soviet Pacific Fleet forces consisting of 5-9 ships and the flight of Soviet aircraft here are presented as "preparation for acts of aggression against Japan." The presence of Soviet troops on the Kuril islands is viewed as "a show of military strength and an attempt to bring strong-arm pressure to bear on Japan." Yet, and this is known even in Japan, the subunits stationed there have no offensive weapons and their combat potential is limited to the minimum level necessary for defense.

The list of charges against the Soviet Union ends with the categorical assertion that "the USSR presents and will continue to present a threat to Japan."

The charges levelled in the "White Paper" are so absurd that even the Japanese mass media immediately indicated the true aims of the authors of this document.. They are justifying the need for the further retention of confrontation with the USSR and distracting public attention from trends which are being manifested increasingly obviously in the current and long-term plans for Japan's military building.

What draws the attention primarily here is the fact that the Japanese leadership has officially adopted the so-called "forward defense concept" which will be placed at the basis of the building of the Armed Forces for the nineties. It provides for the delivery of preemptive strikes and also the waging of "defensive" operations as far as possible from the Japanese islands. It is planned to equip the troops and naval forces with the relevant arms systems. Foreign military specialists consider it entirely feasible in this connection that in the nineties Japan may acquire new missile weapons surpassing in range those models currently in service and also tanker aircraft and aircraft-carrying ships.

The plans to further strengthen the Northern Army stationed on Hokkaido, which already includes 4 of the 13 ground force divisions, speak for themselves. All tactical missile launchers and virtually all self-propelled artillery are also concentrated there. By the early 90's it is planned to deploy about 700 tanks on the island, to complete the infantry divisions' transformation to mechanized and motorized divisions, and to embark on the equipping of the northern Army with cruise missiles. In addition every year in the course of exercises, tasks are rehearsed for the emergency reinforcement of group troops on Hokkaido by shipping formations from other parts of the country. To transport personnel and equipment wide use is made of tank loading ships, freight and passenger ferries, and military transport aircraft. In fact, these exercises are used to rehearse sea and air assault operations.

There has been a considerable increase in the activeness of Japanese aircraft and naval forces which constantly patrol the zones of international gulfs (the Korea, Tsugaru, and La Perouse gulfs). The number of flights by combat aircraft to intercept foreign aircraft flying in airspace close to the Japanese islands is also increasing (up to 900 intercepts a year). The Japanese air force and naval exercises are becoming increasingly intensive and extensive, particularly the annual summing up [itogovyye] exercises and virtually the entire personnel of Japan's Air Force and Navy are involved in them. According to the White Paper, during these exercises last year about 66,000 servicemen, 660 combat aircraft, and 140 warships and cutters were "under arms." The region of the exercises encompassed the entire territory of the Japanese islands and also the airspace and sea space directly bordering on the Soviet Union.

The Japanese newspaper ASAHI has reported that Japan took an active part in the U.S. Armed Forces' "Pacex-89" strategic exercise in the Pacific and Indian oceans,

the largest in the postwar period. The newspaper asserts that the scenario for the joint actions provided for "the delivery of strikes against Sakhalin and Maritime Kray and also for a blockade on Kamchatka and the occupation of the Kuril islands." It is reported that to rehearse the latter task a joint exercise of Japanese troops and the third U.S. Marines division was carried out on a Hokkaido firing range.

The facts cited attest convincingly that the orientation of the military policies of the USSR and Japan is so far diametrically opposite. The Soviet leadership, having announced its adoption of a defensive doctrine, is consistently implementing measures in accordance with the commitments it has taken. Under these conditions Japan's ruling circles are basing their military building on a concept which a spokesman for the Japanese leadership has called "defensive aggression" and in accordance with its spirit are also reorganizing the training of the national Armed Forces. The buildup of military preparations accompanied by an annual increase of 5-6 percent in military expenditure (in 1989 it totalled about $30 billion) is giving rise to an increase in critical sentiments directed against the government within the country and is also intensifying guardedness in the countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia.

Japan To Buy Foreign Land for Army Exercises

LD0611093689 Moscow TASS in English 0928 GMT 6 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo November 6 TASS—Japan's National Defence Agency has decided to explore the possibility of buying vast tracts of land abroad to use them as exercise ground.

Land is necessary for gunnery practice and exercises to war-game operations involving armoured troops, the agency's spokesman said.

Explaining the need for such a step, the agency's military officer, who wished to remain anonymous, referred to the acute shortage of land in Japan.

The land shortage does not enable the country's Armed Forces to hold full-scale exercises with the use of artillery and missile systems. He said the possibility of live-ammunition firing is ruled out completely.

The largest practice ground which is now at the disposal of the Japanese "self-defence forces" is located at Yasusubetsu on Hokkaido Island and is 18 kilometers long.

At the same time the range of Nike U.S. surface-to-air missiles which are in service with the Japanese Armed Forces is 130 kilometers.

In the past the Japanese Government in such cases applied for help to the United States on whose territory field firing exercises were held, the newspaper YOMIURI SHIMBUN points out.

However, what is relevant now is not so much the holding of full scale exercises of land forces as the country's capability to develop its own long-range weapons on the basis of the newest Japanese technologies, the newspaper writes. It is necessary to have vast military ranges to test them.

The proposal to begin to purchase land abroad for the agency's needs is expected to become one of the basic aspects of Japan's new defence construction programme, the implementation of which is due to begin in 1991.

According to a tentative draft programme adopted by Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu four days ago, the main emphasis in the 1990's will be on a qualitative build-up of the might of the Japanese Army and on providing it with the newest types of weapons and combat hardware.

Soviet Peace Delegation Visits Japan

OW0511083289 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 27 Oct 89

[Text] Listeners: A delegation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace [SCDP] is staying in Tokyo now. Arriving in Japan by the Soviet passenger vessel, (Mikhail Shorov), the 53-member delegation is made up of representatives from the Committees for the Defense of Peace from various republics, several deputies to the Congress of the People's Deputies, and peace activists. The delegation is led by Ms Alla Masevich, noted Soviet astronomer and deputy chairman of the SCDP.

The delegation visited the Diet yesterday morning, and held talks with dietmen engaged in the disarmament campaign. At the meeting, Yasui, vice speaker of the Lower House, spoke highly of the Soviet activities in the international arena of strenthening overall peace and freeing mankind from the danger of nuclear weapons. He also maintained that the exchanges between Japanese and Soviet defenders of peace should be expanded and stressed the importance of concentrating all the recent nationwide public opinions in their efforts to settle this issue.

On the vessel, consultations were held with activists of the Gensuikin [the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs affiliated with the Japan Socialist Party], a noted antiwar organization in Japan. Useful views on the antiwar issues in both the Soviet Union and Japan were frankly exchanged during the consultations. Moreover, at the request of the Japanese side, talks were given on the development of perestroyka in the Soviet Union as well as on the activities of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies.

Speaking in an interview with Radio Moscow, Mr (Miyavenov), people's deputy from Kirighris City and member of the USSR Academy of Medical Science, stressed the usefulness of such frank exchanges of views with the people defending peace as well as the important role of the people's diplomacy in building a safe world.

Soviet Economic Delegation Arrives in Japan

OW0511063589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0623 GMT 5 Nov 89

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 5 (KYODO)—A Soviet economic delegation arrived in Tokyo Sunday to have talks with Japanese Government officials on managing the Japanese economy.

During its 10-day visit to Japan, the 10-member delegation, led by Communist Party official Anatoliy Milyukov, will discuss Japanese Government management with officials from the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Labor Ministry and the Economic Planning Agency.

Discussions will center on how the Japanese Government guides private firms and how the government cooperates with them on Japan's economic development.

Japanese officials say they hope the visit will contribute to economic restructuring in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet delegation will return to the Soviet Union on November 14.

Article on Soviet-Japanese Economic Links

OW0411051989 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 2 Nov 89

["Summary" of article "Prospects for Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Japan," published in the 5th issue of PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST, a journal of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and written by economist Kazuo Ogawa, deputy director of the Japanese Institute of Soviet and East European Economy]

[Text] The changes in Soviet-Japanese economic relations during the mid-1980's can be characterized by a shift toward stagnation. The deterioration in the international situation at that time had seriously obstructed the favorable development of Soviet-Japanese relations. In addition, various problems arose because the bilateral dialogue had become difficult as a result of the different positions taken by both sides. At that time, Japan's exports were obstructed as an inevitable consequence of intensified restrictions imposed by the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Export Control to Communist Areas] led by the United States.

The development of Soviet-Japanese trade also was obstructed because of economic and (?business) factors, including changes in Japan's industrial structure, the balance of demand and supply of raw materials and energy for basic industries, and the yen's appreciation. Despite this, however, there was a rapid recovery in the amount of both exports and imports in Soviet-Japanese trade last year. The total amount of transactions increased 20.5 percent last year, as a result of which Japan now ranks as the USSR's third biggest trading partner among the Western advanced industrialized nations, behind only the FRG and Finland.

With regard to the prospects for Soviet-Japanese trade, it is anticipated that there also will be a steady increase this year. Furthermore, Japan is expected to increase its imports from the Soviet Union under conditions of a continuing growth in the Japanese economy.

After writing the above in the Soviet journal, Japanese economist Kazuo Ogawa continued:

At present, the Soviet Union's relations with Western nations, which are now based on realism, have become increasingly constructive. Western nations have welcomed perestroyka as well as Soviet leader General Secretary Gorbachev's new approach toward diplomacy, regarding them as earnest principles. For example, the United States will have to reach a disarmament accord with the Soviet Union because of the former's current goal of reducing its national debt. Thus, the political confrontation between the two systems, which has obstructed bilateral trade, has been eased to a large degree although not completely eliminated. As the tension has been relaxed progressively, there is a great possibility that the U.S. Government also will relax COCOM restrictions.

An atmosphere is taking shape conducive for Japanese-Soviet dialogue. Despite its position of not separating political from economic issues, the Japanese Government should take into consideration the Soviet Union's great interest in Japan's economic capabilities.

Since General Secretary Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, new prospects have opened up for bilateral trade and economic relations, and priority has been given to the comprehensive development of the Soviet Far East. Meanwhile, importance also has been attached to progress in exchanges with Japan, China, and other nations in the Asian-Pacific region. On the other hand, as indicated by the ROK, the Asian-Pacific region, the NIES [newly industrialized economies] in particular, has started to expand its contacts with the Soviet Union in such fields as trade and economy.

Because such changes should be welcomed even merely from the viewpoint of ensuring security in northeastern Asia, Japan must deal with them in a positive way. I believe Japan is capable of assuming the role of promoting the development of the region's multinational cooperation. First, the concept of forming an economic zone in the Sea of Japan is taking concrete shape. Japan, the ROK, and the DPRK will participate in this economic zone. There are now greater possibilities for developing this zone, for carrying out the natural resources development project, and for promoting not only bilateral but multinational cooperation in a smooth way. Such cooperation can be carried out by starting joint ventures and by establishing the compensation system.

After writing the above, and expressing the opinion that to put such cooperation on the right track, the Japanese and Soviet experiences in jointly developing the forestry resources in the Soviet Far East will be of use, Japanese economist Kazuo Ogawa states the following views:

It is expected that the concept of forming a special economic zone, as suggested by the Soviet Union, will be brought up for discussion. If these plans are realized, they would be connected with large-scale projects within the framework of multinational cooperation and naturally would be related to Japanese-Soviet cooperation. The opening of Vladivostok would serve as stimulus to the development of international cooperation in the Sea of Japan area and it would strengthen that port city's role in serving as the central city for all of northeast Asia.

Not all energy should be concentrated on promoting large-scale cooperative projects; efforts also should be made to promote many small-scale projects. In addition, coastal trade is expected to expand as the central government gives local governments more and more authority in the process of perestroyka. Coastal trade has thus far been limited mainly to exchanges of surplus commodities and accounts for only a small percentage of the total amount of trade.

Then, in the final part of his report published in the PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST, Mr Kazuo Ogawa touches on the problems concerning joint ventures and writes:

The Soviet Union has made very positive proposals to Japan for establishing joint ventures, and the two sides are now negotiating on dozens of such projects. However, Japanese companies have, as usual, taken a reserved position. Timber processing, fisheries, agriculture, and tourism can be cited as industries for which joint ventures between Japan and the Soviet Union can be promoted. The Soviet Union has fallen far behind advanced Western nations with regard to the tourism industry. At the same time, the issue of leisure will become increasingly important taking into consideration the need for improving the Soviet people's living standards. In response to frequent requests from Western companies, the Soviet Government has relaxed the conditions for the activities of joint ventures. Despite this, however, the conditions should be relaxed even further when the future of such cooperation is taken into consideration.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Philippine Workers Protest U.S. Bases Presence

LD0611065989 Moscow TASS in English 0649 GMT 6 Nov 89

[Text] Manila November 6 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Sergey Bogdanov:

A number of industrial enterprises in the Philippines downed tools today to protest against the U.S. continuing military presence on the Philippine territory.

Representatives of the Progressive Trade Union Associations of the Philippines stated that hundreds of working people are expected to join the strike in the next few days. The action of protest will be the broadest in scope on November 10, the date for a Washington meeting between Philippine President Corazon Aquino and U.S. President George Bush.

Approximately 70,000 Philippine workers and employees all over the country are expected to hold mass political strikes and numerous meetings on that day to demonstrate the Philippine people's firm intention to prevent the preservation of the U.S. bases on the territory of the archipelago.

These actions of protest against the American military presence in the Philippines are sponsored by the May First Movement trade union, supported by dozens of progressive trade union organisations of the country.

Thousands of Philippine working people will be on strike on the day of the Philippine-U.S. meeting to say no to prolongation of the Philippine-American agreement on bases, which betrays the interests of the Philippine people, Leto Villar, May First Movement secretary-general, said.

Possible Referendum on Bases in Philippines Viewed

HK2010031589 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 19 Oct 89

[Commentary by Anatoliy Aleksandrov]

[Text] The debate continues in the Philippines about the possibility of holding a referendum on the future of the American military bases in the country, as the present agreement ends in 1991.

In response to a proposal made by Antonio Cuenco, Speaker Pro Tempore of the Lower House, legislators endorsed a resolution calling for a national referendum to be held (?before) negotiations between the Philippines and the United States start in December. Wide-ranging talks concerning the military bases were begun long ago, during which suggestions to hold a referendum were raised. [Words indistinct] support for which has been proven by the votes cast by the House of Representatives.

President Corazon Aquino, for her part, announced her support for such a plan. However, members of the Senate hold a different view on the matter. The proposal for a referendum was raised after the Senate declared it would not ratify any agreement entered into by the Aquino Government.

Many analysts believe that the [words indistinct], hence the opposing viewpoints among the senators and congressmen about the future of the American military bases in the Philippines.

Meanwhile, many people say that the Senate will be unable to secure two-thirds of the vote required to ratify an agreement on the military bases. Already, out of 23 members of the Senate, 12 have declared their opposition to the bases' retention. They do not want the Pentagon to have bases in the country, since the presence of the bases highlights the Philippines' loss of sovereignty.

There has been much talk about all the material benefits derived from the United States for allowing them to use the military bases. Those people who oppose the presence of the bases discount warnings about a loss of revenue, declaring that what will mainly be affected if the bases go is the region's balance of power. This issue will be addressed if the United States responds to the Soviet Union's suggestion that it give up its bases in Subic Bay and Clark Field, if the Soviet facility in Cam Ranh Bay is dismantled. The issue of the balance of power need not enter the picture since what is important is that the Filipinos' material interests will be served if these facilities are utilized for peaceful purposes. Already the Aquino Government has said it is studying the possibility of fulfilling such a scheme.

Aquino's Upcoming Visit to U.S. Analyzed

HK0611054989 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Commentary by Vassily Harkov]

[Text] President Corazon Aquino has started her trip to North America where she will visit Canada, after which she will also head for the United States. This trip highlights an issue of great importance to the Philippines, one which affects the entire country and will be the topic of negotiations between the Presidents of the Philippines and the United States.

In this regard, the MANILA BULLETIN has warned that the country's present financial and economic condition calls for new foreign loans. Philippine officials are themselves looking for assistance from international financial institutes like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. [Words indistinct] assistance provided by the United States and Japan has been called a Mini-Marshall Plan. Such a plan to support government programs [words indistinct] implemented by means of new investments.

Hopes for such assistance can be gleaned from the speech of President Corazon Aquino, given on the eve of her visit to the United States. She acknowledged that despite a hopeful prognosis, the country's economy remains problematic. We can therefore say that her visit will endeavor to open doors to let in big investors. Another aim of President Aquino's trip is to see if she can obtain some debt relief for the country's foreign debt which amounts to $29 billion and consumes up to 40 percent of the national budget.

The situation at present is very serious. The Central Bank of the Philippines is seeking ways to lighten the debt load by buying foreign currency from private commercial banks but these will only increase the debt burden.

Philippine-American trade relations are of great importance because they affect the country's financial condition. The U.S., next to Japan, largely controls supplies of the raw materials required by the Philippines and also has a say about that country's finished products. The United States also [words indistinct] one-third [words indistinct] of Philippine trade. To date, trade between both countries continues to be discussed, but mainly for Washington's benefit. This is not the first time that the American Congress has imposed stringent protectionist laws on various products from the Philippines and the ASEAN countries.

This is what has also happened with U.S. campaigns which [words indistinct] dumping coconut oil. There is also the problem involving the sugar quota. Such protectionist moves by Washington are akin to sneak attacks and should not be allowed to continue. Even textiles and other products made in the Philippines are similarly affected.

If we study this situation closely, it can be clearly seen that Washington is employing disreputable economic tactics to increase political pressure on Manila. In truth, if this succeeds, obviously it may backfire since the United States needs these products. [sentence as heard]

A more important issue for discussion involves the retention of the American military bases. These Pentagon bases can continue to operate until September 1991, when the agreement expires. So we can see that the argument which the Americans will use is the one involving money to be able to extend their use of the territory involved.

It is abundantly clear that U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Nicholas Platt has been ordered to warn Filipinos that American businessmen may not be able to fulfill their obligations. Analysts say that the coming negotiations between the Philippines and the United States, which is being called a summit meeting, will discuss financial and economic problems along with the problems involving the military bases. The publicity on this is aimed at influencing the decision on an agreement to be hammered out at the meeting this coming December. It is time for Filipinos to make a responsible decision.

Soviet Foreign Policy in Asia-Pacific Explained

BK0111054589 Bangkok THE NATION in English 1 Nov 89 p 8

["Yuri Akhrimenko is executive secretary of the Soviet National Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee. He contributed this comment to THE NATION."—THE NATION headline]

[Text] The Soviet Union has in the past few years appreciably improved its political image in Asia and the Pacific, thanks to its resolute measures and bold political initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and stability in that vast region. Economically, however, the Soviet Union is not yet considered a partner capable of taking an active part in regional cooperation.

For many businessmen, politicians and public figures the USSR remains terra incognita from the point of view of its economic possibilities, and the Soviet share in the trade turnover in Asia and the Pacific is a mere 1 percent.

The Soviet leadership cannot put up with this situation. It strives to make the USSR a full-fledged participant in all the processes that are taking place in the region. This agrees with the fundamental principles of the present Soviet foreign policy.

Appearing before the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet (Parliament) on October 23, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said that the creation of conditions for the USSR's participation in the international division of labour, including its membership in international financial and economic organizations, was one of the most important directions of his ministry's activities.

As regards the Asia Pacific region, the Soviet Union has announced its desire to join the conference on Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. It already participates in the activities of its working groups. In the spring of 1988, it created a national committee for Asia-Pacific economic cooperation (Sovnapec)—a public organization uniting prominent politicans, public figures, economists, political scientists and economic executives. The committee's high prestige is borne out by the fact that its first leader was academician Yevgeni Primakov, who has how been elected chairman of the Council of the Union (one of the two houses of the Soviet parliament) and alternate member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

Speaking at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev came out for promoting more dynamic foreign economic ties in the Soviet regions of Siberia and the Far East. He said that the measures which were being elaborated in this respect could very well be called a "favourable regime."

Over the past 12 months the Soviet Government has adopted certain measures to make it easier for the USSR to participate in the division of labour in the Asia-Pacific region. Soviet enterprises, organizations and cooperative businesses have received the right of direct access to the outside market. During this autumn, according to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, over 10,000 enterprises decided to use this right. New customs tariffs are being elaborated.

All restrictions on the size of foreign capital involvement in joint ventures have been lifted and a favourable climate for investment is being created. The adoption of the law on property, which is currently being discussed in the Supreme Soviet, will also contribute to furthering the goal. The draft of the law provides for the existence in the USSR of different forms of property.

Favourable conditions are being created for joint ventures in the Soviet Far East. Such enterprises do not pay any income tax for the first three years since the acquisition of their declared profits. In the subsequent years, the level of taxes does not exceed 10 per cent. Small wonder that the number of joint ventures has lately increased four-fold in the Far East. As of August 1, 1989, there were 26 jointly-owned companies there, including nine co-owned with Japan, six with the United States, three with North Korea and two with China.

Zones of joint enterprises, whose concept is being actively discussed in the USSR, can also contribute to greater openness of the Soviet economy and its broader involvement in the system of world economic ties. Soviet experts and scientists say that similar zones in Soviet territory are even more promising than in other countries where they have already proved their value, because the Soviet Union is distinguished by a higher level of scientific and technological development and personnel training and has a solid scientific potential. Unlike the situation in China, in the Soviet Union such zones won't be closed enclaves. One of their tasks will be the drawing of surrounding regions into the international division of labour.

It has already been decided to create a zone of free enterprise in Nakhodka, a port on the USSR's Pacific coast. Experts say this zone should be based on foreign technology (with the participation of Soviet technology, too) and oriented to the extraction and processing of natural resources. It goes without saying that Nakhodka is to become a big trade and financial centre.

A number of Soviet scientists, some of whom are people's deputies of the USSR (parliamentarians), suggest giving such zones the status of self-governed territories with mininum influence from the centre. They say that Moscow is expected only to give consent to the creation of these zones and set the general principles of their performance. All the internal economic matters are to be solved by a mixed Soviet-foreign administrative economic corporation capable of flexible reaction and adaptation to the standards of the world market.

SRV Premier on Meaning of Great October Victory

PM0611102189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 89 Second Edition p 6

[Article by Do Muoi, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the SRV Council of Ministers: "Along the Path of Great October"]

[Text] Hanoi—Mankind is on the threshold of the last decade of the 20th century—a century full of events that

have rocked the globe. First and foremost among these was the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution carried out in Russia under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party headed by the brilliant leader V.I. Lenin.

November 7 1917 marked a great turnaround in world history. It opened up a bright new era—an era of the transition of power to the working people, who started to decide their destiny themselves. From a specter stalking Europe, communism became from the middle of the last century not just a recognized force but also a real social system in the world's largest country. It then turned into the world socialist system with a population of more than 1.5 billion people living on one-fourth of the world's surface and producing more than one-third of world output. It has become the faith and hope of the working class and working people on all continents. History will preserve forever the feats of the Soviet people, who opened up a new era—the era of the triumph of socialism on a worldwide scale.

The Great October victory inspired colonial peoples to struggle for liberation from colonial imperialist fetters and for independence and freedom. The onward march of time does not diminish the greatness of the lesson of the gains and defense of socialist power and the building of the new society which Great October left us. The main essence of this lesson is the leading role of the Communist Party, the combat vanguard of the working class, which plays a leading role in the modern era; the firm alliance between the working class and the peasantry, which is the core of the unification of the broadest people's masses; the breaking down of the old state machine; and the creation of a new state able to rout internal and external enemies, to build a new society, to defend and develop revolutionary gains, and to develop genuine patriotism in conjunction with proletarian internationalism, whose slogan was the appeal: "Workers and oppressed peoples of the world unite!"

Soviet Communists and the Soviet people have proved through the blood they have shed the vitality and correctness of Marxist-Leninist teaching. "...We are entitled to be proud," V.I. Lenin wrote, "and we are proud of the fact that it was our happy lot to start building the Soviet state, to start this new era of world history—an era of the dominion of a new class oppressed in all the capitalist countries and striding everywhere toward a new life, victory over the bourgeoisie, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the salvation of humanity from the yoke of capital and imperialist wars."

Owing to the greatness and depth of the influence exerted by October, the Soviet state was subject from the very first days of its emergence and the entire period of its existence to wild attacks by internal and external enemies who used various methods—from slander to blockades and isolation, from sabotage to armed intervention and large-scale aggressive wars. However, these perfidious schemes and cruel actions by the enemy were resolutely rebuffed and thwarted by the heroic Soviet people.

The Soviet people paid a high price for defending the gains of the October Revolution. Losing 20 million of its best sons and daughters who showed supreme revolutionary heroism, the Soviet people routed the millions-strong hordes of German fascists and Japanese militarists, defended their fatherland's freedom and independence, saved the world's peoples from fascist enslavement, created favorable conditions for other countries' peoples to carry out national democratic and socialist revolutions, and promoted the rapid downfall of the colonial system and the weakening of imperialism. This most vivid feat will never fade in mankind's memory.

Suffering huge human and material losses during World War II—the cruelest war in history—the Soviet people again showed their creative talent and unprecedented courage, healed the wounds of war in a short period, ensured the country's further development, strengthened defense, eliminated the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons, and achieved military-strategic parity with the United States, thereby destroying imperialism's plans to use nuclear weapons to intimidate the world's peoples. Moreover, the Soviet Union was the first country to explore space, initiating the era of man's exploration of the infinite reaches of the cosmos for the sake of people's happiness.

Despite their own difficulties and privations, the Soviet people have always been ready to help other peoples in their struggle for independence and the building of a new life. The slogan "Peace for the peoples!", which was brandished by Great October and subsequently implemented by the CPSU and the Soviet Government and people, became a banner uniting innumerable detachments of supporters of peace and the antiwar movement for disarmament. The preservation of peace for the almost 5 decades since the war is linked with the existence and all-around growth of the Soviet Union and the socialist community and with their unflagging struggle for peace and international cooperation. The present development of international relations in the conditions of peaceful coexistence is the direct result of this decisive factor.

The Soviet Union, as the first country to embark on the path of creating a new socioeconomic formation, is constantly questing and experimenting in the interests of improving socialism. In its more than 70-year history the Soviet Union has repeatedly carried out reforms on a socialist basis. The switch from war communism to the new economic policy pursued under V.I. Lenin's direct leadership is a model of the flexibility of communist policy.

In the interests of more fully utilizing the advantages inherent in socialism the Soviet people are today pursuing perestroyka, which was begun and directed by the

CPSU and is profoundly revolutionary in nature. The main content of perestroyka is the renewal of the structure of production in line with the demands of scientific and technical progress; the bringing about of radical change in the administrative mechanism by eliminating the administrative-edict method of economic management; the increasingly extensive utilization of economic levers, particularly commodity-money relations; the granting of autonomy to entrepreneurial production and local enterprises; the galvanization of external economic relations; the strengthening of socialist democracy; and the enhancement of the role of the soviets so as to bring about "more socialism and more democracy," as M.S. Gorbachev put it. Perestroyka has to make difficult quests. On the one hand, it has awakened the creative initiative of the people's masses while on the other hand it has encountered considerable difficulties and tests linked with the consequences of the previous period and the problems that have emerged during the experiment.

As close comrades and friends of the Soviet people, the Vietnamese people are attentively monitoring the processes of perestroyka and express great hope that Soviet Communists and the Soviet people will overcome all obstacles, successfully complete perestroyka, and give the country new impetus for further progress and the enhancement of the role and place in the world of the first and most powerful socialist state.

Solidarity and friendship with the Soviet Union are profoundly rooted in the consciousness of each Vietnamese Communist and each Vietnamese. The Vietnamese people's revolutionary cause has always been linked with the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Great October, the strengthening of the Soviet Union, and the selfless aid provided by the CPSU and the Soviet people. Reflecting these ideas held by the Vietnamese people, Ho Chi Minh said: "Traveling the path indicated by the great Lenin, the path of the October Revolution, the Vietnamese people have won enormous victories. That is why it has such a deep sense of devotion and gratitude to the glorious October Revolution, the great Lenin, and the Soviet people."

President Ho Chi Minh was one of V.I. Lenin's best pupils. Having learned the ideas of Great October, he passed them on to Vietnamese Communists and the Vietnamese people and strengthened the deep feelings of friendship between the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples.

During the decades of revolutionary struggle for national liberation and the building of socialism, the Vietnamese people have always received sincere support and help from the CPSU and the Soviet people. The Soviet Union's selfless and effective assistance has been a decisive factor in building and defending socialist Vietnam. The Soviet Union gives Vietnam very considerable economic aid. In the current 5-Year Plan this aid is twice as much as it was in the previous 5-Year Plan, and in the previous 5-Year Plan it was more than in the previous 20 years put together. The USSR exports to Vietnam many goods and articles which are of decisive importance for the Vietnamese people's production and life: 100 percent of oil products, cotton, and cast iron, 95 percent of motor vehicles, and 70-80 percent of rolled steel, fertilizers, and nonferrous metals.

It is important that the Soviet Union helped Vietnam to build hundreds of installations which are today the basis for socialism's material and technical base. The Uong Bi Heat and Electric Power Station and the Thach Ban Hydroelectric Power Station, which are already in operation, along with the Pha Lai Heat and Electric Power Station and the Hoa Binh and Chian [name as transliterated] Hydroelectric Power Stations currently under construction ensure the successful functioning of Vietnam's economy. There is not a single sector of our republic which does not have a facility built and commissioned with the Soviet Union's help. Tens of thousands of people, including scientific and technical workers, economic cadres, and skilled workers have been trained in the USSR or with the help of Soviet specialists in Vietnam. This is a valuable foundation for the cause of building socialism on Vietnamese soil.

These specific figures and actions conceal the selflessness of the Soviet people, who have always considered and continue to consider aid to the Vietnamese people in building and defending the motherland to be a call from the heart. Imbued with the folk wisdom that if you drink water you should remember the source, the Vietnamese people are grateful to the CPSU, the Soviet Government, and Soviet people for their immense help.

Our countries are now entering a new period of renewal in Vietnam and perestroyka in the Soviet Union. In line with the demands of this period the leaders of the two countries' parties and governments have reached unanimous agreement on the renewal of the forms and mechanism of cooperation between Vietnam and the USSR. On the basis of the general trend in the international division of labor together with the expansion and enhancement of the effectiveness of such traditional forms of cooperation as exchanges of goods, the granting of credit for the construction of projects, cadre training, and other measures, our countries have started introducing new forms of cooperation—production sharing based on customer-supplied raw materials, output shipments on a barter basis, joint ventures, and integration. Apart from the basic interstate agreement, which serves as the legal basis for this new direction, our countries' sectors, local organs, and enterprises have concluded a number of agreements and contracts on cooperation in the sphere of machine building, the textile industry, clothing and footwear manufacture, oil and gas extraction, and so forth. Thus, in practice cooperation has come about at three levels—the government, sector, and local levels. Despite the fact that the implementation of these new forms and the mechanism of cooperation are just beginning, they are already demonstrating their great potential and effectiveness, since they involve the interest and responsibility of both sides, provide incentives for producers, and create favorable conditions for output sales. This form helps Vietnam to make fuller use

of its existing production capacity and rich labor resources, to earn funds for the acquisition of equipment and raw materials, to better meet the needs of the Soviet market, and to create possibilities for transactions with the USSR.

Like any new undertaking, this new direction of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam is going through the stage of questing and experimentation, gradually overcoming the obstacles in the way of the further development and improvement of efficiency. Initial difficulties stemming from the different level of development in our two countries, the different forms and levels of reform, the economic management mechanism, and particularly the level of the renewal of planning and the introduction of commodity-money relations are inevitable on this path.

However, these difficulties are wholly surmountable, since the course of the two parties and governments is aimed at constantly strengthening Vietnamese-Soviet cooperation. In turn, Vietnam doggedly and consistently advocates the strengthening and expansion of all-around cooperation with the Soviet Union—its greatest and truest friend and, at the same time, its most important partner. Our desire for the broader development of ties is unswerving, and our opportunities continue to grow. Both countries should strive to raise Vietnamese-Soviet cooperation to a new level in order to make it more effective in the next 5-Year Plan.

Near East & South Asia

'Awn Dissolves Lebanese Parliament

LD0411073689 Moscow TASS in English 0708 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Beirut November 4 TASS—General Michel 'Awn, the head of Lebanon's military government, announced the dissolution of the Lebanese Parliament this morning. 'Awn signed a decree to this effect several hours before deputies were due to meet to elect a house speaker, ratify the al-Ta'if meeting's accord, and elect a president.

A meeting of a group of deputies at the place of former House Speaker Husayn al-Husayni continued until dawn.

Early in the morning about 30 parliamentarians left for an unknown destination under an enhanced guard by security forces.

A number of Lebanese state and political figures have already stated that 'Awn's decree on the dissolution of Parliament is unlawful.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Lebanese Situation

LD0411094289 Moscow TASS in English 0907 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS—The Soviet Union is genuinely interested in a steady and irreversible nature of the nascent peace process in Lebanon, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said here in comment on a Lebanese parliament meeting which is to be held in Beirut today.

In line with the accords reached in al-Ta'if, the Lebanese parliamentarians are to elect a president of the country, a new parliament speaker and endorse the charter of national accord.

The spokesman voiced hope that the Lebanese deputies will rise to the occasion in tackling this nationwide task facing them, and called on all political forces of Lebanon to render assistance in holding a parliament meeting.

Salah Khalaf on Soviet-Palestinian Relations

LD0411232489 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf] member of the Central Committee of the Palestinian Fatah Movement, told Soviet journalists that Soviet-Palestinian relations are strong. He added: We have always felt the Soviet Union's support in matters relating to a just settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

Abu Iyad called for a redoubling of efforts to convene an international conference on the Middle East. He pointed out that the Palestine Liberation Organization has built its position on the basis of international laws, and works for the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from occupied Arab lands and the achievement of the Palestinian People's rights in setting up an independent Palestinian state.

Abu Iyad said that in this respect we support Soviet steps and consider the Soviet Union to be doing all it can to achieve the aforementioned steps. We condemn all statements which raise doubt about Soviet-Palestinian relations and which are exploited by those who seek to harm the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Palestinian Arab people.

Commentary on 'Iranian Element' in Lebanon

NC0211175989 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Lebanon continues to be in an instable balance between war and peace. The Lebanese deputies, who reached a compromise with difficulty, ratified the charter on national reconciliation in al- Ta'if, Saudi Arabia. For the time being, however, this issue and this document are dangling in mid-air. Althought the charter was ratified by the (?elected) Lebanese, it does not satisfy anyone. More precisely, it does not satisfy those who have the true power in Lebanon.

Michel 'Awn, leader of the Lebanese Christians, is dissatisfied because the document does not foresee a full withdrawal of Syrian troops. The Muslims' leaders, on the contrary, are satisfied because the Syrian forces

should be transferred from Beirut to al- Biqa'. Moreover, the Shiites have strongly protested this charter. They informed Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati, who was visiting Damascus, of this protest and they met with his full understanding. Thus, the Iranian element in the Lebanese conflict is showing itself more clearly.

Foreign forces play an extremely noteworthy role in Lebanon's civil war. Without them, the conflict would have automatically died down a long time ago, simply because of a lack of sufficient war materiel. But if Syria can justify its participation on the basis of its long-standing historic relations with Lebanon as well as the fact that Damascus is within the reach of heavy artillery on the Lebanese borders, the issue becomes more complicated when it comes to Israel.

But dissatisfaction over the outcome of the al-Ta'if conference expressed by 'Ali Akbar Velayati to Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad appears to be astonishing to an extent. Iran justifies its dissatisfaction by claiming that the national reconciliation charter does not remove the system based on religions in the constitution. Let us assume that this is a just objection. But if the said charter is studied carefully, one can see that a review of the constitution based on religions is foreseen as the first step.

But this is not the issue. After all, what is it to Tehran if Lebanon's political system is based on religions? Only naive children are not living in Lebanon, and the Lebanese are capable—without guardians (?appointed by) Tehran—to discern what type of constitution they should have.

It is only enough that by supporting the Hizballah, Iran shoulders a certain amount of responsibility for the fact that the situation in Lebanon cannot, in any way, move toward detente. Incidentally, as far as the Hizballah is concerned, if this is a party of God, then should all the other parties be considered to be the party of satans? With such an approach, it will be difficult to achieve a mutual agreement in Lebanon.

Yes, the al-Ta'if agreement is not very complete, as the stand of the Christians on this is not very complete. But it is extremely clear that there is no other logical alternative to the al-Ta'if agreement in Lebanon right now and one cannot ignore the fact that the call by each side of the conflict—both Shiite, Sunni, and Christian—to reject an agreement that has been achieved through so many difficulties is tantamount to a call for the continuation of the war in Lebanon; and when such a call is heard from abroad it can only be considered as an effort to set fire to someone else's house.

Specific circles in Tehran were unable to export the Islamic Revolution to Iraq and to Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, it seems that the outlook of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon—a place inhabited by the followers of half a dozen different religions—is doubtful.

Meanwhile, during the coming weeks presidential elections are to be held in Lebanon. This incident can turn into a significant step in the complicated path of Lebanon toward peace; but it can also not be one, if the various religious factions and groups so carelessly condemn the al-Ta'if process and call to thwart it.

U.S.-Iranian Relations Reviewed

NC0511140589 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 4 Nov 89

[(Vladimir Niyazev) commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, exactly 10 years ago—on 4 November 1979—several hundred Iranian youth occupied the American Embassy in Tehran. A serious diplomatic row which then started between Iran and the United States continues today. (Vladimir Niyazev), Soviet expert on Middle Eastern affairs, writes on this:

This year the 10th anniversary of the occupation of the American Embassy turned into an important political event. This day is observed in the country as the national day for the struggle against world arrogance. Strong propaganda appears in the press, and the Information Ministry has compiled a special program for this day. For example, an exhibition of American spying equipment and of documents proving U.S. aggression against Iran has been put together.

One can say that in a realistic analysis of the situation, things do not appear to be very one-sided. We should point out that the occupation of the embassy was the prologue to the arrest and 444 days in captivity of the official representatives of a foreign country. This was unprecedented. The judicial and legal aspects of this act leave no room for questions. On the basis of international norms and, primarily, on the basis of the Vienna Convention which was also signed by Iran, diplomats enjoy diplomatic immunity.

In the first phase of the conflict, the U.S. Administration tried to focus attention on the legal aspect of the issue. The United States demanded that international punishments be imposed on Iran. But world reaction to this differed. The act by the students following the imam's line was also fully approved. For example, as an expression of solidarity, an effort was made in Islamabad to occupy the American Embassy there. Calls were heard to solve this crisis by resorting to arms.

At that complicated time, the United Nations adopted an extremely logical and flexible approach. Members of the Security Council unanimously issued a resolution calling on Iran and on the United States to take all the necessary steps to peacefully solve the problem and to display maximum self-restraint under such tense circumstances.

The Iranians very justly pointed out that for many years, White House policy was against the Iranian people and that the occupation of the embassy was a compulsory act to defend the revolution's outcome.

As we know, the revolution inflicted serious blows on U.S. interests in the region. The Pahlavi regime, which had enjoyed U.S. support for decades, was overthrown. Iran put an end to foreign diktat and severed the economic chains that had tied its hands and feet to the imperialist system. It started to follow an independent foreign and domestic policy.

The blows inflicted by the revolution on Washington's positions were interpreted by the U.S. Administration as unacceptable belligerence, and U.S. officials started preparations for inflicting a reciprocal blow. The documents found in the American Embassy show that the embassy employees persistently interfered in Iran's domestic affairs, that they coordinated the activities of the Armed Forces' hierarchy, and that they prepared plans to crush the revolution. There is no doubt that such activities were completely contrary to those of a diplomatic mission which reflects the policy of its own government.

The U.S. struggle against Iran's revolution also still continues. The White House is in no hurry to normalize its relations with Tehran, and statements by U.S. officials do not indicate it might be. The objective behind Washington's true policy is to expand confrontation with Iran. For example, for many years the U.S. press has been involved in hostile propaganda against Iran, and propaganda attacks are coupled with blatantly terrifying the Iranian leadership. This is the same attitude that the U.S. press showed in June 1988 when the U.S. warship downed Iran's passenger plane in the Persian Gulf.

The presence of U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf continues. According to Iranian Petroleum Minister Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, during the Persian Gulf crisis, the U.S. Navy inflicted $1.5 billion of damage to Iran's resources.

In short, the reciprocal hostility during the past decade not only did not decrease but, on the contrary, is apparently increasing. The Iranian Majlis recently approved a bill against U.S. terrorist acts. On the basis of this law, the president has been assigned to take the necessary steps to arrest and to punish Americans accused by Iranian courts.

Thus, it is clear that the hostile propaganda and the political confrontation between Iran and the United States continues. But lessons learned from history show that extremism is not a suitable way to solve differences. The peoples of both countries should forget the past and try to start constructive talks.

Human Rights 'Violations' in Iran Viewed

NC0311192389 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Station commentary]

[Text] Amnesty International has prepared a report on the state of human rights around the world in 1988. Part of the report was devoted to countries in the Middle East and the Near East, with special attention given to Iran. The compilers of the report confirm that 1,200 political prisoners were executed in Iran during the last 6 months of 1988. Reliable reports on the torture of political prisoners are received from all provinces. Often whipping and the severing of four fingers of the right hand are used as methods of punishment.

The international public is aware of much of the reality about human rights violations that appeared in the Amnesty International report. These violations took place under the political conditions that prevailed before the new leadership came to power. The former officials' policy of suppression and pressure against individuals with differing views met with extensive protest from social and political personalities in various countries, particularly the Soviet Union. Moreover, the issue of human rights violation was discussed at the UN General Assembly and a resolution condemning suppression in Iran was approved.

Iran's new leadership has declared a policy of freeing the country's political, economic, and social life from past constraints. Therefore, it is only natural to expect officials to adopt a new approach to the issue of human rights. The preservation of antidemocratic laws, the continued imprisonment of persons who played an outstanding role in the struggle for independence and social progress, and the intolerance shown toward people with differing views only protract domestic social crises. This prevents the country's emergence from international isolation.

It was no coincidence that one of the first decisions by the new Iranian leadership was the announcement of a general amnesty. This was declared on the eve of a UN conference on human rights in Geneva, and was interpreted by observers as a demonstration of the Iranian leadership's wish to create a good impression in international social circles.

However, many points about the general amnesty are still unclear. The official news report emphasized that the general amnesty and pardon would not apply to profiteers, plunderers of state property, criminals, addicts, and members of opposition groups and organizations. This raises the question of to whom, then, the amnesty applies and what it has to do with justice.

Similar general amnesties were repeatedly announced in Iran during the past decade but neither Iranians nor the international organizations monitoring human rights have taken them seriously. It is quite clear that true progress in improving the situation of human rights in Iran cannot be achieved without the lifting of the ban on the political activities of opposition groups and without the release of political prisoners.

Democratic forces believe that the legal norms that determine human rights in Iran must comply with the UN Declaration on Human Rights. Opponents claim that the human rights declaration is an offspring of the West and does not conform to Islamic values. However,

it is difficult to believe this allegation. The UN document is based on legal experiences gained in both the East and the West. This document has absorbed the humanitarian and just ideas of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and other religions and is imbued with with a civilized attitude toward human rights which should be observed by everyone.

Possibly those Iranians who believe that a general amnesty that does not respect international law is meaningless and to be condemned are right. Without this respect, a general amnesty is not a step toward democracy, but merely a political maneuver.

Iranian Natural Gas Agreement Signed

LD0411153189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1103 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Tehran, 4 Nov (TASS)—An agreement was signed in Tehran today between the governments of the USSR and the Islamic Republic of Iran on supplies of Iranian natural gas to the USSR in exchange for supplies of Soviet equipment and machines, and the provision of services in the construction of industrial and other national economic installations in Iran.

The document was signed for the Iranian side by M. Nurbakhsh, the Islamic Republic of Iran's minister of economics and finance, and for the Soviet side by K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations, who is here on an official visit at the head of an economic delegation.

The agreement provides that supplies of Iranian natural gas to the Soviet Union will commence 1 April next year, with 2 billion cubic metres being exported by Iran prior to 31 December, and from 1991 and an annual volume of up to 3 billion cubic meters.

The Soviet Union will take part in the construction of 19 important national economic installations in Iran.

The agreement, the Soviet minister said, is a bright example of practical implementation of the arrangements reached in Moscow during the negotiations between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and President A.A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which devoted great attention to the development of economic relations between the two neighboring countries. The agreement creates a favorable basis for long-term comprehensive cooperation, which corresponds to the interests of the peoples of the two countries.

The Iranian minister also indicated the important nature of the document. He stressed that undoubtedly the implementation of the intergovernmental agreement corresponds to the interests of both the Iranian and the Soviet peoples. The construction of important industrial installations, which will make a weighty contribution to the development of the economy of Iran, will be carried out in our country.

V.V. Gudev, USSR ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other Soviet and Iranian officials were present at the signing ceremony.

Iran's Economic Woes Threaten 'Social Tensions'

NC0311183389 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, Iran's President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani spoke to about 100 Majlis deputies representing the country's most backward areas in the parliament. Reports indicate that matters pertaining to growing social tensions in Iran stemming from high prices and the shortage of staple goods as well as ways to end the complicated economic situation that has been created in the country were discussed.

If we look at Tehran's overpopulated areas in the south from its comfortable northern neighborhoods, we can see smoke and dust. This is, figuratively speaking, the story of Iran's economic growth and the growing schism among the various social strata in Iran. On the one hand there are the millionaires of the black market and the wealthy merchants of the shadow economy and on the other hand there are the millions of deprived who are making ends meet with great difficulty. The Iranian press is paying increasing attention to the fact that most people have had to live on for years with the rationing of major foodstuffs and daily cuts of water and electricity, coupled with a rapid rise in the cost of living and inflation. The government, which owes astronomic sums to domestic banks, finds this situation increasingly difficult to combat.

In short, the current state of Iran's economy threatens to exacerbate social tensions. This is why the Iranian Government adopted to a series of measures to improve the country's economic situation. For example, in an effort to stem the people's growing rage and dissatisfaction with the constant deterioration in their standard of living, Iranian officials presented a bill on price control to the Majlis. Despite the approval of the bill, there has been no change in the country's economic situation, even though the bill envisaged the creation of a 7,000-member organization to control the implementation of the law throughout the country.

The recent steps by Iran's Central Bank to improve the financial situation also produced no results. The new financial and commercial measures did not prevent the spread of negative trends in the country's economy. The introduction of these regulations had no effect on the price of goods and it is too early to tell whether the cabinet's new policy aimed at reducing government intervention in economic affairs and encouraging private investment will produce the necessary results.

Under such conditions, the Iranian leadership has preferred to move in two directions simultaneously. On the one hand, the Iranian Government has called on the

people to tighten their belts further and not to expect that economic problems will be solved rapidly. On the other hand, these officials have expressed their readiness to extend immediate assistance to the poorest areas of the country. For example, in his meeting with 100 Majlis deputies, 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated that the government is waiting for their proposals on how to overcome the needs and problems of their constituencies. He said: Negative trends in the country's economy will undoubtedly be removed and we will overcome existing problems.

Many in Iran now hope that the new cabinet will be able to ensure a logical and dynamic leadership in the country, bring it out of the prolonged economic tempest, and establish stability and calm in this field.

Iran To Give Agriculture 'Special Attention'

NC0611083989 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary from "The World Today"]

[Text] Dear listeners, Mr Gholam Reza Foruzesh, minister of the construction jihad, is visiting various parts of the country in order to inspect Iran's agricultural situation. This trip is part of preparations to implement the new 5-year plan for the Islamic Republic's social, economic, and cultural progress. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev writes about this.

For a long time the Iranian Government did not pay the necessary attention to agricultural development. It allocated less to agriculture than to other parts of the economy. For example, about $1 billion was allocated for agricultural growth last year, while about $5 billion was allocated for development in the oil industry.

It should be noted that Iran's agricultural situation is sufficiently complicated. Many foodstuffs such as rice, meat, dairy products, and other staple goods are carefully rationed. International assessments indicate there are shortages of more than 30 percent of foodstuffs.

Facts show that the new government is not willing to tolerate this situation. At any rate, the second 5-year plan indicates special attention will be paid to agricultural development. According to Gholam Reza Foruzesh, minister of the construction jihad, first of all, 400,000 hectares of farm land damaged during the Iran-Iraq war are to be reclaimed. Second, more farmland is to be designated.

There are 16 million hectares of land in Iran which can be used for agricultural production. Only 6 to 7 million hectares of this area are under cultivation now. Moreover, the new cabinet wants to set up 65 km of roads in rural areas and to increase to 77 percent the number of villages which have electricity.

The major objective behind the government's new agricultural strategy is to completely overcome the foodstuff shortage in Iran so that the country will be able to supply its own meat, milk, rice, and wheat. Solving the foodstuff problem is also extremely important because according to experts, the population of the Islamic Republic of Iran may reach 72 million.

Our commentator then writes: Apparently, it will not be easy to ensure that a serious leap will be made in agriculture. This is because the second 5-year plan does not remove the major obstacles to agricultural production. Land issues continue to be unsolved, and problems stemming from the way agricultural land is dispersed have not yet been overcome. Deliberations on agricultural reforms have been going on in Iran for 9 years now, but nothing has been achieved. Meanwhile, the great majority of farmers live in extremely dire conditions. The monthly income of 72 percent of families in rural areas is lower than the official minimum cost of living rate.

Despite all this, many of Iran's farmers are expecting developments, and they have hopes for the government's new agricultural policy.

East Europe

GDR's Krenz on Gorbachev Meeting, Protests

LD0311205989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1940 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Berlin, 3 Nov (TASS)—The meeting between Egon Krenz, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, and Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which took place in Moscow, passed off in a spirit of the cordiality and friendship linking both peoples and both parties. This was stated by the GDR leader in an interview for the GDR Television young people's program "Elf 99" which was broadcast today.

He expressed deep conviction that much of what was discussed in Moscow will also play a part at the forthcoming plenum of the SED Central Committee. E. Krenz highly assessed the proposals he had received from GDR journalists in Moscow on improving the reporting of events taking place in the USSR by the mass information media of the GDR.

Describing the present situation in his own country, E. Krenz stressed the need for a careful study of the large number of collective and individual proposals that are reaching the SED Central Committee these days. A special group has been set up under the SED Central Committee for this purpose.

E.Krenz refuted assertions by some of the Western mass information media that the state of his health allegedly would not permit him to fulfill his duties effectively.

Speaking of the fact that he fulfils three functions simultaneously—general secretary of the SED Central Committee, chairman of the State Council and chairman of the National Defense Council of the GDR, E. Krenz stated that there is nothing unusual either for socialist or for capitalist countries in combining party and state posts. "I do not consider it incorrect," he said, "at precisely the present complicated time to further a situation in which work in the state and work in the party proceed in a single channel."

Replying to a question about mistakes in party work, the GDR leader noted that subjectivism was permitted to take place by the SED Central Committee Politburo, criticism was developed insufficiently, and unrealistic assessments took place. Here, however, one ought not to draw the conclusion that, on account of this, the prerequisites for the implementation by the party of its leading role had supposedly disappeared. Anyone who thinks like that fails to take into account the fact that there are more than two million members and candidate members of the party in the SED and that the party itself found within itself the strength to bring about the present turnaround.

Assessing the street demonstrations taking place in the country, E.Krenz stated that highly diverse people are taking part in them. Everyone wishing to further by constructive suggestions a situation in which there would be more socialism and more democracy is acting fully in the spirit of the turn that has been started. At the same time, it is doubtful whether this could be implemented over a long period of time on the street. "I deeply respect those who work hard day and night, who apply their efforts to ensure that supplies function, who concern themselves for children, ensuring that trains and buses run—in other words, those who combine dialogue with labor," the GDR leader stressed.

Krenz Expresses Thanks for Congratulations

PM0611102989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 89 Second Edition p 1

[Message from Egon Krenz, chairman of the GDR State Council, to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

I am sincerely grateful for the cordial greetings in connection with my election as chairman of the GDR State Council.

You may be sure that the GDR, in conducting a policy of renewal and continuity, sees the deepening of the indestructable fraternal alliance with the USSR as the very basis for further socialist building on German soil.

I take this opportunity to wish you great successes in implementing perestroyka for the good of the Soviet people in the interests of strengthening socialism and peace.

Egon Krenz, chairman of the GDR State Council

Zagladin Receives Visiting GDR Official

LD0511052389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1702 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow, 4 Nov (TASS)—Vadim Zagladin, chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, received Stefan Doernberg, chairman of the GDR Committee for European Security, here today. During the course of the meeting, there was a discussion on matters relating to enhancing the contribution by the public of the two fraternal countries to the movement in order to implement the ideas of the common European home.

PRAVDA Reports Budapest Anti-Soviet Demonstration

PM0611123289 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 89 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov report: "Provocative Sortie"]

[Text] Budapest, 5 Nov—A demonstration demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary was held outside the Soviet Embassy by representatives of the Hungarian Radical Party and the Hungarian Party of October (the latter takes its name from the events of October 1956).

The demonstrators could not but know that the Soviet troops are on Hungarian territory under the Warsaw Pact. Incidentally, under a Soviet Government decision and by agreement with the Warsaw Pact allies, 22 military units are to be withdrawn from Hungary, as a result of which the numbers of Soviet troops will be reduced by 10,000. The demonstration, which began 4 November (at different times between 100 and 200 people were taking part), ended early this morning (during the night there were 5-15 people on the picket line). Anti-Soviet chants, slogans like "Russians go home!", and national flags with holes in—sad and tragic symbols of fall 1956, when the Hungarian emblem was cut out of the middle of the flag—kept up the courage of those assembled. The Soviet Embassy was encircled by police.

On the eve of the demonstration the Foreign Ministry of the Hungarian Republic stated on behalf of the government that the demonstration is contrary to Hungary's national interests.

Gorbachev's policy, the Foreign Ministry statement says, is aimed at building a "common European home," in which we, too, want to live. The Hungarians have a vital interest in the preservation and development of Hungarian-Soviet relations and the improvement of cooperation between the two countries in the new conditions. The Hungarian Government regards the two parties' call for the holding of a demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy building as a step that is detrimental

to Hungary's relations with the USSR and contrary to the country's national interests. The Hungarian Government dissociates itself from these and similar actions.

TASS Reports Hungarian Protests

LD0511020189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1136 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Budapest, 4 Nov (TASS)—Correspondent Sergey Ivanov reports:

Individual groups of extremist elements, although few in number, have unleashed their activity against the background of the political transformations now taking place in Hungarian society, using the development of democracy and under its cover.

Examples of this are the appeals disseminated some days ago by two political organizations: The Hungarian October Party, named thus in connection with the events of October 1956, and the Hungarian Radical Party. These parties, which are not distinguished by their large numbers, have proposed to the population that they take part in a so-called "protest demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy building in Budapest in connection with the 33d anniversary of the occupation of Hungary by Soviet troops in 1956." These actions are to begin this afternoon, and according to the intentions of their organizers, are to last until 0700 the following morning.

The reaction to this of the Hungarian leadership has been very unambiguous. A statement distributed on behalf of the government by the Foreign Ministry of the Hungarian Republic notes that today, when epoch-making transformations are taking place in the republic, the significance of responsibility for the fate of the republic and of true evaluations of historical facts is increasing. It is extremely important that links between Hungary and neighboring countries are built on mutual trust and respect. This is particularly true with regard to the Soviet Union, which has embarked on a path of large-scale social reforms and perestroyka. Hungary is fundamentally interested in the preservation and development of Hungarian-Soviet relations and cooperation between the two countries in accordance with the new conditions.

The creation of tension and difficulties imposes a pernicious burden upon the fragile balance of the transitional period. It is precisely thus, as something which inflicts damage upon the links between the Hungarian Republic and the Soviet Union, that the government regards the appeal by the two parties to hold a demonstration under extremist slogans in front of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, and the government dissociates itself from these and other such actions, the statement stresses.

At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the appeals to hold such events, which are clearly unfriendly to the USSR, have been heard on the eve of the Soviet people's greatest holiday: the anniversary of Great October. Although 7 November is no longer a red day on the calendar, by a decision of the Hungarian parliament, the country's leading political force, the Hungarian Socialist Party, [HSP] honors this date. This is said unambiguously in the HSP statement distributed here, which appeals to the Hungarian public to take part in the celebration of the Great October anniversary. The HSP statement notes that the Great October Socialist Revolution is an event of historic significance which created conditions for the rapid socioeconomic development of a whole range of countries. Noting that the blunders and tragic mistakes permitted during the construction of the new society cannot belittle the significance of this day, the Hungarian Socialist Party has called upon the country's public to mark 7 November in a festive manner.

PZPR 16th Central Committee Plenum Opens 6 Nov

LD0611102889 Moscow TASS in English 1022 GMT 6 Nov 89

[Text] Warsaw November 6 TASS—A regular, 16th, plenary meeting of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) Central Committee opened in Warsaw today.

The plenum participants will consider draft programmatic documents, submitted by the central commission for preparations for the PUWP's 11th congress, the main provisions of new party rules, and principles for the election of delegates to the congress.

The meeting was declared open by Polish party chief Mieczyslaw Rakowski.

Rakowski Interviewed on Talks With Gorbachev

90UI0078A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 43, 28 Oct 89 p 2

[Report on interview by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondents A. Golub and D. Makarov with M. Rakowski, first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee: "The PZPR Learns the Lessons"; in Moscow; date not given; first two paragraphs are ARGUMENTY I FAKTY introduction]

[Text] As a result of the parliamentary elections held this summer in Poland, the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR], which had governed the country for over 40 years, was defeated. For the first time in a socialist country a Marxist-Leninist party was forced to cede power to other political forces.

Following the election of W. Jaruzelski, former first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, to the office of president of the country, former Polish Premier M. Rakowski, member of the Politburo, was elected to the highest party office. He was recently in Moscow on a working visit, in the course of which he met with M.S. Gorbachev. At the conclusion of the meeting M. Rakowski gave a press conference, after which he answered ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondents' questions.

Rakowski: My talks with M.S. Gorbachev lasted 3 and a half hours. This was our fourth meeting. Gorbachev listened closely to my detailed account of the situation in Poland and in the PZPR, although he knew it in general outline. He believes that the situation in which Poland finds itself now is historically justified. He called Poland a "testing ground" for other socialist countries, although I personally, of course, would have preferred some other country to have been such a ground. Gorbachev is a splendid conversational partner who understands the rhythm of our life in Poland. I am leaving Moscow very satisfied that the times have finally arrived when I encounter here support for my ideas, which was not always the case in the past.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: Comrade Rakowski, this is your second meeting with ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondents. The first was more than a year ago, not long before your appointment as premier. You were at that time optimistic, full of hope.... Tell us what effect these abrupt changes in the country and in the party have had on you.

Rakowski: To speak of my personal happiness and my personal interests, it would be better for me were I neither premier nor first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, but had remained a journalist, which I am by profession. Believe me, a journalist is freer than any politician. You can see this for yourselves when you read your newspapers now.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: You are one of those who initiated profound democratic changes in the country and the party. It is sufficient to mention if only trade union pluralism, the legalization of Solidarity, the work of the "round table," free parliamentary elections.... Have not the results of these transformations been a surprise to you? Do you not regret what has happened? If you were now to start everything from scratch, would you take the same route?

Rakowski: Were I to take this route once again, I would be more cautious and wiser. I would draw conclusions from the mistakes which we have made. Anticipating all surprises is impossible; nonetheless, I continue to believe that the main direction was right and remains right now also.

But unfortunately it happens in history that reformers who are the initiators of a process of changes themselves fall victim to their reforms.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: You mentioned that in conversation with you M.S. Gorbachev called Poland a "testing ground". Inasmuch as you are pioneers in socio-economic transformations, against which mistakes would you want to caution us?

Rakowski: The democratization process should develop under prudent control exercised not only by the governing party or the government; society should control itself. Achieving this is difficult, it is true. It is frequently difficult tracing the line between anarchy and democracy. And one further problem: it is essential to correctly evaluate public opinion, people's aspirations.... A number of actions on our part could be cited today which at this time I no longer consider correct.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: It seemed to us in Moscow that one party was violating the terms of the "round-table." However, far from all Polish Communists with whom we have spoken have agreed with us. What is your viewpoint on this issue?

Rakowski: I would not say that there were no violations. We agreed that the elections would not be of a confrontational nature, but this proved impossible. In addition, a number of important agreements which were reached in the course of the "roundtable" were not enshrined in documents subsequently. This also created difficulties.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: Do you consider Solidarity a dependable partner and do you intend cooperating with it in the future?

Rakowski: Of course, we have to cooperate with Solidarity. This trade union association is highly heterogeneous in its composition and consists of several currents—from moderate to extremist. It is essential that we cooperate because by and large Solidarity was opposed not so much to socialism as to the way in which it was realized in practice in the past.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: Do you not think that what is now happening in Hungary and Poland will sooner or later happen in other socialist countries also?

Rakowski: Yes. Only each country will have its own specific features. We must not be captive to the inexorable laws of history but must be able to anticipate them and embark on changes when this is required by reality.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: The PZPR had the leading role in its coalition with the United Peasant and Democratic parties. What did the practice of this cooperation reveal? Was it viable?

Rakowski: No. For this reason it no longer exists. The deputy clubs of these parties operating in parliament entered into a coalition with the opposition and joined the new government. As far as our parties' local organizations are concerned, the cooperation which has lasted many years cannot, of course, be canceled with the stroke of a pen.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: How will you exist organizationally given a multiparty system? Will the party cells at the enterprises and in agriculture continue? We are particularly interested in the army and the Internal Affairs Ministry.

Rakowski: In the last two organizations which you have cited they will undoubtedly remain. To speak of the party organizations at the work place, at the enterprises,

although we want them to remain, this is in many cases problematical. But we are not supporters of frozen forms.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: What is the party's financial situation today? What constitutes its budget? Does it enjoy a state subsidy?

Rakowski: We provide in a bill on political parties which we have submitted to the Sejm for financing all political parties, ours included, from the budget. As is the case in the West. But this law will evidently not be enacted soon. Meanwhile we have begun to develop our own economic activity because we believe we must ourselves earn money for the needs of the party.

Slyunkov, Mazowiecki Interviewed on Meetings

LD0311232789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with CPSU Central Committee Secretary Nikolay Slyunkov by correspondent Y. Ulyanov following Slyunkov's meetings in Warsaw with Polish leaders on 3 November—live or recorded]

[Text] Comrade Slyunkov was in Warsaw today on a brief working visit at the invitation of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] Central Committee.

[Correspondent Yuriy Ulyanov] He met the first secretary of the PZPR central committee Mieczyslaw Rakowski; the prime minister of the Polish people's republic, Tadeusz Mazowiecki; and other Polish leaders concerned mainly with economic and financial matters.

[Video shows Ulyanov interviewing Slyunkov] There have recently been signs of noticeable differences in the development of the economies of Poland and of the Soviet Union. How, in the new conditions, do you see the outlook for our future cooperation?

[Slyunkov] We have an interest in strengthening Poland's economy and in seeing the country emerge as soon as possible from its state of economic crisis. We also have problems of our own. We are working on the problems of improving the economy in our own country, and we also have similar approaches associated with the directions of the development of economic relations between our countries. As for the differences, they arise from the fact that each country independently choses its methods, approaches, and ways of solving problems at home.

[Ulyanov, to Mazowiecki] And what do you think about Soviet-Polish cooperation?

[Mazowiecki in Polish with consecutive Russian translation by Ulyanov] I think that cooperation is very important to both our countries. We've just been discussing the problems of the correlation of our national currencies, which is very necessary to the development of cooperation—though we are well aware that it's not the sort of problem that can be solved in a short time. We also talked about the plans for Soviet perestroyka, the difficulties that Poland is experiencing, and our countries' mutual obligations and mutual deliveries—something that is important generally, and especially so at the present time.

[Ulyanov] At the end of the day, Comrade Slyunkov had a meeting with the President of the Polish people's republic, Wojciech Jaruzelski.

Slyunkov Talks With Baka

LD0611132989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Nov 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Exchange of Opinions"]

[Text] N.N. Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was in Warsaw 3 November on a working visit at the invitation of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Central Committee.

During the visit talks were held with PZPR Central Committee Politburo Member W. Baka.

N.N. Slyunkov was received by Polish President W. Jaruezlski, T. Mazowiecki, chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers, and M. Rakowski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee.

There was an exchange of opinions on topical questions of cooperation between the CPSU and the PZPR and Soviet-Polish economic ties.

SFRY's Loncar Concludes Visit, Leaves for Home

LD0311130589 Moscow TASS in English 1252 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Yugoslavian Foreign Secretary Budimir Loncar left the Soviet Union for home today. He was staying in the country on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the Soviet government, during which he visited Moscow and Leningrad.

West Europe

Aeroflot Signs Agreement With Finnish Airline

PM0211143589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 6

[V. Belikov report: "To New York via Helsinki"]

[Text] Agreements have been signed between the airline Finnair and the USSR Civil Aviation International Commercial Administration for a program to develop air transportation for 1990-1995.

The frequency of flights on the Moscow-Helsinki and Leningrad-Helsinki air routes will be increased. Whereas now each company has 8 flights each a week between the states' capitals, by 1995 the frequency on this route will

be 14 flights per week for each airline. For the convenience of Finnish tourists going to the Black Sea, as of summer next year Aeroflot will introduce direct flights from Helsinki to Sochi and Simferopol.

Possibilities of organizing transportation from Moscow to New York with passengers changing at Helsinki were examined by the two airlines.

Commentary on Efforts for Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone

LD0211193489 Moscow TASS in English 1823 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 2 TASS—By TASS political analyst Yevgeniy Babenko:

The regular session of the interparliamentary commission of Nordic countries for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe, that ended in Copenhagen, once again drew the attention of the world community to the problem of making the region nuclear-free.

The idea was first put forward by the late President Urkkho Kekkonen of Finland more than a quarter of century ago.

It surfaced again and again under various circumstances and was supported in many countries. A new impulse to the drive was imparted two years ago in the far-reaching Soviet initiatives, advanced in Murmansk by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. They concerned the entire European North—from the Baltic Sea to the Barents Sea and the north Atlantic.

The Soviet Union, confident that the Arctic must become a zone of peace, called for a radical reduction of the level of military confrontation in this region.

The Soviet Union proposed to all concerned countries to begin negotiations on the curtailment and reduction of military activity in the north of both the Eastern and the Western Hemisphere.

The guaranteed security of the north would undoubtedly prove a major stabilizing influence on the whole European process.

During the Soviet-Finnish summit in Helsinki in October, Mikhail Gorbachev further developed the concept in his speech in the Finlandia Palace.

He announced that practical steps were being taken towards the establishment of a nuclear-free zone: The Soviet Union had decided to eliminate some categories of its sea-based nuclear forces in the Baltic Sea.

The store of anti-submarine nuclear missiles intended for submarines meant for scrapping will be eliminated, never to be renewed.

Facts indicate that the Soviet president's visit to Finland has affected the hearts and minds of Finns, and not Finns alone. Within a few days after the visit, the first practical international response became known.

The Copenhagen session of the interparliamentary commission of the Nordic countries adopted a resolution welcoming Gorbachev's Helsinki initiatives aiming to promote the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe.

All these developments have once again emphasised the need to try and use new opportunitities for disarmament and undertake new initiatives towards the reduction of nuclear stockpiles in Europe, the resolution said.

The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe could be a major contribution towards this objective and provide an impulse to a new positive development in this region.

The success of the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional arms and the growing awareness of the need to re-orient armed forces towards non-offensive pursuits and remove offensive groupings from the decisive border areas makes the steps towards the establishment of a nuclear-free zone particularly timely.

The preconditions for proclaiming a non-nuclear zone in the north of Europe have recently been considerably consolidated, the participants in the Copenhagen session pointed out.

The parliamentarians called upon the governments of the Nordic countries to help expedite the work of the commission of experts of these countries' foreign ministries, who have been studying prospects for the establishment of the zone for two years.

The experts' report is required for the subsequent political decision-making.

The opinion of the interparliamentary commission, judging by its composition, carries weight and will undoubtedly be heeded.

Submarine Caught in Nets of Norwegian Trawler

LD0311132889 Moscow TASS in English 1209 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—A diesel submarine from the Soviet northern fleet was caught in the nets of the Norwegian "Senior" fishing trawler on Thursday at 13:54, 200 kilometers North of the Rybachhy Peninsula.

The submarine immediately surfaced and established communication with the trawler.

Despite the storm, Norwegian fishermen and Soviet sailors managed to free the submarine. Neither the ships nor the net were damaged.

According to reports from Oslo, the fishermen have confirmed that the Soviet crew's actions were correct.

Latin America & Caribbean

Chilean Communist Youth Statement on Rights

PY0311002089 Moscow Radio Magallanes in Spanish to Chile 0100 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] A public statement released by the Communist Youth of Chile [JJCC] points out that the youth's struggle for democracy and for life has always been a component of mobilization.

The JJCC statement was released this morning in Santiago during a news conference in which the JJCC Central Committee leaders Marisol Berrios and Ivan Salinas participated.

The JJCC calls all Chilean youth to participate, on 2 November, in the National Day Against Torture. This event has been called in solidarity with Judge Rene Garcia Villegas who has received death threats from those who have been repressing the people during the past 16 years.

The text of the JJCC statement states:

We are one of the sectors that has been greatly affected by violations of our rights. We have suffered the most brutal repression, facing daily discrimination under a system that denies us the possibility to improve. The statement notes that, during the past 16 years, we have been stripped of the rights to lead an adolescent life, to organize ourselves, to participate, to have a house and an honorable job, to decide when to have children, to an egalitarian access to education, and to entertainment.

Let us listen now to text of the statement through a direct dispatch from Santiago via telephone:

[Begin recording] We communists are motivated by the loftiest humanism, one leading us to struggle for a society in which men play a leading role in the changes and in the people's social, political, and cultural rights. This is part of our political doctrine and our slogans that seek leaders among our youth.

We want to become the youth for human rights, and our 8th congress reaffirmed our willingness to resolutely engage in the cause, quote, for truth and justice, for the freedom of political prisoners, for preventing impunity, and for demanding the dissolution of the CNI [National Intelligence Center], unquote.

We intend to concentrate on encouraging every social organization to the promotion and defense of human rights within their field of activity.

In this regard, we support the creation of human rights brigades, expanding our alternatives to include those carried out by the Sebastian Acevedo Movement Against Torture [Movimiento Contra La Tortura Sebastian Acevedo] and the Groups of Relatives of Repression Victims [Agrupaciones de Familiares Victimas de la Represion].

The human rights issue, which is being recognized as an issue of paramount importance by all the opposition sectors and the social organizations, today takes on a different dimension. It has become a cornerstone of the institutional system that must be developed during the future democracy. In this regard, the youth can contribute with their creativity and their initiative to prompt timely responses and keep the problem alive in the conscience of the youth and the people. [end recording]

The JJCC statement, which was released this morning during a news conference in Santiago, continues:

We support the dissemination and promotion of human rights through the primary, secondary, and university education curriculums and programs, including those of the Armed Forces colleges.

In addition, today we publicly assume the imperative commitment of demanding truth, justice, and the rejection of an amnesty, which are the primary concerns of broad social and political sectors and causes for permanent mobilization.

This commitment, the statement adds, involves preventing across-the-board pardons [perdonazos] and conditions of impunity from being imposed.

We extend this commitment, the JJCC states, to about 500 political prisoners, of which 173 are young people less than 30 years old.

We have joined the campaign for the liberation of all the political prisoners, a campaign that has been implemented by the Group of Relatives of Political Prisoners [Agrupacion de Familiares de Presos politicos.]

The JJCC has also commited itself to actively participate in the Command of Solidarity With the Life of Judge Rene Garcia Villegas [Commando de Solidaridad Con La Vida del Juez Rene Garcia Villegas] and to participate in the National Day Against Torture scheduled for tomorrow, 2 November.

The JJCC statement also calls all youth to participate in the human rights fairs scheduled for 4 and 5 November in Villa Portales.

Deputy Premier Talks With Cuban Scientist

PM2610141389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Friendly Ties"]

[Text] On 25 October N.P. Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, received R. Pomes, vice president of the Cuban Academy of Sciences.

Questions of the state of and prospects for scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries were discussed.

J. Camacho, Cuban ambassador to the USSR, was present at the talks.

Supreme Soviet Visit to Mexico Ends

LD0511115389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1413 GMT 5 Nov 89

[Text] Mexico, 5 Nov (TASS)—The Soviet Union resolutely supports the establishment of a firm, all-encompassing peace on the planet and the cessation of the arms race which is swallowing up thousands of millions of dollars. The achievement of real results on the path of disarmament could make it possible to release gigantic funds and direct them to the solution of the most urgent socio-economic problems of many developing countries. M.I. Snegur, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, who has been leading the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation which has been on an official visit to Mexico and Guatemala at the invitation of these countries' congresses, yesterday spoke about this here.

In a conversation with journalists at the Mexican capital's airport before the Soviet parliamentarians' departure for home, M.I. Snegur stressed that within the framework of the process of peresteroyka taking place in the USSR, the Soviet Union is carrying out a policy directed toward the broadening and strengthening of links with all countries. He noted that the visits of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation to Mexico and Guatemala were useful, and enabled them to familiarize themselves with the experience of the activity of these states' legislative bodies.

Salvadoran Government Said Hindering Peace Talks

PY0311001189 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Spanish to Latin America 0330 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Text] Salvadoran social organizations have issued a statement excoriating the Cristiani administration for its propaganda campaign, which has been aimed at hindering the third round of talks with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. Journalist (Marina Petrovskaya) filed this report:

The statement was issued by the major Salvadoran unions, which consider Cristiani's recent criticisms of the rebels' peace initiatives as the Salvadoran Government's clear refusal to consider participating in the peace talks. Cristiani has described those peace initiatives as absurd, ridiculous, and purposeless.

Cristiani has said he would not give in on any point. What is so absurd about those patriotic initiatives? Why does the government not want to pay attention to them or commit itself to take the initial steps toward a solution to the Salvadoran problems?

[Passage indistinct] of the motion made by the guerrillas who called for a ceasefire between the two parties and afterward their liquidation is considered [words indistinct]. It seems that [word indistinct] Cristiani considers as laughable the guerrillas' proposal for holding democratic elections, creating legal institutions, reorganizing the Army and the police, and creating conditions to allow the rebels to join Salvadoran political life.

It seems that the Salvadoran Government considers the rebels' demand for the adoption of urgent measures to stop the repression and to guarantee human rights as groundless.

It is hard to imagine that the authorities will (?ignore) such proposals and that, at the same time, they are willing to attend the third round of talks to seriously consider ending the civil war.

We fear that the government's participation in the past two rounds of talks—which were held at the guerrillas' initiative, with support from the Catholic Church and the citizenry in general—has simply been part of a scheme to avoid its real participation in the Central American peace process.

As it is known, this process foresees the end of armed conflicts, [words indistinct] persecutions for political reasons, and the redemocratization of the country.

If after the first round of talks between the government and the guerrillas the Salvadoran people expected few positive results, after the second round of talks they and Central America only found disappointment, since the Salvadoran authorities have not expressed authentic wishes to seriously consider a (?solution) to the national conflict. Worse yet, people were disappointed to (?observe) the (?Cristiani administration) clearly draw close to reactionary circles in the Army, which declared it would not grant any concession to the guerrillas, who, they said, should be terminated by force.

It is impossible not to notice the fact that the repression against the (?rebels) has increased in El Salvador lately. As in the past, death squads operate freely.

Evidently, the government's position is opposed to what has been attained by the five countries of the isthmus in their quest for a political solution to the regional conflicts. The Salvadoran Government has closed ranks with the reactionary sectors, which increasingly show their preference for solving any problem by force.

It is symptomatic that at the same time that we observe destructive actions by the Cristiani administration we also observe active anti-Nicaraguan operations by the U.S. Government, which is trying to preserve the combat capability of the contras. U.S. provocations against Panama are not ceasing either. In a word, we have the impression that the destabilizing forces are being consolidated in Central America and that they are hindering the peace progress on the isthmus.

Supreme Soviet Session

Deputies Address Supreme Soviet 31 Oct

Moldavia's Grossu

LD0411075989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1955 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Speech by Semen Kuzmich Grossu, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, at the 31 October session of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade People's Deputies, the draft state plan and budget for the economy and the development of the USSR for 1990, which has been submitted by the USSR Council of Ministers and examined by the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet, basically meets the requirements of the First Congress of People's Deputies and is aimed primarily at improving the economy and money circulation. It is expressly socially oriented in nature and provides an opportunity for the broad development of economic reform and the creation of a degree of headway for the start of the new, 13th 5-Year Plan. However, neither the plan nor the budget is devoid of shortcomings. They have many defects and weak spots.

The protracted material and financial imbalance in the economy has not permitted us at this stage to manage without a plan deficit in the budget of R60 billion or currency issues to the sum of R10 billion. If the substantial growth in money incomes, subsidy payments from the budget—which exceed R100 billion—and the huge personal savings of the working people—of which around R100 billion demand to be turned into goods every day—are added to this, it is not difficult to realise what heavy burden these negatives impose on our economy, the life of the working people, and the responsibility of the government and the USSR Supreme Soviet to normalize not only our economy, but the social and political life of our state as a whole. They increase the inflationary processes, reduce the purchasing power of the ruble, and give rise to constant shortages of goods, for all the growth in production.

In this connection, I would like literally to make two comments. In the situation that has come about, it seems to me that the state, Soviet, and financial bodies should place under particular supervision and protection two main trends and aspects of the plan, above all.

First, the further reduction, up to and including complete elimination, of the budget deficit and issues of money; the regulation and restraint of growth of the salary fund and of any other input of money into circulation. To this end, the Supreme Soviet has adopted very important and serious documents that guarantee regulation. In addition, an important step in this direction is the new investment policy adopted and presented by the Council of Ministers.

In this connection, I would like to say that reducing capital investments by both the state and etnerprises by R5 billion, as suggested to the commission by individual deputies, is completely inadmissible at the present stage. It could undermine our country's economic development as the basis of social development and put a brake on expanded reproduction [rasshirennoye vosproizvodstvo]. We could find ourselves on the threshold of dislocating industrial production and the economy as a whole.

In the present complex situation, further forcing of allocations at the expense of the state budget for the nonproduction sphere, of which the total volume reached in the volume of construction and assembly work is 48.7 percent, is no longer permissible, either. Therefore, we believe that from the point of view of capital investments, the plans are balanced and must be adhered to.

The second matter: In order to provide the essential full backing for the money circulation that is causing such great difficulties today, the main emphasis has to be placed on increasing the mass of goods. Fairly serious measures have been developed to this end within the plan. We support these entirely and completely, and are prepared to take the most active part in their implementation. At the same time, however, it seems that the Council of Ministers should work out a program for the annual increase of the mass of goods and foodstuffs by R50-60 billion as of next year and for the whole of the 13th 5-Year Plan. This would help us fully back the money circulation. All in all, I support the draft plan and budget for 1990 and move that it be ratified, and that a struggle on the part of all the people be initiated everywhere so as to have it implemented. Thank you for your attention.

Azerbaijan's Mutalibov

LD0511224889 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2004 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Speech by Deputy Ayaz Niyazi ogly Mutalibov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, at the 31 October session of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Comrades, we consider the approach to drawing up a plan for elections to be the correct one, and the extraordinary measures planned to improve the economy to be right, on the whole. With persistent and purposeful work, they will undoubtedly make it possible to ensure that the national economy functions in a balanced and well-proportioned way. I should nevertheless, like to draw attention to a number of issues that we consider require further work. For instance, one cannot agree with the practice of transferring previously strictly limited material resources for the construction of housing and social amenities to an as yet unformed and uncontrolled wholesale trading and direct link market. For it is no secret that many enterprises refuse to conclude contracts on established interrepublican coproduction, demanding equivalent supplies in the form of

other types of output. It is therefore necessary to raise the question of reducing the size of the state order for some products, in order to have an alternative output for goods exchange both within the country and beyond it. This, I think, would also accord with state-wide interests.

I would like to dwell in particular on the problem of scientific and technical progress. Even though major tasks of scientific and technical programs have been included into the state order—ecology, economical use of resources, and increased production efficiency—the economy still remains inert, and slow to take up the introduction of scientific and technical achievements. It is high time that a mechanism of planning be worked out such as would give enterprises an interest in financing scientific developments and in introducing them into production at a fast rate.

The problem of employment is another one that faces us acutely. Deputy Yanayev was hard-hitting and correct in his discussion of this. There are over 300,000 able-bodied people who are not employed in public-sector production, and with the arrival in the republic of over 200,000 refugees from other republics, the situation has become more acute than ever. We are working out special programs for solving the employment issue in 1990 and during the 13th 5-year period. At the same time, however, we are linking high hopes with the construction of factories and enterprises. In connection with this, we consider it necessary to ask that the school computer factory under construction in Baku, and the motor vehicle, machine-building, and acoustic instruments works in Kirovobad, which is approaching construction readiness, not be mothballed.

One cannot fail to mention a matter which is vital for the solution of the food program. Over 80 percent of the gross output of our republic's agriculture is produced on irrigated land, and further increase in output depends on improvement in the technical state of the operating irrigation systems, and on bringing new irrigated lands in to agricultural use. However, the decision has been taken to a halt in our republic the construction of many water conservancy and land improvement installations, and to freeze over 250 million rubles' worth of incomplete construction projects. This decision will seriously hamper the implementation of plans to improve the economy and will aggravate the already acute problem of employment of the population, especially refugees, the overwhelming majority of whom worked in agriculture in the areas they have left. We therefore beg most insistently that the plans for land improvement construction be restored to us, on the scale provided for by the 5-year plan.

We support and approve the draft plans for the economic and social development and the budget of the country for 1990, and feel that they can be ratified. The successes in implementing these will, of course, depend upon each republic and upon each of us. Therefore I assure you that we shall do everything to bring this about.

I shall take this opportunity to express my thoughts on the subject of the Congress. I think we should agree with the proposal voiced here, and given that the third quarter was also a difficult one, and the fourth too, and that we have to prepare for next year and ensure a good start, and that we have to implement all the rough drafts of programs we are currently discussing—I think that it would be expedient to postpone this congress. All the more so in that the government should nevertheless be given the opportunity to get on with its affairs.

This is by way of criticism from below, we do not always manage to see ministers at their work places, and resolve issues with them. Thank you.

Tajikistan's Makhkamov

LD0511232489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2021 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Speech by Deputy Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee, at the 31 October session of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies! One should not fail to take into account the fact that successful implementation of the next plan demands a great deal of preparatory work. Only 2 months remain before that plan, and the people are asking of us not papers and speeches, but practical deeds. In this connection, one must not pass over in silence the fact that the draft plan contains a number of positions which demand for their implementation huge efforts and out-of-the-ordinary methods, as well as the maximum coordination of our as-yet-limited material resources and existing capacities. It is not by accident that the conclusions of the commissions and committees emphasize the need for the balanced nature of plans to be approached in a better-thought-out way, all the more so in that these plans are established at the upper limit of attainability of indices and production efficiency.

I will permit myself to dwell on the production of non-food consumer goods. In retail prices, the growth rate of these is envisaged at 20.3 percent. The country has never known such a high growth index, but it is essential to secure it to sharply improve the situation on the consumer market. It is precisely this that today represents one of the main sources of social tension. consequently, this should be fully provided with material and technical resources, taking into account, of course, their economic and rational uses. I say this, because in our republic we are already extremely concerned about the fact that the plans for production of non-food consumer goods do not as yet fall in with the resources earmarked for distribution. It is proposed to try to find 20-25 percent for market trade and for direct links, but we all know that given the absence of such a market and, furthermore, given the group economic egoism which is increasingly making itself felt, even in whole regions: it will be extremely difficult to provide oneself with resources.

We completely support the USSR Supreme Soviet commissions and committees' proposal regarding the introduction of sanctions against leaders for using—for purposes other than those intended—quotas of material and technical resources allocated for production of consumer goods. In our view, harsher sanctions should be established for breaking economic contracts on supplies, all the more so in that recently such phenomena have been tending to rise. For example, in our republic alone, in connection with the allocated quotas and schedule orders for the 9 months of the current year, the supply of 500 units of extremely essential machinery, tens of thousands of tonnes of cement, a large quantity of timber materials and metal was refused. As a result, the 9-month plan for commissioning housing has wrecked.

During the course of examination of the draft plan, both in Gosplan and in committees and government institutions, we raised a number of questions of vital importance for our republic. I would like to touch on just three, er, two issues.

The first is this. It is high time for us to rectify the injustice committed at one time in regard to an entire mountainous region, in respect of creating living conditions and wages. The rayon in question is the Murgabskiy Rayon of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, which has a population of 11,000. The rayon is located at an altitude of 3,600-4,200 meters above sea level. The absence of sufficient oxygen...er, there is not enough...fodder in the foothills. I mean, the rayon is engaged in livestock farming, and the climatic conditions are difficult; in the summer temperatures go from 30 degrees above to 60 degrees of frost in winter. However, in terms of wages, this rayon has not been classed with the most distant northern rayons in the country, where a 100-percent supplement is provided for harsh living conditions.

The second matter is this. For many years, over the course of four 5-year periods, the question of building a railway to one of the republic's oblasts, or rather to 2 of the republic's oblasts, in order to raise the economy of these oblasts has been on the agenda in the republic. This railway is 128 km in length, in all. Yet after four 5-year periods, it has still not been decided. In the current 5-year period, in 1990, it was envisaged that ground work should be done; that was the last 5-year period when it was said there will be no more questions, we will build this railway. And now, this railway is still not in the plan. We simply do not know how to explain this to the people. We understand that there are many problems in the country, but problems such as these, the most difficult ones, which must be resolved, we should evidently find ways of resolving.

On the whole, the draft plan and budget of the country for 1990 answer the requirements set by the congress and on behalf of the deputies from Tajikistan I propose, I also join with those comrades who have spoken, that it should be approved.

1 Nov Parliamentary Proceedings Reported

PM03112389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 1

[IZVESTIYA parliamentary correspondents V. Dolganov and V. Kurasov report under the rubric "At the Second Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet": "Step Toward Rule-of-Law State"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] ...Let us return to the events of the 1 November morning and evening plenary sittings. We have already announced that, on the instructions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, delivered a report on the draft Standing Orders of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and other draft laws determining the activity of our elected representatives.

We are talking about a package of organically interconnected acts designed to ensure the effective working of the Congress, the Supreme Soviet, and every USSR people's deputy, he said. Extremely intensive work lies ahead. It is complicated by the fact that new norms for our overall activity are having to be elaborated almost on the move, inasmuch as practical work in all structures of the country's new supreme organ of power is developing daily. Our task is to enshrine all the best elements of this practical work and at the same time provide scope for further improvements in the work of deputies within the chambers' committees and commissions and the Congress and Supreme Soviet as a whole.

Recalling Lenin's well-known remark that legislation demands extreme care, the speaker stressed the importance of procedural questions. He also particularly singled out the Law on the Status of People's Deputies. This is understandable, since it is the deputy who must be the central figure in a soviet of any level and within the system of representative democracy as a whole.

R.N. Nishanov pointed out that during the preparation of the new draft laws consideration was given to our new parliament's accumulated experience, along with a great many useful elements from world legislative practice. Characterizing the features of the documents under examination, he laid the main stress on the most critical provisions which provoked many heated arguments at the Congress of People's Deputies and at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In particular, he discussed the secret ballot procedure, other important procedural questions, the principles of the formation and accountability of various central bodies, including the country's government, and the Supreme Soviet's monitoring powers and foreign policy activity.

The package of documents put forward for consideration, the speaker said, was distributed to people's deputies during the first session of our parliament; they have had time to study it thoroughly and submit proposals and addenda. More than 60 deputies have conveyed their comments to the Supreme Soviet's Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order Committee.

Touching on the question of voters' instructions to USSR people's deputies, the chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities stressed that, as a rule, only those instructions relating to the competence of union ministries, departments, and organizations should be accepted for execution.

Then R.N. Nishanov answered numerous questions from deputies, explaining in conclusion that the proposed legal acts will undergo further finishing work in the committees and commissions and that there is still an opportunity to improve and refine them.

People's Deputy K.D. Lubenchenko spoke on behalf of the Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order Committee. He said that these documents, which have been created by qualified state law specialists, are the basis for further work and that they still have to undergo further examination in all committees and commissions.

After a short recess, N.D. Pivovarov, chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies and Management and Self-Management Development Committee, was given the floor. Speaking about the difficult birth of the drafts under discussion, he said, inter alia: One draft law alone on voters' instructions to USSR people's deputies went through nine versions in the committee stage.

The Soviet of Nationalities Standing Orders must differ from the Soviet of the Union Standing Orders, otherwise the separation of the Supreme Soviet into two chambers will be merely arbitrary, Deputy R.V. Gudaytis said. He was opposed to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies ratifying the composition of the Supreme Soviet inasmuch as representatives of one republic cannot be aware of the professional and human qualities of other regions' emissaries.

People's Deputy Yu.N. Shcherbak believes that the draft laws duplicate one another in many respects, so it is sufficient to adopt only two of them—those on status and standing orders.

People's Deputies T.N. Dudkov, A.Ye. Sebentsov, A.A. Likhanov, V.I. Matviyenko, N.N. Koryugin, and others also voiced their proposals.

The question of approving the package of draft laws at the first reading was put to the vote: 390 deputies voted "for," 8 voted "against," and there were 6 abstentions. The committees and commissions have been given 2 weeks to put the finishing touches to them.

Ye.A. Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, was given the floor twice—at the 1 November morning and evening sittings, presenting the deputies first with the draft Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on the Judicial System and then with the draft Law on the Procedure of Appeal to the Courts Against Unlawful Actions by State Management Organs and Officials in Breach of Citizens' Rights. The adoption of these laws will be a further step toward creating a genuine rule-of-law state, the speaker and many deputies pointed out. Although it is true that the participants in the discussion did not agree on everything with the authors of the drafts and with the observations already introduced by the Supreme Soviet Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order Committee.

Deputies A.V. Oborin and V.I. Semenko upheld the joint viewpoint held by this committee and the USSR Supreme Court, which had submitted the draft laws for consideration. People's Deputies I.B. Shamshev, N.I. Ignatovich, Yu.K. Sharipov, F.M. Burlatskiy, A.M. Yakovlev, V.M. Minin, A.A. Denisov, B.I. Oleynik, and many others spoke in fairly stringent opposition.

Which proposals will be adopted? Which will be rejected? We will obviously receive the answer to these questions soon. Both draft laws were adopted at the first reading.

Committee Discusses Leasing Bill 3 Nov

LD0311172489 Moscow TASS in English 1655 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

Of a package of bills designed to put the Soviet economy back on track, the bill on leasing is closer to approval than others now being considered by Supreme Soviet committees and commissions.

Chairman Sergey Alekseyev told a meeting of the Supreme Soviet legislative committee today that the bill on leasing could be adopted by the autumn parliamentary session.

Leasing can help reverse the economic decline, he said.

Meanwhile, some committee members believe the bill needs improvement. They want it to allow farmers to hire seasonal workers. Current Soviet laws prohibit individual owners from hiring workers.

The government submitted the draft Soviet and republican guidelines on leasing and bills on ownership, land, taxes and social enterprise to the Soviet parliament in early October.

After the parliament approves the guidelines every republic will pass its own law on leasing, based on differing national traditions and economic trends.

Also on Friday, the Economic Reform Committee discussed a bill on uniform Soviet tax system.

The bill drew fire from many deputies who said it failed to clearly define tax relations between enterprises and local authorities.

Marshal Kulikov on Duties of People's Deputy

PM0611104189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Report by Captain First Rank V. Lukashevich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA parliamentary correspondent: "People's Deputy: Rights and Responsibilities"]

[Excerpt] The Kremlin—[Passage omitted] Questions connected with the rights and responsibilities of people's deputies and the feedback between them and the voters also concern people's representatives elected from the military. And, as is well known, there are more than 80 of them. What is the opinion of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, one of the most senior members of the Supreme Soviet, on progress in the parliamentary discussion of these problems?

[Kulikov] As a military man, I would like to express my viewpoint on the advisability and necessity of drafting and adopting these draft laws. There are indeed quite a lot of us. A total of 82 people from the Armed Forces, and I would include war and labor veterans in this group too—75 people who were connected with the Army and Navy in the past or are still connected now. For this category of people, as for all people's deputies, these belated documents are extremely necessary.

In his report, R.N. Nishanov discussed many aspects of the problem in detail. Deputies still do not have clear-cut rights and responsibilities. From my own experience I feel that you sometimes experience awkwardness in this work: deputies' questions, tens, hundreds of letters, meetings with the electorate; All this not only takes time, it also requires a certain contribution from assistants and material expenditure. When legal documents appear, the deputies' work will be more clear-cut. It is probably also true that, once he knows exactly what rights a people's deputy has, the voter himself will take his problems to him with greater confidence and certainty.

[Lukashevich] Viktor Georgiyevich, how do you regard the fact that some military servicemen who are members of the Supreme Soviet and members of committees and commissions seem to be torn between Moscow and their garrisons, where they also have difficult responsibilities?

[Kulikov] I have served a great many years in the Army and have also been a member of the Supreme Soviet for a long time. Of course, you cannot compare the work of the Supreme Soviet in past years with its present work. Its functions and approaches have changed and parliamentary activity is now conducted in new conditions. The new political thinking, glasnost, and, I would say, new-found individual freedoms have introduced a number of features which it is hard to compare. I include among these positive aspects everything that is now taking place with regard to democratizing the supreme organ of authority. But there are some questions which we have yet to assay and confirm in practice. So I only have the right to express my own opinion.

The Supreme Soviet is a permanent organ, and members of the Supreme Soviet must free themselves from their official duties. I certainly do not say that it should be all of them, but most of them, at least. If we are talking about members of the military, I cannot even think of a post in which it would be possible to combine membership of the Supreme Soviet with fulfillment of official duties. This applies to either the deputy regiment commander responsible for political affairs, or the commander of a battalion, regiment, or division, or even the commander of a military district. Our statutes clearly stipulate the duties of these officials, who carry personal responsibility for combat readiness, combat and political training, and the state of military discipline. There are not even any provisions that give others the right to take the responsibility for the main parameters of our official activities. Some say that you can come and take part in the work of the session on some occasions. But this kind of erratic attendance is of no use. That is my point of view. [passage omitted]

Political & Social

Soviet Leaders Attend Oct Revolution Ceremony

LD0411172489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow—The Kremlin Palace of Congresses. Today the leading people and innovators of production of the capital's enterprises; veterans of the party, war, and labor; scientific and cultural figures; servicemen; and workers of Moscow Oblast gathered here. They came to the ceremonial session devoted to the 72d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Foreign guests and diplomats were present.

The participants in the sitting greeted with applause Comrades Gorbachev, Vorotnikov, Zaykov, Kryuchkov, Ligachev, Medvedev, Ryzhkov, Slyunkov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Biryukova, Vlasov, Lukyanov, Pugo, Razumovskiy, Yazov, Baklanov, Girenko, Manayenkov, Stroyev and Usmanov.

The ceremonial session was opened by Saykin, chairman of the executive committee of Moscow City Soviet. The Soviet anthem was played. Kryuchkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Committee for State Security, presented a report entitled: "The Great October Revolution and the Renewal of Soviet Society." The report was listened to attentively and was applauded. After the conclusion of the ceremonial session, The Internationale resounded throughout the hall. Ceremonial sessions devoted to the 72d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution took place in the capitals of the Union republics and in other cities of the country.

Gorbachev Addresses Diplomats

LD0611111589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Nov 89 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[TASS report: "Meeting with Diplomatic Corps in Kremlin"]

[Text] The traditional ceremony of the presentation of the heads of foreign countries' diplomatic missions accredited in Moscow to M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was held 4 November in the Saint George's Hall of the Great Kremlin Palace. The ceremony was attended by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister.

The diplomats were presented by V.I. Chernyshev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry protocol department.

The heads of the diplomatic missions warmly congratulated the Soviet leaders and entire Soviet people on the imminent Great October holiday.

Addressing the gathering, M.S. Gorbachev said:

I greet you at the traditional meeting to mark our statewide holiday—the birthday of the land of the soviets. The personal destiny of each one of you has determined that you live with us through a very complex but also very interesting and very promising period in the Soviet people's life.

To judge by how the leadership of the majority of countries represented here is responding to what is happening in our country, we can see the fruit of your work too—objective and conscientious information.

That is extremely important right now—having a correct idea about each other. The whole world is at a crossroads of world historical importance. On the boundary between the centuries mankind is making his choice—in thinking and in practice—of international and national priorities. And at the same time a selection of the values accumulated over millenia and capable of continuing to serve people in the future.

Processes of renewal are under way in countries with the most diverse sociopolitical systems in various parts of the world. And at the same time there is an increasing awareness of the interconnection and interdependence of all parts of the international community today. That is why responsibility is also increasing for decisions even on a purely internal plane, not to mention foreign policy, because each decision to one degree or another sooner or later will come into contact with the interests of others, which now demand special attention and respect. Without that international relations cannot be restructured on a democratic, humane basis.

For our country this year has been very full—with summit meetings and thorough diplomatic work. At the conference table there have been new initiatives, important agreements have been reached, and extraordinary, sometimes unique documents of international significance have been adopted. There is a good amount of groundwork for next year.

We now attach special importance to the formation of the bilateral and multilateral mechanism necessary to implement new ideas and accords and to achieve tangible results. That is now the key question. And one link in this mechanism is the embassies here in Moscow and, naturally, our embassies abroad.

You know of our overall assessment of the international situation from the recent statements and speeches by representatives of the Soviet leadership. Positive trends are gathering momentum and acquiring increasingly specific forms. Many events confirm that conclusion. But almost every day also brings unfavorable news, which prevents the normalization of relations and progressive transformations and runs counter to the aspirations and hopes of the peoples and the world public. That is why there is still a large amount of difficult constructive and creative work to be done on the expanses of the planet.

It is of fundamental importance that there is now place in it for all countries—large, medium, small, and tiny; allied, neutral, and nonaligned. It is the vigorous, enterprising, and original participation of all the multiplicity of UN members in world politics, which is a sign of the times and a gain of recent years.

Mankind has acquired the chance, by thinking in a new way and acting in a new way, of gradually approaching a more harmonious, secure, and truly civilized world order. We can only implement this chance together.

Convey to your governments and peoples best wishes and greetings from Soviet people and the Soviet leadership.

The doyen of the diplomatic corps, Kwan Hui-kyong, DPRK ambassador to the USSR, said in his speech:

We are glad to have met with you in the Kremlin on the eve of the 72d anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

I have the honor, on behalf of the heads of the diplomatic missions of various countries in Moscow, to express to you, the Soviet leadership, and the entire Soviet people ardent congratulations and wishes in connection with the notable October holiday.

Encompassing all fields, renewal and perestroyka in society in the Soviet Union are being implemented in depth.

The elections to people's deputies seats and to the first congress of people's deputies proceeded successfully, having enormous importance in the history of the Soviet people. Various measures were taken aimed at the socioeconomic development of the multinational Soviet Union and the improvement of the people's welfare.

Allow me on behalf of the heads of the diplomatic missions once more to congratulate you in connection with your election to the post of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the first Congress of People's Deputies.

We know well the efforts of the Soviet Government and people aimed at accelerating the Soviet Union's socioeconomic development, completely eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons in the world, and creating a peaceful world without wars and in particular your vigorous activity and great contribution to the matter, esteemed Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

All mankind, irrespective of region, country, or nation, demands stable and lasting peace and a clean ecological situation.

We must pool our common efforts for the sake of peace throughout the world, international security and a cloudless planet.

I am sure that the relations of friendship and cooperation between our countries and peoples will develop on the basis of the principles of mutual respect, noninterference in internal affairs, equality, mutual advantage, and peaceful coexistence in the interests of our country and to benefit peace and security throughout the world.

We wish you good health and happiness and also great successes in your responsible work aimed at deepening perestroyka in the economic and social spheres and improving the people's welfare.

After the official ceremony relaxed talks took place with the ambassadors and charges d'affaires ad interim.

The meeting with the diplomatic corps passed in a friendly atmosphere.

KGB Chief Addresses Session

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[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1355 GMT on 4 November begins a live relay from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses of the "Ceremonial Session in Celebration of the 72d Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution."

At 1358 GMT Gorbachev enters to applause, followed by other members of the leadership. The leadership lineup on the podium is shown. Seated in the front row, from left to right, are: Slyunkov, Medvedev, Ligachev, Gorbachev, Saykin, Zaykov, Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Voritnikov.

At 1400 GMT Moscow City Soviet Chairman V.T. Saykin declares the meeting open. The national anthem is played. He then gives the floor to KGB Chairman Kryuchkov.

At 1403 GMT Kryuchkov delivers a 57-minute speech, ending at 1500 GMT.

At 1502 GMT Saykin declares the festive meeting closed. All present then stand and sing "The Internationale".

Kryuchkov's Address

PM0611114589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 5 Nov 89 pp 1-2

["Great October and the Renewal of Soviet Society: V.A. Kryuchkov's Report to the Ceremonial Session Dedicated to the 72d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses on 4 November 1989"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] Dear comrades, respected guests from abroad: the 72d anniverary of the Great October Socialist Revolution is on the calendar of history. Again and again the Soviet people and our numerous friends abroad turn their thoughts to those days that shook the world and which set the development of the country along a new, unexplored channel. At that time in October 1917, something unprecendented in history took place. In a huge country, distinguished by the particular severity of

its social and political oppression and the lack of rights for the people, all power passed into the hands of the workers and peasants. On the debris of the collapsed empire there arose a republic of soviets, a new kind of state which set as its goal the building of a communist society.

The scale of the design and the audacious courage of the revolutionaries boggles the mind. The Bolsheviks, with Lenin at their head, and the people who rose up were not superior to their class enemies in either material resources or in weapons, but nevertheless they were victorious. The forces of truth excelled in the profundity of their ideas and strength of spirit and their belief in the inexhaustible creative potential of free labor. They excelled in their self-sacrificing readiness to struggle for the cause of the revolution, even at the price of their own lives. The working people followed the party of Lenin because of all Russia's numerous political parties, only it was prepared to head the struggle for the aspirations reached by the people through suffering, to halt the imperial war, and to give power to the soviets, land to the peasants, and factories and works to the workers, to give every nation the possibility of developing and flourishing. This was a genuine popular program for saving Russia from catastrophe, the only way out of the very deep social crisis that had seized the country.

In his book "Russia in the Shadows", Herbert Wells, who, as is well known, at that time did not share communist ideas, wrote of the Bolsheviks that "only they could become the backbone of a reviving Russia, and only on the basis of Soviet power could it return to civilization."

For the first time, the October Revolution opened up before mankind a real prospect of socialist development. Until 1917, capitalism held sway in the world. The future of the peoples was essentially decided in a few western capitals and was decided in such a way that wars followed one after the other until they merged into worldwide carnage. The October Revolution deprived imperialism of the monopoly to determine the destinies of the planet and served as a kind of detonator for an entire series of anticolonial, popular democratic, and socialist revolutions which swept through all the continents.

As a result, in the second half of the 20th century, a qualitatively different world order came about, based on a variety of social structure forms of over 160 independent states.

Placed in conditions of competition among social systems, capitalism itself, too, underwent considerable changes. The West's ruling circles were forced to limit their global claims and could not but take into account the attractive force of much of socialism's social and economic experience.

The heroic and at the same time dramatic fate of the new society engendered by the October Revolution leaves no one indifferent. Progressive mankind draws inspiration and confidence in the struggle for a more perfect world from the humanist ideals of our revolution and from the vast spiritual force of the peoples who have thrown off the fetters of the old system.

At the same time, attempts are being made to represent the October Revolution as a tragic mistake of history, to portray things in such a way that the creation of a society of justice and freedom, started in 1917, has suffered failure. Some are sincerely mistaken, unable to understand the complex, contradictory history of the 20th century. Others do not accept the revolution precisely because it threw down a challenge to the world of oppression and violence. We ourselves are closely looking into our past and seeking to extract from history the lessons that are necessary for the comprehension of the present and the vision of the future. The experience of the country which was the first to take the road of socialist development is invaluable. The path of trailblazer was difficult. During over half of the years after the October Revolution, our people lived in extraordinary, extreme circumstances. There were years of devastating wars, foisted upon us, of restoration of the destroyed national economy, of an exhausting arms race, years of the personality cult. Could our path have been less difficult?

It is more of a theoretical question. The path has been traveled. It contains both things we can be proud of and things we cannot fail to condemn. But it is of fundamental importance to emphasize: it is precisely the ideals of the Great October which inspired all that is best and heroic in our history. The labor exploit of the workers and peasants and the intelligentsia, who created in a very short time a mighty industrial power, the scale of cultural construction in the country, the unparalleled heroism of the Soviet people in the years of the Great Patriotic War, and the impressive achievements of science—all this has become the continuation of the cause of October and the cause of Lenin. All this constitutes the subject of our common pride and serves as a never-ending source of Soviet patriotism. Patriotism is the highest moral value, it is the basis for consolidation of all healthy forces of society. Such feelings as love for our country and devotion to the fatherland are imperishable for us as they were before. We are turning with words of most profound gratitude to the veterans of war and labor and to the veterans of the party for all that they did for the homeland. We bow low to them! It is vitally important not to lose their ardent patriotism and their lofty faith in the ideals of socialism and communism, not to sever the bond between the generations—the thread of continuity leading from the veterans to today's youth and to future generations. Without historical continuity of all that is revolutionary and that ensues from October, there would be no perestroyka, which is reviving the creative potential of socialism. [applause]

We have also drawn other, bitter experience from the history. At issue are the grave and destructive consequences of Stalinism, which deformed socialism and misconstrued the Leninist conception of the new society.

The premature departure from New Economic Policy, the culmination of peasant ways, the dictate of the command-administrative system inflicted serious damage to the economy and provoked social tension. The cult of personality distorted beyond recognition the institutions of Soviet popular power. The law enforcement bodies, including the state security bodies, were in large measure turned into an instrument of Stalinist arbitrary rule. The ruthless mechanism of repressions destroyed the flower of the Bolshevik party and drained of blood all sections of Soviet society. The pleiad of Cheka [Soviet security body 1918-1922] men who trained under, and were comrades-in-arms of, Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy fell under its mill wheels.

There is no justification for the mass repressions and brutality that were frequently perpetrated in the name of the revolution, party, and people. Today we bow our heads to the memory of the innocent victims. For all of us it is a moral purification, and a guarantee that nothing of the kind will ever happen again—ever.

The birth of the new social system was truly agonizing. However, those who shut themselves away in a nihilistic attitude to the past are deeply mistaken. We shall lose too much irrevocably and commit an obvious sin against the truth if we take up the point of view of those who place the historical responsibility for the Stalinist repressions on the Great October Revolution and who try to convince us that Stalinism was not the negation of Leninism, but its logical development. We shall be deeply wrong and become spiritually destitute if we reduce the history of the country and the party to sheer mistakes. Under whatever pretexts the past is distorted, it is always antiscientific and immoral. The ideas of Lenin, freed from a dogmatic interpretation and enriched with contemporary social thought and experience of socialist construction—and of the whole of world development—are a reliable foundation for perestroyka.

What is the value of Leninism for us today? What is particularly important about it? It is, above all, a humanistic vision of socialism, the orientation of the new society towards man and his interests and the need to use the Marxist method of knowledge creatively, to take social and economic realities and the state of public awareness into account, and to pursue policy accordingly. We are reviving the Leninist views of socialist economics, which assume a variety of forms of ownership and the development of commodity-money relations, cooperatives, and self-management. At the heart of our policy today is the Leninist concept of democracy, of the fight against bureaucratism, of the construction of law-governed socialist state, and of the affirmation of the genuine sovereignty of the people. We are comprehending anew the Leninist dialectic of the ethnic and the interethnic, aspiring to find new ways of harmonizing interethnic relations. The Leninist theory of culture, which is aimed at assimilating and developing the best national traditions and achievements of world civilization, and the Leninist ideas of the precedence of common human interests over those of class and of peaceful coexistence and cooperation by states with different social systems, are profoundly topical.

Finally, Lenin's teaching about the party as the political vanguard of the masses, a party of the people and for the people, is invaluable. All this, which has been taken by us from Lenin's heritage, is being tested by present-day experience and is working towards the renewal of socialism.

Comrades, we call perestroyka a revolution in the revolution. Perhaps we have never been so close to the sources of our revolutionary thought, to the undistorted essence of Lenin's ideas, to the creative content of Marxism. In this the party sees an indispensable condition for moving ahead.

The economy is the leading edge of perestroyka. For the first time in many years, at the party's initiative, a radical transformation of the entire totality of production relations, of the economic system which has developed, is being implemented in the country.

The economic reform, which is revolutionary in its essence, has drawn into its orbit millions of Soviet people and has engendered hopes for positive changes. Each of us must be a realist and realize that a radical improvement of the economy demands great efforts and a certain length of time. Some changes for the better have already begun to show. Major structural changes in the economy, its practical reorientation towards resolving social problems and improving the people's well-being have started. This is also manifest in the marked increase in the share of resources from the national income which is being channeled towards social goals. The plan for next year, which was adopted the other day by the USSR Supreme Soviet, provides for a rate of increase of production of Group B consumer goods which is 13 times higher than Group A output. A redistribution of capital investments is taking place in favor of the nonproduction sphere and the production of consumer goods.

New possibilities for resolving the housing problem have opened up not only through state budget funds but also from the resources of enterprises, the population's personal savings, and on a cooperative and individual basis, with the use of credits. In this 5-year plan period, some 660 million square meters of housing is expected to be handed over for occupancy, which is almost 110 million square meters more than in the previous 5-year period.

The entire system of pension provision is being restructured and the minimum pension has been raised.

The economic independence of state enterprises is being expanded. They have obtained free access to international markets.

The level of glasnost in the economic field has risen significantly. The quality of statistics is improving, and dates are published widely. As a result, an objective picture of the condition of the economy is beginning to be formed for the first time in many years in the public's

consciousness. Yet at the same time, the fact remains that so far it has not proved possible to overcome critical phenomena in the national economy. Moreover they have even been aggravated. Disquiet is growing in society. This is connected to the lack of balance in the consumer market, the acute lack of a number of essential goods, and price hikes. So far, little has been done to improve life for the less well off section of society. People ask, with good reason, about the causes of the complicated situation in our economy. Is it a result of perestroyka itself, a kind of payment for it, or is it holding in check the burden of problems that have mounted up? Of course we must provide answers to these questions. Here it is not a matter of perestroyka. Obviously the phenomena of stagnation and the complexity of solving the problems which have mounted up were not properly appraised. Technical and economic backwardness and the lack of development of legal economic regulators have a negative effect on the development of our national economy. It is necessary to admit that the system of incentives for labor are extremely deformed. Many have lost interest in working well and the syndrome of living at other people's expense has developed excessively.

It is completely clear that the command-administrative system has become obsolete. But to ensure that it goes into the past once and for all, it is necessary to create a new management mechanism, and this means intensive, laborious, daily work in many directions.

At the center of economic reform lies the problem of ownership. It is a matter of returning actual possession and disposal of the means of production to the people and of freeing their creative intiative; of creating a full-blooded socialist market which, in conjuction with skillful state planning, would ensure flexible and effective regulation of economic processes. In the West, and indeed here as well, voices are heard, claiming that we are retreating from socialism and are almost restoring capitalism. I would like to say quite definitely that we are retreating not from socialism, but from a narrow and dogmatic understanding of it. For socialism presupposes not formal, but real, ownership by the people, not a bureaucratic, but a genuinely democratic administration of the economy. Our society cannot develop normally without a variety of forms of socialist ownership and equality between them.

The USSR Supreme Soviet is now considering a package of draft laws aimed at transforming the economic system. The new laws will make it possible to make economic reform more effective.

The public is in favor of the development of all-union, union-republican, republican, communal, and other forms of socialist ownership. There is support for leasing, the healthy manifestation of cooperatives, the family contract, and individual labor activity. Joint-stock formations of a socialist type and various forms of mixed ownership including ones involving foreign capital are making themselves felt. The issue of individual personal ownership is also being posed anew; completely unnecessary restrictions have been erected around it. Life convinces one that it is necessary to take a fresh look at a great deal in this area. Individual ownership is intended to become an important factor in speeding up development of the economy. Naturally, it cannot be obtained in an unlawful way, and exploitation of labor is ruled out in this regard.

Perestroyka opens up fine prospects for the economy. It is directed at efficiently tackling such chronic problems as shortages, producers' monopolies, poor incentives for scientific and technological progress, and remoteness from the benefits of the international division of labor. However, we are obliged right now to do everything possible to ease as much as possible the hardships of the present transitional period.

The economic self-reliance of the republics is to be strengthened and their transition to financial autonomy and self-financing is to be ensured. This is the correct way to create equal opportunities to avail oneself of the results of one's labor.

It is very important to achieve a restoration of balance in the market and a healthy ruble and to overcome the gap between the income of the population and their full provision with goods. One may bank on the fact that the measures undertaken by the government will yield tangible results within very short time spans. At the same time, it is necessary to state quite definitely that we wil not succeed in balancing incomes and expenditure and improving the financial system if we count only on centralized measures. Enterprises, organizations, and cooperatives make their own small contribution, if one can put it so, to the disorganization of the market. Defects in the financial autonomy system have opened up opportunities for them to increase their profits by unjustified price increases and changes in their range to the detriment of the consumer.

In 1988 alone the profit obtained by the country's enterprises and organizations grew by 12.3 percent. The average monthly cash wages of workers and employees grew by 8 percent while the gross national output in current prices grew by 6 percent. An even greater gap between the growth in incomes and the increase in goods output is being formed this year. All this is evidence of the complexity of the processes of the economic reform. Unfortunately, not all of its undesirable consequences are being forecast nor taken into account in the course of elaboration of legislative and other normative acts. It is also necessary to stress that the work in this respect should in the first place boost the raising of the productivity of labor, the growth of production efficiency, and that it should not be restricted to the sphere of distribution relations, as it was until now.

The conditions of life in our country and in the West, first and foremost in the United States, are frequently being compared. You cannot get away from it. The comparisons are frequently not in our favor. But is the

fact that these differences are to a great extent explained by differing efficiency and, indeed, by the differing intensity of workers' labor always taken into consideration? The statistics show that the USSR is lagging behind the United States in the level of labor productivity in the national economy by twofold. And do you all know that the labor intensity of U.S. workers is approximately twice as high as it is in our country?

So, an indispensable condition of living better is everyone starting to work better. All must understand this.

The improvement of the economy also depends to a considerable degree on introducing elementary order in the organization of production. Unfortunately, there is lack of it. The national economy incurs huge losses in the extraction and processing of raw materials, in harvesting and procurement of agricultural production, in the transportation, storing, and utilization of all kinds of material resources. These losses are comparable with the annual volume of capital investments in housing construction. To make up for such major losses in some way, we have to spend more than R40 billion of capital investments on the work of 2.5 million people. As you can understand, this kind of economic management cannot make us rich!

Finally, one cannot fail to also speak of those violations of public order which are upsetting the work of national economy industries, particularly of transport, which are throwing the whole regions out of their working rhythm.

The country can and will no longer suffer this. The people need a calm and business-like atmosphere. Strikes are a phenomenon that for us is new and complicated. In many cases labor conflicts have serious social and economic causes. Not infrequently, the strikers' demands are just, although it is not always feasible to resolve them quickly. At the same time, the damage to the economy from the strikes is huge and frequently irreparable. A very high level of responsibility is required when utilizing such an extreme means of resolving labor disputes. What is needed here is constructive dialogue and a rigorous observance of the law. It is not possible to overcome the crisis phenomena in the national economy without skilled economic analysis and competent and responsible management, conscientious labor and a high level of discipline in carrying it out, and legal and political guarantee of the irreversibility of the reform.

The creation of a new economic mechanism is indisolubly linked with the democratization of society. The political and intellectual life of the Soviet people has become richer and more varied. The difficult work on perestroyka has been headed by restless people, generously giving of their knowledge, experience and energy for the good of their homeland. Political activeness is so high that people are proposing a multitude of different answers to each of the questions which life sets. Such an emancipation of the civil activity of millions of Soviet people is one of the very important achievements of the present day. Society has changed and we, ourselves, have become different in many ways. Perestroyka means the assertion of genuine, socialist people's power. The authoritarian legacy of the past is being overcome. A process of extensive association of the working masses with the management of state and public affairs is underway. The guarantees of the rights and freedoms of the individual are being strengthened, and a law-based state is being constructed.

Basing itself on its own, socialist values, the Soviet political system is also open to all the best from world democratic experience. The road to real people's power is not simple. It lies, first and foremost, in the restoration of the genuine purpose of the soviets of all levels. The elections of the USSR people's deputies, their first congress, and the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet show that, before our very eyes, a new, democratic culture of socialism is taking shape. For the first time in many decades, the Soviet person has felt the reality of his civil rights, has satisfied himself that his voice is heard and will have a significance in the formation of power bodies. The open discussion of state issues, the struggle of opinions in which new laws and important state decisions are born, and the systematic, strict accountablity of the Soviet government before parliament and before all of society are becoming the norms of political life.

And although there are still many emotions in the work of the highest bodies of state authority and although, possibly, not all the laws that are being adopted are perfect, one thing is clear: only such a road corresponds to the spirit, goals, and tasks of perestroyka. Sovereignty of the soviets in combination with exact division of the functions of the legislative and executive bodies, independence of the judiciary, and guarantees of rights of the individual—all this is a very important component part of the policy of renewal. Soviet people have many genuine values derived from the October Revolution, and the main one of them is our Soviet power. Throughout the country, the preparation for the elections of republican and local soviets is beginning. Not only the quality of the work of the bodies of popular representation at all levels of the political system, but also to a large extent the destiny of perestroyka will depend on how the elections go. We still have little experience of democratic government of the state. But already it is clear how the political maturity of people is growing. More and more, they are giving preference to those who are not aspiring to cheap popularity but who are genuinely concerned for the interests of the cause and who really assume responsibility for the destiny of the country.

By directly participating in the political struggle, citizens are learning to distinguish serious politicians from demagogues who consider themselves political Gullivers and who bring into doubt our main values. We will recall the warning of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin about the fact that demogogues are the worst enemies of the working class, capable of dooming the masses to the most bitter tests. It

is necessary to know how to resolutely uphold and protect socialist democracy, its ideals and principles, and the diversity of its forms, to uphold by sharpness of theoretical ideas and by knowledge of life, by the force of one's own example, to protect it also against authoritarian phenomena, against crusty conservatism, and against radicalistic loss of touch with reality. It is impossible to understand democracy in a biased way, merely as a right to all and everything, ignoring thereby the duty and obligation of the citizen. Unfortunately, reason and realism far from always prevail in those acute discussions which have unfolded today about the issue of the role and the place of the party in society. Certain participants in the discussion depart far beyond the bounds of objectivity, common sense, and even simply of decency. Quite naturally there arises the issue about the dividing line beyond which constructive criticism turns into direct defamation of Communists. However, it is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that many remarks which are being addressed currently to the party are justified. Indeed, one has to renounce the command-and-order style of administrative meddling; one has to consistently rectify mistakes and to develop a new strategy and to again and again win the trust of the people.

Let us argue and let us discuss when it is quicker and better to do things, how one is to pass over to political methods of leadership. When we speak about political methods, then we have in mind first and foremost the elaboration by the party of a scientifically founded program for the development of society on the basis of deep study of the processes happening in it, consideration of public opinion, and integration of the interests of the various social groups.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the elaboration of policy adequate to the demands of the times is impossible without creative enrichment of the Marxist-Leninist theory of socialism. The party, with the assistance of ideological and political means, and by means of persuasion, should seek understanding and support for its program from the broad masses of the working people. In former years, we clearly did not attach due importance to the fundamental truth of Marxism that any ideas become a material force only when they capture the masses. Political methods of leadership imply active and direct participation by the CPSU in election campaigns during which the composition of the bodies of state power is formed. The utterances which sometimes are made about alleged inadmissable "interference" by the party in the election process do not hold water. Political struggle at elections is one of the most important functions of any party in any country. The CPSU is no exception in this respect.

The party is required to create the political conditions for the realization of its program goals. This requires well-considered ideological and organizational work, initiative from all communists in the mobilization of the masses for the consistent fulfilment of the decisions that are adopted. The CPSU is proceeding towards its 28th congress, which is less than 1 year away, while renewing itself in a qualitative manner and deepening intra-party democracy. Live and constructive discussion designed to consolidate the party and overcome inertness in its ranks assists in this. Ideological and political unity on fundamental issues implies a broad pluralism of opinions at the stage of discussion. However, the decisions that have been adopted are binding for every Party member.

Comrades, throughout the entire history of our country, Communists have always been right at the heart of the people, in the front ranks of fighters for its interests and for the incarnation of the ideals of October. Let us recall that during the war years, the aspiration of non-party members to go into battle as actual Communists happened on a mass scale. Thus, their attitude to the party was rated at the highest price, the price of their own lives. Faith in the creative force of the party helped us to stand firm and win. This faith is needed today too.

There is no other political force in our society capable of taking the country onto the road of prosperity; thus a weakening of the role of the party as a consolidating force to resist centrifugal tendencies in society must not be allowed. We need neither splits, nor internecine strife, nor mutual suspicion and hated. We need something else—the patient mastery of the norms of civilized dialogue, of the art of mutual understanding and of the ability to work out concerted decisions despite the sharpest differences of opinion.

Renewal is taking place not only in the party but in other public organizations as well, and primarily in the trade unions and the Komsomol. The increased activity of labor collectives demands fundamental changes in the trade union movement. Transforming the interests of the individual into the basic priority of perestroyka places most important tasks before the trade unions: creating an effective system for defending the interests of the working people, educating people to take a high degree of responsibility for the results of their labor, and taking care that the laboring person should for his part become the true master of production and of his country.

Revolution has always been an affair for the young. That was the case in October 1917. That is also the case in the current historic phase. The fate of perestroyka will, in the final analysis, be decided by the generation which is entering life today. For a long time, our society united itself, guided by the unwritten rule according to which concern for the young was a kind of incentive for their obedience. Furthermore, the natural right of young people to express and realize their own views, needs, and aspirations were not considered, as it were. The essence of our current policy is trust in young people and deepening the interrelationship between society, the party, and the Komsomol. As you know, a draft law on young people has been prepared. It is intended to safeguard in reality their full and equal participation in the economic, political, and spiritual life of society and to satisfy specific interests and requirments. Young people have the right to count on their social status being

determined not by age, but primarily by personal, business, and professional qualities.

Young people and members of the Komsomol bear the burden of great work upon their shoulders. We would like very much for the Komsomol to take all that is best and purest from their older comrades. That is healthy continuity between the generations.

The numerous independently-run organizations have become a new phenomenon in the country's political life. They have quite a few useful deeds to their credit, in various fields, from solving problems of ecology and culture to developing international contacts. The way in which these associations are entering public life is far from simple' and it would be naive to expect anything else. However, it is a matter of concern that in some of them the tone is set by loud-mouthed and ambitious people, or people who are ill-disposed to Soviet power or are openly hostile attitude towards it. But, it is not they who determine the face of the informal movements, but those organizations which devote themselves to creative work. It is precisely those associations and movements which are an important component of the social base of perestroyka.

Revolutionary perestroyka has created objective conditions for awakening national self-awareness. It is perfectly natural that people want to be the owners of their own soil and to develop freely their national culture, traditions, and language. This can only be welcomed. At the same time, the sharp exacerbation of interethnic conflicts is prompting great alarm in the country. This is in large part a consequence of serious deformations in Leninist policy on nationalities and a result of a former lack of objectivity in evaluating the real state of affairs. Let us be frank: the problems, contradictions, and dissatisfaction that have appeared represent a real cross-section of our society, without any embellishment. One cannot ignore the fact that social and economic difficulties have a negative effect on relations among nationalities. In individual regions, ethnic egoism has made itself felt in a dangerous manner. Extremists and corrupt elements are fanning ethnic discord in interethnic relations and terrorizing people of other nationalities. Surely no political goals or slogans can justify this barbarism. This is a challenge to the elementary norms of general human morality. The party declares resolutely: there must be no room in the Soviet Union for ethnic discrimination and the incitement of ethnic hatred or discord, and those who are behind the bloody excesses and inspire interethnic clashes should know that the law will not permit any of them to escape responsibility. [applause]

In order to stabilize the situation, a high level of consciousness enabling people to rise above national prejudices is necessary, as is a considered dialogue. I would like to remind you of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's words which he spoke at the CPSU plenum in September 1989: "We all understand the complexity of the nationalities issue and what acute problems it involves. This is a delicate and sensitive issue that demands respect, patience and restraint."

A long-lasting strategy of harmonization of interethnic relations was planned in the party's platform adopted by the CPSU plenum. A new model for Soviet federation is outlined in it which realistically guarantees the independence of the union republics. We are convinced that only within its framework is it possible to utilize to the fullest extent the huge advantage of our union and guarantee the all-around development of all the USSR's peoples, both large and small in numbers.

At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the rights of a nation cannot be above human rights, otherwise this is a direct path to discrimination. The main principle of the Communist Party's nationalities policy is the creation of conditions in which every Soviet citizen, regardless of which region of the country he is in, can enjoy all rights and freedoms and develop his culture and language, regardless of his national background. Internationalism based on the complete equality of the rights of citizens of all nationalities and friendship and fraternity among the peoples is not only the ideal of the party and of socialism. It is the only possible form of normal existence of a multiethnic state. It is not our policy to separate the country into isolated ethnic compartments, but to turn it into a community of genuinely free socialist nations with equal rights. [applause]

Perestroyka and democracy are being implemented on the basis and within the framework of Soviet laws. The formation of a socialist, law-governed state is ushering in a stormy process of law making and the growth of the role of the highest bodies of state power, and of the whole body of deputies. A great number of problems need legal regulation. The question of the democraticness of the procedure for passing laws has been seriously raised, as has their conformity with the needs of perestroyka and public opinion. An atmosphere of the predominance of the law is being created in society, and of the strict observance of socialist legality by state bodies and public organizations, officials, and every Soviet citizen. On the one hand this means respect for the constitutional rights and interests of the individual; on the other hand respect for the bodies of state power and its administration. Soviet people are seriously concerned by the sharp rise in crime. There are various reasons for the situation that has come about. There are defects in the legislation itself, there are instances of unsatisfactory work by the organs for maintaining law and order. But there are also deeper sources of crime.

These include imbalance in the economy and the increase in shortages, management errors and mismanagement, inefficient control of the measure of labor and consumption, failings in upbringing, and inadequate political and legal culture. Some of these are found all over the country; others are local. If society does not excise them, or at the very least localize them, then no matter what efforts are made to bolster the opportunities of the law-enforcement bodies, there will be no improvement in the situation.

The party will strive to ensure that the program that has been formulated to combat crime yields tangible results in the very near future. But the creation of a moral atmosphere in society, such as would make it "too hot" for criminals, depends on each and every one of us. The mass media has a big part to play in this. Organized crime provokes justifiable indignation among citizens. Of late, it has been noticeable how corrupt elements have been seeking access to the levers of power. In its own way this is logical: "Have money, need power." For precisely this reason, the KGB has joined the battle against the most dangerous criminal groups. This has come to be one of its most importance avenues of acvitity in the interests of the people.

In complete conformity with the requirements of the time, the state security organs are implementing a radical restructuring of their activity. There was a need for this sort of renewal. There is no way of defending democracy without submitting our work to the principles of a law-based state, extending glasnost in the work of the KGB's and strengthening our ties with the people. Only under these circumstances will the organs of the KGB operate under supervision and do so effectively; the people will also be assured that state security is ensured within the framework of the law. The measures providing for a precise definition of the rights and obligations of the KGB's organs and troops and the increase in party and parliamentary supervision of their work provide guarantees against a recurrence of the past. The preparation of the new laws on state security and the USSR KGB and the creation in the USSR Supreme Soviet of a committee for defense and state security issues are fully in line with this. The correctness of the chosen course is being confirmed in the course of the everyday work. The desire for democratic ways and for openness meets with the public's support.

The current method of regarding the KGB through the prism of the times of the personality cult and stagnation is being dispersed. Citizens are coming more to recognize the part they play in the matter of safeguarding the security of our multi-ethnic socialist homeland.

Comrades, perestroyka has introduced fundamentally new elements into the USSR's foreign policy and into our homeland's international position. Life is showing that in this field, too, the essential condition for success is the renaissance of the principles and values that have been characteristic of our revolution from the very start: realism, the resolute rejection of obsolete stereotypes, and the affirmation of the new political thinking. The situation in the world, which our people—schooled by bitter historical experience —are accustomed to regard with alarm, is today more and more often inspiring high hopes and optimism.

International tension has palpably decreased as a result of the Soviet Union's bold and considered foreign policy initiatives. A reduction of military arsenals has begun in the country as well as a switching of funds to peaceful purposes within the framework of conversion. Realistic prospects for reducing military confrontation in Europe have taken shape. Understanding of the need to settle regional conflicts peacefully is growing. Our troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan; this state which is our neighbor is successfully defending its independence and liberty as well as the interests of its people for whom Soviet people have sentiments of respect and friendship. International political dialogue, which strengthens mutual understanding and trust, is developing energetically. Perestrokya in the Soviet Union is giving rise to attitudes of benevolence on the part of many people abroad who represent the most various political trends. Sympathy for our country is growing. All of these are the specific fruits of perestroyka. The main thing now is to strengthen the positive trend and to make it stable and irreversible in nature. The recent visit to Finland by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the documents which were signed there are convincing evidence of this.

Tumultuous changes are enveloping the world of socialism. In many countries there is a quest for options of contemporary development taking account of national traditions, historical and economic particularities and, of course, the diversity of social cultures and political institutions. Historical experience has shown convincingly that universal models of socialism do not exist and that attempts to unify and standardize social development in various countries are doomed to failure, and, on the contrary, freedom of choice and independence are capable of enriching the theory and practice of socialist construction. It is our conviction that the peoples that have embarked upon the course of socialism and that have become acquainted with its profoundly popular nature and its possibilities will display wisdom and, in pursuit of humane ideals, will overcome difficulties, work out correct solutions, and follow the course of creativity. The further development of their comprehensive interaction and cooperation on the basis of equal rights is an important factor. Links between the CPSU and communists, socialist, and other progressive parties are developing along the course of the new political thinking. The front of democratic forces on all continents is becoming stronger.

In our foreign policy we take into account the profound changes that are taking place in the world. People are now becoming increasingly convinced that banking on force and diktat is insolvent; all this belongs to the past. The significance of economic factors in the development of international relations is growing at a stormy pace. The bipolar structure of world politics, characteristic of the cold war era, is disintegrating. We face major global problems such as the ecological crisis, a shortage of raw materials and foodstuffs, terrorism, and drug addiction. Understanding of the common nature of mankind's destiny and of the pressing need to expand international cooperation is growing.

The objective requirements of a mutually dependent and integral world are incompatible with the practice of "closed" societies. The expansion of contacts between

people and the exchange of ideas and spiritual values are becoming powerful factors in the mutual rapprochement of peoples.

We attach great importance to developing humanitarian cooperation on the basis of an exact fulfillment by all countries of the decisions of the Vienna meeting and a deepening of the Helsinki process. New laws in the sphere of human rights, that are being prepared by the USSR Supreme Soviet, will help to overcome the legacy of isolation. The democratization of society, the development of Soviet parliamentarism, and the coming into being of people's diplomacy are giving new qualities to our foreign policy, enriching its content, and helping to enhance the USSR's prestige.

Naturally, a further improvement of the international situation depends on our partners too. At times, Soviet people are asking themselves whether we are making concessions which are too great to the West and whether certain unilateral measures by the Soviet Union in reducing its Armed Forces and armaments are justified. It is necessary to state with all responsibility that those steps are not damaging the country's defensive capability. The world is at present overloaded with weapons. Strengthening the security of states requires not a build-up of arsenals but, on the contrary, their reduction. It is precisely such a policy that is in accordance with the vital interests of our people and the interests of the survival and progress of all mankind.

The new vision of peace is meeting with increasing understanding from Western politicians. There are weighty grounds to count on real results from the Soviet-U.S. talks on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments, on a reduction in conventional armed forces, and on improved confidence measures. The preparation of an international convention on banning chemical weapons and eliminating their stocks is moving on to a practical footing. The Soviet Union continues to strive to achieve a total ban on nuclear weapons tests.

Our political contacts and business cooperation with the developing states are becoming more and more fruitful. It would, of course, be premature to claim that solutions have been found to all acute international problems. The irreversibility of the positive changes is possible and attainable but has not yet become a stable trend in international life. Behind the words of some Western leaders about their positive attitude toward our perestroyka, one does not always sense a wish to develop normal, mutually beneficial links. In the civilized community, there still remain discriminative restrictions, and an embargo still exists on the supply of technology to the Soviet Union.

Regrettably, it has to be noted that the desired trust between East and West does not exist yet. We cannot ignore the impeding force of conservative thinking and dangerous calculations that socialism can simply be "closed down." Voices are still heard in the West, including voices belonging to high-ranking statesmen, alleging that the disintegration of the Soviet state is predetermined. Well, this is not the first time that we have heard this. Our great union of peoples has endured more than one ordeal and has stood its ground. It will stand firm now, too. The Soviet Union is not disintegrating but is seeking and finding ways for its own renewal. The Soviet Union is finding new breath as one of the world's largest multinational powers. [applause]

In certain circles of leading capitalist countries, the shortage of political will for cooperation is still felt. And indeed how can one reconcile statements about devotion to peace with the continuing escalation of the West's military programs? In these conditions, it is necessary to maintain the defensive might of our country at levels of reasonable sufficiency. History teaches that we must always be ready to defend the socialist fatherland. [applause]

Today the Soviet Armed Forces are equipped with further improved types of weapons. Serving in the armed forces are competent cadres with a high degree of professional training who are devoted to the cause of defending the homeland. The renewal of society has touched the Army and the Navy where the processes of democratization, improving the moral atmosphere, eradicating irregular relations, and strengthening the welfare provisions for servicemen are occurring. Here, too, there is quite a lot remaining to be done.

We have been living in peace for over 4 decades, an important role in that peace is played the Armed Forces of the Soviet State, along with other factors. The party and the people are filled with feelings of profound gratitude and respect for those who serve in the Armed Forces and in the frontier and internal troops and who are fulfilling their sacred military duty to the homeland. [applause]

Soviet foreign policy is still awaiting its objective and thoughtful chroniclers. Opportunities have appeared for an honest and dispassionate analysis of the whole legacy of foreign policy, including those events which we formerly passed over. However, one cannot agree with attempts at a tendentious reevaluation of the very essence of the foreign policy line of the Soviet State. For some people go almost so far as to say that the Soviet Union bears responsibility for both fascism's accession to power in Germany and the start of World War II, and say that the cold war was also, allegedly, the USSR's handiwork. None of that has anything in common with the historical truth. Everybody knows about the decisive contribution of the Soviet peoples to the crushing of fascist Germany. [applause]

It was a determinant contribution towards liberating the peoples of Europe, and not only those of Europe, from the deadly threat of such a monster as fascism. Our sacrifices, brought to the altar of peace and progress, are innumerable; the dearest price which we paid was the many millions of lives of Soviet people taken away by the war against fascism. Can it really be possible, after all

that, to level any complaints against our country? The Soviet Union is indebted to nobody. [applause]

Of course, the USSR's foreign policy has not been free of mistakes and errors, but at all stages of history, the main thrust of the Soviet state's foreign policy line has been and remains the struggle for peace, justice, mutual understanding, and cooperation. [applause]

Comrades, in October 1917, the peoples of our country made their historical choice in favor of socialism. Perestroyka is a confirmation of that choice in new conditions and a continuation of the cause of the Great October. It is important that the process of renewal and the deep transformations that have begun should develop on a large scale, without pausing or retreating. He who does not move forward is condemned to stagnation. The tasks facing the country are truly momentous. It requires accord among all the people, as well as consolidation and selfless labor, to solve these tasks. We are growing more and more clearly aware that the good of each person and each nation is inseparably linked to the common good. The main condition for progress lies in uniting the minds, talents, and efforts of millions. We have every reason for optimism. Society has thrown off apathy and begun moving; the spirit of the people, in which love for the fatherland, wisdom, courage, conscience, and honor have merged together, has been awakened. That is the guarantee of the immortality of the cause of October and the guarantee of the victory of perestroyka. [applause]

The people of each country have an object which is sacred to their nation and their own source of strength and pride. For Soviet people it is October, the embodiment of the innermost dream of a society of liberty, justice, peace, and happiness. Under the banner of the revolution, under the banner of Lenin, for the renewal and prosperity of the country of October, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics! [applause]

Gorbachev Urges 'Deepening' Economic Reform

PM0511212189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

["Concluding Remarks by M.S. Gorbachev" at undated CPSU Central Committee meeting with "prominent economists, leaders of central and republic departments and of labor collectives, and USSR people's deputies": "Everything of Value Should Be Put into Practice"; published following account of discussion at above meeting under general headline "Economic Reform at a Crossroads"]

[Text] This meeting could have been held earlier, but it does serve a useful purpose today. Particularly in the context of the times in which we are living and making decisions for the next few years as well as the more distant future. It is very important that we pool our creative efforts today, since we are now dealing with really key questions of perestroyka affecting the relations of ownership and a whole variety of other questions concerning both the base and the superstructure of society. These problems are at various stages in terms of deliberation and the preparation of solutions.

Taking part in various meetings, above all those within the framework of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I am able to see that we now need concerted efforts more than ever before if we are to achieve the optimal solutions corresponding to the objectives we have set ourselves. I think that there is general understanding in our country of the basic plan, the crux of this concept: We want, through perestroyka, to renew our society, to achieve new forms in all spheres of social life, and to reveal more fully the potential of socialism—to make it human, to humanize it. It seems that no one in this circle has proposed anything different. While there have been some opinions on a different plane, they have related to discrete issues.

Why is this important today? It is important because this is no longer an abstract question. When some people advanced the idea of a "capitalization" of our society, this immediately produced a very stormy reaction: "What is being suggested to us?" I confess to you that I was immediately beset by a stream of letters resolutely protesting against such concepts.

On the other hand, self-styled "champions" are trying to defend socialism from...perestroyka and, if one is to be frank, to obstruct perestroyka and obstruct the renewal of socialism at any cost.

Perestroyka is regarded by them as the dismantling of not only the command-administrative system but of socialism altogether.

In short, discussion has become very trenchant in nature. What conclusion should we draw from the prevailing situation? First and foremost that we need to understand and grasp the specific political reality of our time. It is possible that we too, Comrades, have in part given cause for such statements and conclusions. That is to say, we have not worked everything through in some areas. Even now we are failing to work things through to a substantial degree. Clearly many of our comrades, including representatives of science, have lacked a sense of due responsibility and consideration in public discussion of fundamental questions. We are therfore faced with the task of deepening the elaboration of the concept and policy of perestroyka. Since there are represented here those who are personally involved in this matter and those who head large scientific collectives, I want to address you on behalf of the party Central Committee: Due attention must be paid this problem, because, as I have already said, it is precisely those basic questions which require full clarification.

I think that those bent on questioning our socialist option are at variance with the public mood and with working people's attitude toward life. Socialism has laid down deep roots. People associate the implementation of the principles of justice, the creation of a humane society, and the assimilation of other values common to mankind with the realization of this idea. In other words,

we have something to lean on, to support us, and something to strive for. But I do think that at some stage we did not do everything we could to provide political perestroyka with ideological support. I do therefore urge that you to continue developing this topic.

It is necessary to deepen our analysis of the new situation that has already taken shape in the course of implementing perestroyka. We obviously need to recognize more clearly that we have already left behind the old forms of life. We have done this deliberately, because we do actually want to say goodbye to ways that are exhausted and that have fettered society's development. All today's difficulty resides in the fact that the constituents of and stages in our entry to the new system have not been fully thought through and elaborated. A situation has arisen whereby we have temporarily lost some levers of economic management. The old system is no longer operating, while the new one based on the democratic methods toward which we are heading has not yet been switched on to full power.

We have underrated some things and not done others, fearing an acute social response to certain radical solutions. We have deferred them for a while, we already see malfunctions in the economy. However, I am sure that the answer to the question "what is to be done?" does not lie in returning to the past. I also say this because there is a dangerous mood among some communist leaders who want to continue issuing orders and base themselves on the old exhausted approaches and mechanisms. But if, Comrades, we succumb to this mood, we will undo the entire cause of perestroyka.

It needs to be frankly stated that, now that we have imparted a dynamic character to the political process, people will not agree to any retreat by us, even a partial one. Once the political process is secured then people, buttressed by it, will exert a more active influence on economic processes too. one can say that economic reform is now at a crucial juncture. We need therefore to go only ahead.

But there is another question which also needs thorough elaboration: How do we advance? I pin my hopes on the fact that this discussion of ours has given impetus to the consideration and development of the ideas of perestroyka. They will also be the focus of attention at the All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference of Economists, which is soon to open in Moscow. Our scientists and practical workers must focus their main attention on this today.

In-depth scientific understanding of economic questions is vitally necessary now. This should be reflected in the Supreme Soviet's legislative activity and should be embodied in actions by the state. It must not be forgotten that theory does not of itself automatically encourage practice. Our purposeful activity needs to be skillfully organized or, more accurately, materialized in large, specific acts. That is why we need both general theory and applied science—a detailing of all the stages of and components of perestroyka. The task is a complex one. How will our future economy look in the light of the reform of ownership relations and the utilization of the market's potential and its regulatory instruments? How and when are we to attain such an economy?

Politicians, economists, and sociologists must take account of these without fail. We have reached the stage where we need to have a further, more considered, detailed program. People expect such a program from us.

As I have already said, we are to deal at the next Congress of USSR People's Deputies with serious, thoroughly elaborated government proposals on improving the economy and on its prospects in the 13th 5-Year Plan. Urgent measures to improve the whole economy, including finances, the consumer market, and so forth will clearly be reflected in the report. But the main thing is that it should reflect the strategy of deepening reform. Preparatory work, including within the USSR Supreme Soviet, is already proceeding in that direction.

I ask that you involve yourselves in the work of Supreme Soviet commissions and committees and regard this as a very important party Central Committee instruction. What we need are not ephemeral documents but clear perspectives for a number of years ahead. It is essential that they be thoroughly elaborated in their theoretical, juridical, and socioeconomic respects.

Incidentally, many deputies express the wish that scientists become involved and assist them with their counsel. This good, healthy attitude shows the deputies' appreciation of their role, their sense of responsibility, and their desire to get to the heart of issues. I think that this should only be welcomed and be met halfway—it is necessary to concentrate on drawing up legislative acts and specific measures to improve the economy that will open up the path to the future.

The experts must begin to work on pioneeering projects such as the problems of regional economic accountability, which are currently being elaborated in relation to Belorussia, the Baltic republics, and some regions of the Russian Federation. This work needs to progress further.

You remember how we started to transfer industrial enterprises and associations to economic accountability. First came the Belorussian Automobile Plant and the M.V. Frunze Science and Production Association in Sumy, then it was entire industries. What a breakthrough that was, and what a mental shakeup it produced! Now we have embarked on a completely new, higher phase in the development of economic accountability.

I do believe that the comrades were right, too, to suggest that we are not ready for the new economic management system in cadre terms. We need to think through the entire system of economic cadre training and develop it in our country with input from specialists from the socialist countries or from the West, where they already have considerable experience. The Central Committee

Socioeconomic Department ought to study these questions and find out about different systems of training and retraining cadres in the perestroyka spirit. This matter will not progress without Central Committee influence and a clear Central Committee position. Because the new approaches in the economy have to be implemented via people, and above all via high-class specialists. In other words, we need a new state system for training cadres at all levels.

You probably all noticed that in my opening speech I stressed how we have to deal with the realities. When I talk about such realities I have in mind the economy, the political process, and our entire society. We have to look at the degree to which particular proposals take account of the realities and the way they will be received and assimilated in people's minds. We have to evaluate dialectically and understand what we are dealing with—what kind of society, and what kind of economy. Only then will we be able to see the real approaches to and the real stages in real perestroyka.

Since these two meetings of ours I sense an even greater need to continue the dialogue that we have set in motion. We must continue it because many of the questions that comrades here have raised have an importance of their own. So far we have, so to speak, taken an overview of the problems and highlighted the most important of them. We must go on to take up separate major topics and discuss them. It would seem to be worth examining the draft Law on Ownership at our next meeting, before it is submitted for nationwide discussion.

In short, we have taken a first "inventory" and discovered how many problems remain to be solved and how many interesting ideas have been expressed. All of them we will summarize.

So, until we meet again, until our next discussion!

CPSU Politburo Session Held 3 Nov

LD0411213789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow, 4 Nov (TASS)—At a routine session on 3 November, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee discussed questions of agrarian policy connected with progress made in carrying out the food program and with the further development of grain production within the country. As was pointed out during the session, the political importance of resolving the grain problem requires the devising and assimilation of an effective economic mechanism that makes provision for raising the interest of collective and state farms in increasing grain resources through the use of the achievements of scientific-technical progress and the development of new production relations. The Politburo voiced its support for the government's proposal for drawing up an all-union program to boost the production of grain and make efficient use of it for the years 1991-1995.

The Politburo considered the question of the development of the Siberian branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences during the period up to 2005. Scientists at the Siberian branch have accumulated considerable experience in resolving the large-scale problems pertaining to the country's economic and social development, and have made a major contribution towards strengthening the scientific-technical potential, developing the production forces, and solving the sociocultural problems of that region.

At the same time, a lagging behind has recently been noticed in the organization of research into a number of important areas in the natural and social sciences, and in the development of the experimental, design, and production base of scientific research, and of the social sphere of Siberian science.

The proposals of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences on the profound restructuring of the whole sphere of fundamental and applied research on the achievement of higher mobility and performance of the scientific potential, and on the improvement of the system of training scientific cadres, were supported.

The Politburo examined progress in the fulfillment of the decision on increasing the production of medicines and providing them to the treatment and prevention establishments and to the population.

The attention of Communist leaders of the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry, and other ministries was drawn to the unsatisfactory fulfilment of adopted decisions. It was noted that instead of carrying out active work in implementing the tasks of development of the chemical-pharmaceutical industry, some republican and local bodies are frequently avoiding and even hampering the creation of enterprises in this industry and the reconstruction and modernization of existing ones.

Questions concerning the implementation of measures aimed at the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station were examined within the context of checking the fulfilment of decisions which were adopted earlier. It was noted that significant work aimed primarily at ensuring the protection of the health of the population which lives there is being carried out in the rayons which were subjected to radioactive pollution.

It was considered necessary to adopt additional measures to step up health protection and to speed up the improvement of the material situation of the population residing on these territories, the construction of housing, and the provision of social and cultural amenities.

Taking account of numerous appeals from working people for a solution to the issues of the social development and comprehensive use of the highly valuable raw material resources of western Siberia, a report was heard

from the USSR Council of Ministers on the problems of developing resources of hydrocarbon raw materials in those regions, especially concomitant gas. A proposal from the government to concentrate efforts on creating production facilities in the next 5-year plan period at the Tobolsk oil and chemical combine and the Surgut and Novyy Urengoy oil and gas chemical complexes was supported. The commissioning of these facilities will facilitate an improvement in the provision of chemical production for the manufacture of goods for consumers, machine-building, and construction and will have a positive effect on the ecological situation in the country. The outlined plans devote a lote of space to solving social issues which have come to a head.

The Politburo approved the results of M.S. Gorbachev's conversation with A. Sodano, the head of the Vatican's Foreign Policy Department, who was in the USSR on behalf of Pope John Paul II, in the course of which new opportunities for the development of the Soviet-Vatican political dialogue and for growth in interaction and mutual understanding between the USSR and the Vatican in the interests of peace and the strengthening of international security and cooperation were brought to light.

The results of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the Republic of Finland were examined at the session. It made it possible to raise cooperation with neutral Finland to a new level of openness and mutual understanding and to give it a businesslike and dynamic nature in accordance with the spirit of the times. M.S. Gorbachev's conversations and varied talks with President M. Koivisto and other authoritative representatives of Finland revealed a wide range of agreement in the approaches of the Soviet Union and Finland to global and international problems and issues of bilateral ties.

The political content and character of the Helsinki Summit went far beyond the framework of relations between our two countries and had an all-European and international ring. The address by M.S. Gorbachev in the Finlandia Palace and the Soviet-Finnish declaration further developed the ideas and principles of the new thinking and priorities for ensuring its effectiveness. The agreements and other documents which were signed during the visit established reliable reference points for the broad and intensive development of Soviet-Finnish contacts and for deepening and improving interaction between our countries.

The results of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and E. Krenz, general secretary of the Sociality Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, who was in the Soviet Union on a working visit were discussed and approved. The solidarity of the CPSU with Communists and working people of the socialist German state who are today resolving complex problems of the development of their country was stressed.

It was noted that the existence of a stable, sovereign GDR remains an important factor for peace and security in Europe. The CPSU, relying on a unity of views with the SED on fundamental issues of the renewal of socialism, will continue to strengthen interaction beween the two parties and is ready for a broad exchange of experience in perestroyka in accordance with the interest shown by German comrades.

Having examined information from E.A. Shevardnadze about his visit to Poland, the Politburo of the Central Committee noted that further stepping up of comprehensive Soviet-Polish cooperation is fully in accordance with the interests of both countries and peoples and the interests of security and stability in Europe.

The importance of strengthening friendship and good neighborliness between the Soviet Union and Poland and increasing the effectiveness of links, first and foremost in economic and other spheres, in accordance with the principles of soveriegn equality and mutual advantage was stressed.

E.A. Shevardnadze's report on the results of the session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states which took place in Warsaw 26-27 October was heard. It was noted that the decisions taken at the Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in July 1989 and the policy of real disarmament and strengthening of the common European process were further developed at the session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers. The Politburo came out in support of the aspiration expressed at the session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers by all of its participants, firmly following their duties as allies, to continue to improve cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, which is an important factor of stability and equality of rights in Europe.

The Politburo of the Central Committee considered information on the results of O.D. Baklanov's working visit to the CSSR. It established with satisfaction that good prerequisites existed for the joint exploitation of the productive and scientific and technical potential freed during the process of the conversion of the defense industries of the USSR and the CSSR in the interests of increasing the output of high quality products for civilian purposes.

More detailed information about the session of the Politburo will be published in PRAVDA.

Vorkuta Miners Appeal for Foreign Assistance

LD0611105489 Paris AFP in English 1017 GMT 6 Nov 89

[Excerpt] Moscow, Nov 6 (AFP)—Soviet Coal Industry Minister Mikhail Shchadov Monday negotiated with miners' leaders in Vorkuta after flying to the Siberian far north in a bid to end a week-long strike, a city spokeswoman said.

Meanwhile, a Vorkuta strike committee member in Moscow said the miners were appealing to British and U.S. miners' unions for "material and technical assistance". A spokesman for the miners' strike committee in Vorkuta, contacted by telephone, said that 27,000 miners were still striking Monday. Only two of the region's 13 mines were operating.

Mr. Shchadov Monday met with the miners at a mass meeting after visiting the Yurshur and Vargashorskaya [spellings as received] mines, the strike committee spokesman said. He added that the miners were under increasing pressure from the authorities, who were compiling lists of active militants.

The Vorkuta miners walked out en masse last Wednesday in the wake of hastily-adopted legislature banning industrial action in key sectors. They were joined briefly by miners in the region of Inta, but miners' spokesmen said the Inta mines were working on Monday. The miners are demanding that the government fulfil promises made after a nationwide miners' strike in July, including the dispatch of consumer goods and economic and administrative improvements at the mines. But they have also formulated political demands, including an end to the communist party's monopoly on power, and the election of the Soviet president by universal suffrage.

A member of the Vorkuta 20-member strike committee, Nikolay Teryokhin [name as received], told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE in an interview here that the miners were sceptical that Mr. Shchadov would meet the miners' demands: "He's just a minister, a bureaucrat," Mr. Teryokhin said. He insisted that the miners wanted Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov to visit the region. Mr. Teryokhin said the miners were sending an appeal to the British National Union of Mineworkers because the Soviet miners had offered assistance, such as making rest-homes available, during the 1984-1985 miners' strike in Britain. He accused Soviet media of publishing "tendentious" reports which failed to mention the miners' demands. [passage omitted]

Coal Minister Arrives for Negotiations

LD0511172489 Moscow TASS in English 1712 GMT 5 Nov 89

[Text] Vorkuta, Komi Autonomous Republic November 5 TASS—By TASS correspondent B. Makarov:

The strike continued today at most mines of Vorkutaugol Amalgamation. Only four out of the 13 pits in Vorkuta were working in a normal regime. There are delays about loading coal onto means of transportation.

With every day Vorkuta miners are lagging behind production and delivery schedules by tens of thousands of tonnes.

Slightly over seven thousand tonnes of coal was shipped to consumers in the past day.

After four days in November, the Vorkutaugol Amalgamation is 188,500 tonnes behind the production quota, and 140,000 tonnes have not been shipped to consumers.

Many work collectives and the population of the Komi Republic and the country are adversely affected by the pit strike in Vorkuta.

There are calls to miners to come to reason and call off the strike.

Even those who support the strikers' demand condemn the fact that they have now resorted to a strike, the extreme measure for the protection of their rights.

Users of Vorkuta coal resort to sanctions because of the failure to meet the schedule of supplies.

Thus the Cherepovets metallurgical complex whose work is affected by the shortage of coking coal resulting from the Vorkuta pit strike, stopped supplying metallic products to the Vorkuta plant of reinforced concrete products.

The Vorkuta plant is the chief supplier of reinforced concrete structures for construction products in this arctic city. This is why the construction of many houses and amenities in Vorkuta has been frozen.

The Executive Committee of the Vorkuta city Soviet of People's Deputies abrogated its decision to register strike committees.

A.V. Oreshkin, general director of Vorkutaugol Amalgamation, abrogated the decree under which members of the city workers' (strike) committee were freed from work and on paying them salaries for their work on the committee. The strikers continued to demand official recognition for strike committees.

Mikhail Shadov, USSR minister of the coal industry, and other officials of the Ministry, as well as officials of the USSR State Committee for Labour, arrived in Vorkuta today.

All mines of the Intaugol Amalgamation are functioning. The schedule for transporation of coal to consumers is being overfulfilled.

Ryzhkov Appeals to Miners To End Strikes

LD0511132789 Moscow TASS in English 1304 GMT 5 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 5 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov urged the officials and labour collectives in coal-producing regions to be reasonable and stop strikes.

In a message released here, he said that "the situation that has arisen at present, especially on the eve of winter, in the coal industry, first of all in the Pechora Basin (Northern Russia), creates an inadmissible situation in ensuring vital supplies for our people, for the work of

basic and other sectors of the national economy. All this can lead to extremely grave results."

"Appealing to your reason and workers' honour, I ask you to show reasonableness and the sense of civil duty for the consequences which can arise in the country, to stop strikes, to maintain the necessary rhythm of work, to ensure the normal life of Soviet people," the message reads.

Ryzhkov sent this message after a number of coal industry amalgamations asked the prime minister to consider the fulfilment of Resolution No. 608 of the USSR Council of Ministers.

"The USSR Council of Ministers keeps under constant control the fulfilment of this resolution, which is the result of agreement between the government and miners of the country on tackling urgent socio-economic issues," the Soviet prime minister said.

Ryzhkov also said that the fulfilment of Resolution No. 608 of the USSR Council of Ministers will be considered on November 17 jointly with the representatives of work collectives from the coal-producing basins.

Text of Ryzhkov Appeal

PM0611143889 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 89 Second Edition p 3

[Message from N.I. Ryzhkov: "To the Leaders and Labor Collectives of the Country's Coalfields"]

[Text] A number of coal industry associations have appealed to the USSR Government for the progress of fulfillment of USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 608 to be examined under the auspices of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The USSR Council of Ministers constantly monitors the fulfillment of this resolution, which is the result of an accord between the government and the country's miners on the resolution of urgent socioeconomic questions.

The USSR Government believes that the situation that has now arisen, especially as winter approaches, in the coal industry, and first and foremost in the Pechora basin, is creating an intolerable situation regarding vital supplies to our people and the work of basic and other sectors of the national economy. All this could lead to extremely grave results.

Appealing to your intelligence and honor as workers, I ask you to show prudence and a sense of civic responsibility for the consequences that could arise in the country, stop the strikes, adopt the necessary pace of work, and ensure the conditions for Soviet people's normal life.

I hereby announce that on 17 November the fulfillment of USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 608 will be examined under the auspices of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, with the participation of representatives of the coalfields' labor collectives.

N.I. Ryzhkov, 5 November 1989.

Gorbachev Expresses Concern Over Pechora Situation

LD0411062389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Our correspondent, Yevgeniy Zubarev, reports from Vorkuta that 4 mines out of 13 are working on extracting coal this morning; but so far only one, Zapolyarnaya, is offloading coal.

In the town of Inta, which neighbors Vorkuta, all mines are continuing to work, in spite of the strike committees' decision to join the strike. This was decided by the majority of miners working on the evening and night shifts.

Yesterday evening, (Yuriy Alekseyevich Spiridonov), first secretary of the Komi oblast party committee, spoke on local radio and television to the workers of the autonomous republic. The day before he had a telephone conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who expressed his very serious concern with the state of affairs in the Pechora coal basin. He asked (Spiridonov) to pass on to the miners of Vorkuta and Inta his appeal not to resort to such extreme measures as striking, and for all the mines to start work. All of us, the whole country, need this today.

Ukraine Miners Urge Vorkuta Miners Back to Work

LD0411212789 Moscow TASS in English 1959 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Makeyevka, South Ukraine, November 4 Ratau-TASS—The miners' strike committee in Makeyevka, the Donets coal basin, adopted an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers, miners of Vorkuta and the rest of the country at its meeting on Friday.

The appeal says that miners of the Makeyevugol Amalgamation, the oldest in the country, are concerned over the repeated strikes in the national economy, which "once again aggravated all problems of not only mines but the entire industrial complex," it points out.

"The unstable situation in the industry is largely brought about by the slow implementation of miners' demands. The provision of mines with necessary materials—timber, metals, pipes, cement and fuel—is lagging behind schedule.

"Cities and towns are hit by shortages of foodstuffs and industrial goods."

Makeyevka miners called for an honest discussion between miners and the government and for the announcement of concrete and real terms for the implementation of miners' demands.

"In this connection, we address USSR people's deputies, the Government of the country, and personally you, esteemed Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, and express hope that such a discussion will take place.

"It would help relax tensions in all coal regions, especially in the Pechora basin."

Makeyevka miners supported just economic demands and urged Vorkuta miners to display wisdom and responsibility for the destiny of the country.

"We must remember that our industry is basic and that the wellbeing and normal life of all Soviet people depend on it.

"The USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a number of important laws on social issues, and we should give the Government time for their implementation.

"Let's do it in a worthy way, suspend strikes and heed the voice of the people," Makeyevka miners pointed out.

TV Reports on Vorkuta Miners' Strike

LD0411212289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1512 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Video Report from Vorkuta by Ye Kuznetsov—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Kuznetsov] On 1 November all the pits in the town stopped work for 2 hours in support of the demands of the miners at the Vorgoshorskaya Mine. Meetings were held, some at enterprises unconnected with the coal industry. Attitudes toward the strike are mixed, even among those who are showing solidarity with those at Vorgoshorskaya, but everyone—and the party and local soviet leaders in particular—is agreed on one thing: It is essential that a government commission come to Vorkuta urgently, one that will be able to understand the situation through direct contact with people and initiate genuine ways of solving the conflict.

The losses at the Vorkutaugol Association during the events of this fall continue to grow. They are now approaching 2 million rubles. A resolution being adopted at the meetings expresses a lack of trust in a number of leaders. One of the main demands remains that of legalizing the status of the workers' movement.

[V.B. Utkin, member of the interregional strike committee] The miners are not on strike for the sausage or soap we don't have. The miners are on strike to counter social injustice, the serfdom under which miners cannot move from one enterprise to another without loss of grade, the shameful system whereby miners dismissed by the administration do not have the right even to go to court over the actions of the administration. Matters like this don't need even a kopek to be spent. They could be solved in a matter of hours. The miners are continuing their strike. To date, two more pits at this very moment have joined the Vorgoshorskaya Mine.

[Kuznetsov] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, during the recent events in Vorkuta a council of party committee secretaries has been set up. What is its aim?

[A.D. Sartakov, second secretary of the CPSU town Committee] That neither our local bodies nor the strike committees have reliable information and do not have precise information regarding the implementation of [word indistinct] resolution. The aim is that this council is a coordination council and should, so to speak, coordinate the work—perhaps in parallel with the strike committee—should coordinate the work of the party committees at the pits and should go to the party Central Committee in Moscow to obtain objective information and bring that information back to us.

[Kuznetsov] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, the town's strike committee has now adopted a strategy of permanent strikes and ultimatums. How do you view this?

[Sartakov] My attitude is, to start with—and I spoke today at one of the meetings at the Severnaya Mine—my attitude is that first of all the law that has been adopted must be obeyed. We really are all in favor of a state based on law.

Strike Updated

LD0411211489 Moscow TASS in English 1911 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Vorkuta, Komi Autonomous Republic, November 4 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Viktor Makarov:

The overwhelming majority of mines of the Vorkutaugol Amalgamation in northern Russia continue their strike. Eleven mines out of 13 are on complete or partial strike.

Workers from the Komsomolskaya Mine are only mining coal but not shipping it. The other of the two working mines, Vorkutinskaya, resumed work today.

The biggest mine in the Pechora coal basin, Vorgashorskaya, has been on strike since October 25.

Losses from the strike are rapidly growing. In the first three days of November alone, miners of the Vorkutaugol Amalgamation hoisted 150,000 tonnes of coal less than planned, and did not ship almost 100,000 tonnes of coal to consumers.

Coal production in the Pechora basin in January-September was more than a million tonnes less than in the corresponding period of 1988.

The Supreme Soviet of the Komi Autonomous Republic held an extraordinary session on Thursday evening, at which it adopted an appeal to miners of the Pechora basin.

Legislators expressed deep concern over the recent developments in Vorkuta and their negative attitude to the strike as a method of solving problems.

They urged miners to be guided by common sense and stop their strike.

The appeal pointed out that many people in the republic support miners' demands but denounce their choice of the way to protect their rights, as the strike has a negative effect on the work and social security of other working people in the country.

Miners insist on an emergency arrival of a government commission in Vorkuta. They express readiness to suspend the strike for the time of the commission's work.

Fuel Shortage Noted

LD0311214189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Excerpt] The strike in the polar town of Vorkuta is continuing. Only 2 of the 13 local mines are working normally, the others are either totally or partially on strike. The polar miners are falling further and further behind in the plan schedule for mining coal and despatching it to consumers. In the past 2 days of November alone the Vorkutaugol association as a whole has brought around 43,000 tonnes of coal to the surface, that is almost 100,000 tonnes less than scheduled. During these 2 days, some 50,000 tonnes have not been dispatched to consumers. The Vorkuta railway station and the spur lines to the mines are choked with empty cars. As (Semushin), deputy chief of the transportation section in the Vorkuta department of the northern railway line, reported, yesterday around 500 cars had not been loaded with coal. Today the dispatch of coal is going even more badly. According to operational data, the polar town will send only 150 car loads of coal.

Because of the miners' strike, the department's collective is suffering huge losses. In October alone these amounted to about R300,000 and since the beginning of the year they have exceeded R2 million.

Complaints and requests to speed up deliveries of coal are arriving from various regions of the country. Coal consumers in the Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], especially in the capital and in the republic's southern agricultural areas, are also concerned.

Usually the Syktyukar office of the Komitopprom association has 16,000-18,000 tonnes of coal in reserve at the beginning of winter. Deliveries by road to villages and hamlets used to be continuous. Now there are just 1,500 tonnes left here. The transportation link is on the verge of ceasing. This situation has arisen because the strike-bound Vorgashorskaya mine has not been delivering fuel. Winter has almost begun in the republic and coal is in short supply. The normal functioning of boiler rooms at kindergartens, schools, hospitals, and residential homes depends on it. [passage omitted]

Ministry Investigating Strike Leader's Death

PM0211155589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Unattributed "Rumors and Facts" feature: "What Happened in Zverevo Settlement?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The newspapers have already reported the tragic death of A.A. Sotnikov—miner and deputy chairman of the Donbass miners' strike committee, who was highly respected by his colleagues. Despite these reports, in Rostov Oblast (and even in Moscow) rumors about his death abound. The editorial office asked the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] for explanations. Our correspondent A. Pokrovskiy obtained documents there which are published below.

Telegram. To the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Main Administration. On 18 October 1989 at 2315 the body of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Sotnikov, tunneler at the mine named for the 60th anniversary of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] of the "Gukovugol" production association, was found with his face covered in blood in the entrance to No 8, Cavalry Division Street in Zverevo settlement. The medical examiner concluded that Sotnikov, who had been found dead, sustained injury to the skull (front part), a fractured jaw, injuries to his internal organs and abrasions to the body. There was a large amount of alcohol detected in the victim's body.

It has been established that at the end of the work shift, members of the tunnelers' brigade at the mine named for the Komsomol's 60th anniversary comprising A.A. Sotnikov, Ye.Yu. Kovalev, A.V. Sotnikov (who bears the same name as the victim), A.A. Ivanov, S.P. Meshkov, and S.P. Knyazev arrived at Kovalev's house at 1630 to celebrate his wedding. At the reception A.A. Sotnikov hit A.A. Ivanov. But the quarrel did not develop further... At about 1930 the guests started to leave... A.A. Sotnikov accompanied Knyazev home and left. His body was found about 600-700 meters from the latter's home.

V. Kalyukin, oblast deputy prosecutor, and Ye. Lagoda, first deputy chief of the USSR MVD Criminal Investigation Main Administration, have been placed in charge of the operations group investigating the crime. The group comprises 12 experienced investigators, operations workers and experts. In total about 150 workers from the militia and the prosecutor's office are now working on this case.

'Repercussions' Program on KGB's Role

LD0311153389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1645 GMT 2 Nov 89

["Repercussions" program entitled "The KGB on Itself and the World", presented by Vladimir Yakovlevich

Tsvetov, with program participants Major General Anatoliy Petrovich Bondarev, Major General Vasiliy Alekseyevich Dozhdalev, Major General Gennadiy Vasilyevich Kislykh, Colonel Aleksandr Nikolayevich Karbainov, and Colonel Viktor Aleksandrovich Ugarov]

[Text] [Tsvetov] Hello, comrades: Our program today is very unusual. Today, it is not officers of the USSR Committee for State Security who are asking the questions: Today they are being asked the questions. (?And here in Ostankino), esteemed viewers, the telephone, number 217-45-43, is at your service.

And so, for the first time in the history of the Soviet secret services, and for the first time in the history of Soviet television, leaders of the principal areas of the KGB's activity—intelligence, counterintelligence, investigations, and the cadre apparatus—are live on the air.

Let me introduce the participants in the program: Major General Bondarev, Anatoliy Petrovich; Major General Dozhdalev, Vasiliy Alekseyevich; Major General Kislykh, Gennadiy Vasilyevich; Colonel Karbainov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich; and Colonel Ugarov, Viktor Aleksandrovich.

I have a feeling that there will be a lot of questions, and they will be very varied. Therefore, comrades, if you have no objection, I will slightly limit the subject-matter of our meeting today. It will deal principally with who the Soviet Chekists [KGB officers, from the name of the original Bolshevik secret police, the Cheka] are; and, second, it will cover the KGB's activity connected mainly with international affairs.

Now for the first of the questions which began coming in to us yesterday. (Vladimir Kucherenko), an engineer from the city of Moscow, has sent us a full-blown letter. To begin with, he has quoted a statement by a group of communist officers from the Turkestan Cheka to the Central Committhee of the RKP(B) [Bolshevik party's title from 1918 to 1925]. The letter—that statement—was dated March 1921. I'll quote what Comrade Kucherenko has written to us: However sad it may be, we have to realize that a communist, when he lands up in a punitive body, ceases to be a human being, but turns into an automation which is put into opertion mechanically. He even thinks mechanically, since he is deprived of the right not only to speak freely, but even to think freely and individually. He cannot express his views freely.

That is the statement which officers from the turkestan Cheka wrote in 1921. Then there follows a question from Comrade Kucherenko. The question is this: Does that image correspond to the present body of cadres in the KGB? I think you, Anatoliy Petrovich, are the man to answer this one.

[Bondarev] I'll try to answer, Vladimir Yakovlevich. I feel that the very way in which the Turkestan Chekists formulated the issue and the actual fact that they wrote that letter testify to the fact that those people had by no means lost their individual identity and were not afraid to write such a letter, that, in general, speaks for itself. I should like especially to express my firm conviction that that assertion does not apply in any measure to present-day Chekists. The fact that today's Chekists work together, are ideologically convinced people of like mind, are people dedicated to our motherland and subject themselves, as officers, to military discipline, does not at all indicate that they are people who have lost their individual identity or people who are incapable of thinking independently or, even worse, who have turned into some sort of mechanical executors. Today's Chekists are people who possess a high intellect and deep knowledge, professionals, people who have to work in difficult conditions; and it is precisely those qualities which are valued most highly in today's officers.

[Tsvetov] In other words, individuality, the ability to think independently, and the ability to approach a problem in a nontraditional manner.

[Bondarev] Quite right. Often they have to make decisions in fairly difficult conditions, very difficult decisions, and take a justified risk; and this quality is simply what an officer of the state security bodies needs. I would also add to that the point that many officers are simply talented people. Many of them write poetry and music and are successful painters. Some comrades are authors of fairly outstanding works of art.

[Tsvetov] You know—forgive me for interrupting—if you suddenly organize an exhibition of works of art created by your officers, I should like to be the first to report from that exhibition.

[Bondarev] Vladimir Yakovlevich, we regularly arrange exhibitions by our amature artists at our central club. They are very popular; and if you have the opportunity to really make such a program we won't have any objection.

[Dozhdalev] Anatoliy Petrovich, there is a literary association at the Dzerzhinskiy club, too.

[Bondarev] Quite right.

[Dozhdalehv] Well, then.

[Tsvetov] You know, a continuation of this subject raised by Comrade Kucherenko—he is interested in, so to speak, the intellectual standard of KGB officers—a continuation of this subject could be a telephone call which we have received from Riga. (Anatoliy Yevgeniyevich Demidov) asks: Is it possible to cite examples of information provided to the country's leadership for them to make foreign policy decisions? It is clear that information for the leadership to make foreign policy decisions could hardly be supplied by people who did not have a sufficiently high intellectual standard.

I think this is your question, Vasiliy Alekseyevich.

[Dozhdalev] I'll try. Comrades, the Committee for State Security participates, together with other foreign policy

departments and together with information bodies and scientific centers, in the provision of information for the elaboration and implementation of our country's foreign policy. The involvement of many departments in this process, incidentally, makes it possible to give problems a more all-around examination and to take the interests of the Soviet Union more fully into account. By the way, life convinces us that those political decisions which are taken on the basis of attentive analysis and comparison of the pecularities of the views on the particular problem of all foreign policy departments are the correct ones.

But, what does the Committee for State Security, specifically, do in this regard? In sending the country's political leadership information on international issues, the Committee for State Security proceeds on the basis of two interrelated principles: first, to provide information on those aspects of the situation in the world which are capable of influencing our state's security in the military, political, economic, and scientific-technical fields: and, second, to bring to light new opportunities for improving the international atmosphere.

It should be said that the State Security Committee's information is distinctive information. It has its specific characteristics, because it is based on data obtained by means of intelligence. I suppose the viewers imagine that there exist various problems in international practice: both those which are completely closed, and those about which very little is known. Of course, in such conditions only intelligence can shed light on what the opposite side would like either to cover up completely or to present in some kind of different light. Thus, if we are talking about the peculiar nature of the State Security Committee's information, it should be said that it is prepared on the basis of secret data and taking account of analysis of open-source material on the problem in question—which makes the committee's information more complete and objective.

[Tsvetov] Forgive me for interrupting you, Vasiliy Alekseyevich. Comrade (Podleshchuk) from Moscow, developing your conversation, so to speak, asks this question: Does the KGB only gather international information, or does it also analyze it? You've just said that you analyze it. But Comrade Podleshchuk goes on to ask this: Does the KGB's analysis coincide with the analysis of world events conducted by academic institutes?

[Dozhdalev] Vladimir Yakovlevich, I can say that the State Security Committee's information is valued by the country's leadership and is taken into account when political decisions are made. I can also say that, as a whole, it coincides with the information about which your author asks.

[Tsvetov] Our viewers also have, directly—or, rather, we have so many questions from our viewers that one stems directly from another. [sentence as heard] Comrade (Petrovskikh) from the city of Tashkent, asks: Did the KGB know in advance about the events in Fergana? If it did know, why did it now warn the party and soviet bodies? Was the story that the slaughter of the Meskhetian Turks started over a box of strawberries tossed up by KGB officers, or was it invented by an irresponsible apparatus? Aleksandr Nikolayevich?

[Karbainov] If I may? I would say that the Fergana events did not brew up in a few days: I would even put the figure at a few months, or even more. There were several causes at the root. There were deep social and economic causes, and everybody knows that there were also causes from further back, from when the Meskhetian Turks were, so to speak, virtually transported or deported, so to speak, from their place of permanent residence. There were also a number of more immediate causes, if I may put it like that. In particular, I myself happened to be in Fergana, literally from the first days of those events.

Well, some 10 days later there took place the so-called Kuvasay clash. Kuvasay is a small town near Fergana. Well, this clash was a serious one, so to speak, and it was possible to avert it with the help of the militia bodies. Incidentally, the local KGB operatives carried out very active work there. Unfortunately, the truth about Kuvasay did not, as it were, reach the wider public as it should have done—strange though it is, glasnost let us down in this day and age! So rumors began to abound. Generally speaking, these rumors were vigorously peddled. The main thing is that they created a public mood of intolerance toward the Meskhetian Turks and the subsequent explosion directly during the Fergana events was actually a result of that.

As for the KGB bodies, the KGB bodies provided information about this situation coming to a head, about the development of this situation. Perhaps it was not done with enough persistance—this probably has to be said, in a self-critical vein. As for their direct participation in the events, it can be said here that many operatives displayed courage and personal valor and that they saved, personally saved, individual families. Well, a Fergana KGB Directorate operative brought out by bus some 150 persons of Meshkhetian Turkish nationality, literally breaking through cordons, stones, and even gunfire. As for the strawberries, an explanation has emerged which has gained currency, and it is a very shallow explanation. The KGB bodies have nothing to do with it and the real analysis of the way in which the situation has developed is roughly as I set it out.

[Tsvetov] (?That is understandable).

[Kislykh] That's right. Let me, incidentally, remark that even now a sizeable body of our investigators, together with the Procuracy and Internal Affairs bodies, is actively taking part in investigating the crimes perpetrated in Fergana Oblast.

[Tsvetov] Gennadiy Vasilyevich, here is a question for you. Well, this is what (Petr Kolomeytsev) from Leningrad has sent us. Is a law on the KGB in the offing? And what legal documents regulate the KGB's activities?

[Kislykh] Yes, a draft law on state security is practically ready now. Moreover, a draft or, shall we say, a normative legal act [polozheniye] on the KGB has been prepared. In its activities, the KGB, just like other bodies charged with protecting the law, is guided above all by the USSR Constitution, by USSR laws, and normative acts promulgated strictly in accordance with the Constitution and USSR legislation.

[Tsvetov] Here is a question for Viktor Aleksandrovich. In connection with the expansion of foreign economic ties, the setting up of joint enterprises, and the access of cooperatives to international markets, a certain fear arises lest so-called company and commercial secrets should filter abroad unimpeded. What, in this context, is intended to be undertaken to protect them? In other words, this comrade is interested in whether the KGB is combating industrial espionage, that is the way I understand it.

[Ugarov] Well, what should I say? I mean, of course, the question is new for our country, but it is a very interesting and essential issues. Well, the circumstances which the author of the note mentions will lead to the concept of a so-called commercial secret emerging in our country, there can be no doubt about that.

If you take the practice of foreign countries—well, Vladimir Yakovlevich, let us, say, take Japan, with which you are so familiar, I remember one of your dispatches from Japan, devoted to Soviet specialists' visit to a company. In it, you noticed so very aptly how the Japanese can protect the secrets of their companies. If you take the practice of countries such as the United States or, the FRG, it has to be said that they have very strict legal foundations for the protection of such secrets. I repeat: for us it is a new question but one that is extremely essential. Well, aware of its essential nature, the KGB has submitted a proposal to the government that the entire problem of commercial secrets should be worked out. The government agreed with our proposal. It has given the necessary instructions. Now active work is proceeding in this area. We are taking part in it.

[Tsvetov] A girl has phoned us. She is a student at a vocational and technical educational establishment. Her name is (Svetlana Matveyenko) from Leningrad. Anatoliy Petrovich, here is a question for you. It is a bit silly, but we shall make allowances, as it were, for her age. This is what she said: judging by the James Bond movies, an intelligence-gathering operative should be a good shot—ambidexterously so—he should be able to knock a man off his feet with a single blow to the jaw, and moreover he should be a sexual giant. Are our operatives also like that?

[Bondarev] Well, of course, everyone knows that Agent 007 is a product of the unbridled imagination of those who make these pictures. I think I will not be mistaken—and Vasiliy Alekseyevich will hopefully confirm this—if I say that, all in all, these qualities are far removed from the qualities of intelligence-gathering operatives in any special services. Nonetheless, we would not like our operatives to have even a small part of such qualities. And that is why it is surely ridiculous indeed to speak of any similarity between Soviet intelligence-gathering operatives and James Bond.

[Tsvetov] Here is a question from (Viktor Aleksandrovich) from Skoptsov, a student from Kiev. The countries which support terrorism are known. The KGB is waging a battle against international terrorism. Well, the question boils down to this: how does the KGB's fight against international terrorism interact with Soviet relations with other countries?

[Ugarov] That is a serious matter. The KGB is, of course, carrying out work, active work, to put paid to the subversive activities of terrorist and extremist organizations situated in Western territories. This work assumes special importance now that these organizations are striving to transfer their subversive activities to the territory of the Soviet Union. Well, in order to prevent explosives, arms, and other means used to perpetrate terrorist and subversive acts from being brought into our country, the KGB, together with the Chief Customs Directorate and other law protection bodies, is taking measures to cut off the channels whereby these means are brought into our country. It prevents certain members of those organizations who have been established as belonging to them from coming into the country. It is also taking a number of other active Chekist measures which, as a rule, are preventive. Moreover, there is an active interaction in this work with the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Procuracy, the Supreme Court, and other organizations.

I would like to note that at the 42d session of the UN General Assembly in 1987 and at the USSR's initiative the Warsaw Pact states put forward a joint statement on the need to deepen the struggle against international terrorism and they put forward a proposal to set up an international tribunal under UN auspices to investigate terrorist acts. Well, certain other steps in this direction were also undertaken. Unfortunately so far these initiatives have not met with an appropriate response.

The KGB is ready to cooperate with the special services of capitalist and other countries in waging a battle against international terrorism, smuggling, drugs, currency speculation, and other international crimes. It seems to us that nuclear terrorism in future might pose a special danger. It is no secret that, despite all the measures that have been and are being adopted to have control and to have protection in this area, there is the possibility that nuclear weapons can be put into the hands or fall into the hands of terrorists. Hence, entire countries could become hostages. There is one way out: to search for and to organize contacts, to search for measures of joint action in emergency situations, to search for and prepare the legal basis to prepare international agreements on these matters. There is also, so to speak, some hopeful progress here: there are working contacts, there are joint operations with regard to plane

hijacking and confiscation of drugs. Recall the widely known Operation Thunder [Grom]. Recall the Riga customs case, recently published in the press.

For our TV viewers who have not yet read about this information I shall, very briefly, describe its main points. Comrades from the Riga Customs discovered a container. Judging by the documents, it contained sand for aquaria. But the container was en route from the Phillippines to the Netherlands via Belgium. Well, imagine: where are the Phillippines, where is Belgium, and where are the Netherlands? More than that—I mean there was a label on the container. Its essence, the essence of the label that is, is that the container was gas-sealed and that to open it posed danger to life. Well, the Riga Customs comrades, who are no cowards, did open up the container. Of course they remained alive. They took a look round and they discovered some 200 kg of marijuana in barrels. That is one of the strongest drugs. The Chief Customs Directorate suggested that we let the freight through the border. That is to say, that the operation should be monitored. Operatives of the USSR KGB, our Riga colleagues, became involved. They got in touch with the Belgian side through diplomatic channels. Representatives of the Belgian special services arrived. The freight was allowed to pass through and then the operation developed under the control of the Belgian special services in cooperation with the Netherlands bodies. The result was that 16 people were arrested—that is to say the criminal gang was neutralized.

[Tsvetov] Viktor Aleksandrovich, excuse me—(Kovalchuk) from Kiev asks, incidentally in connection with this: the Israeli Mossad intelligence service has had great successes in the struggle against international terrorism. Does the KGB cooperate with Mossad?

[Ugarov] Well, I have already mentioned Operation Thunder. All other cases depend upon specific situations and specific circumstances.

[Tsvetov] Let me put all the questions on this subject in one go, so as to exhaust it. Does the KGB intend to cooperate with Interpol? This one is from office worker (Kiykin) from Leningrad.

[Ugarov] Interpol cannot be counted as a special service as such. As far as the nature of its activities is concerned, it is closer to the ministry, to the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the same time, I have mentioned that the KGB is ready to cooperate with the special services in international crime. As far as cooperation with Interpol is concerned, there are certain circumstances that do not depend upon us. For the time being, this prevents a broad development of this cooperation.

[Tsvetov] Well, (Arkadiy Artemovich Khodanovich) from Volgograd Oblast, party and labor veteran, asks how many Chekists now work abroad. How many of them have died recently? Vasiliy Alekseyevich?

[Dozhdalev] So, he asks outright: how many? Or what number? Well, I must say that data such as this constitutes a strict secret in all countries. The conspiratorial nature of intelligence-gathering work demands that. Incidentally, counter-intelligence services of Western powers are also very interested in such data. That is why I would not like to make their work easier. Incidentally, even if in violation of the rules of our service I wanted to be a bit candid with you, I do now know, because of the secrecy, I really do not know the number—I only know...

[Tsvetov, interrupting] Even though you are working in intelligence-gathering, you do not know the number?

[Dozhdalev] Of course—but I do know the number pertaining to this small sector of work where I myself work—but what is beyond it, I do not know.

[Tsvetov] I think you have, in this way, replied also to the second question. Well, (Aleksandr Pavlovich Kozodayev) from Moscow asks in what country are the most KGB intelligence-gathering operatives? That's the same thing.

[Dozhdalev] Naturally, of course.

[Tsvetov] More questions in the same category. (pecherskiy) from Zelenograd asks how many KGB staff work abroad under cover of embassies, trade missions, and correspondents?

[Dozhdalev] Well, the answer here is, generally, the same, the same answer.

[Tsvetov] Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, this question has come in: How has the development of democracy and glasnost reflected itself in the work of the KGB. It is put by (Vladimir Nikolayevich Malkov) from Mytishchi.

[Karbainov] Well, in general, I think that it is a broader question: what does perestroyka mean within the KGB's bodies? What does it signify as far as its essence is concerned? The effect of the development of glasnost and democracy stems from this. The same thing in restructuring the KGB's bodies is, at present, to redefine the role and place of the KGB's bodies within the political system and within the mechanism of the law-governed socialist state. That is how I would put it.

Actually, the main thrust, as it were, or the main essence of this perestroyka now consists in the KGB's bodies being accountable and in them proceeding from the point of view of society's and state's interests and not the other way round, as has, in general, been the case during individual tragic pages, periods of our history. At present, glasnost in the activities of the KGB's bodies represents one of the most important directions of perestroyka. Well, the fact that we have gathered here is a very good illustration of this direction, as it were, in our activities. This line of work is now being actively developed in the KGB's bodies.

We are trying to publish more things; to have more meetings with the labor collectives, to describe the work

of the KGB's bodies, so that the people know what the KGB's bodies do and what results this body brings to the common cause as it were. Well, that's it, very briefly.

[Tsvetov] We have here a rather serious question—an acute question. I'd say: (Petr Ivanovich Ivanov), a Moscow electrician, asks how many senior intelligence-gathering KGB personnel defected to the West during the 1975 - 85 period? What was the damage done to the state due to this and what punishment was meted out to them?

[Bondarev] Vladimir Yakovlevich, unfortunately we have to say that some of our employees indeed defected to the West and became traitors. And, indeed, by their actions they inflicted serious damage, political and moral damage. And they deserve the strictest punishment, as it were, for this. But we are, as a matter of principle, against judging people in absentia and, as a matter of principle, we are especially opposed to extra-judicial reprisals.

[Tsvetov] Understood. In this context there is a question, for Vasiliy Alekseyevich this time. (Viktor Korolev), a pensioner from Moscow, says: the Ministry of Defense took the trouble to make sure that Sorge and other military intelligence-gathering operatives should become known to the Soviet people and that they should turn into heroes. But the NKVD is only mentioned as the killer of Sorge's wife, meaning his Russian wife. Does not the KGB have heroes of its own?

[Dozhdalev] The KGB has many heroes of its own. This, apparently, is an omission on our part, the fact that we are now beginning to lift the curtain a bit in this respect and to introduce glasnost to this matter. I am aware that numerous names are already known to our viewers. The name of Rudolf Ivanovich Abel is known. I knew him personally and I can describe him, as it were, not only as a brilliant intelligence-gathering officer, but also as a perfectly and astonishingly versatile and developed individual. He was an artist, equally at home with the brush, the pen, and the pencil. He was a landscape painter and, at the same time, a portrait painter. Comrades, he was a mathematician. When he was sitting out his sentence in prison he gave himself mathematical exercises and I had occasion to see pages full of differential and integral calculus.

He was an astronomer at the same time. It is an interesting fact that when he was arrested it was decided that the investigation of his case would be carried out in a different part of the country. It was night-time. There was an aircraft. They put him in and set off in the aircraft. He could tell by the stars and by the duration, by the distance, by the time the aircraft flew, where he was. That is the sort of multifaceted all-round individual. And he was a wonderful linguist, I am sure...

[Tsvetov] You are saying that it is completely unnecessary to be a sexual giant and that it is simply necessary to be an individual with all-round development.

[Dozhdalev] Or take, say, Konon Trofimovich Molodyy. I would say that this man was a natural intelligence agent, a born intelligence agent, handsome to look at, energetic, bold, extremely bold. I had occasion to see him not only, say, here in our country, but also in the places where he lived under the name of Gordon Lonsdale. I would say that for boldness and behavior he was a man of exceptional quality. Let me say straight out that sometimes when I looked at him I thought: how would I conduct myself in those conditions? And I must confess as a man that I gave him the winner's laurels, certainly.

Or take Kim Philby. I think that viewers know quite a lot about him. But I would like to add a little more information which, I think, will throw light on the contribution which Kim Philby made to our common cause. The award bulletin which was written in connection with the award of the Red Banner Order to Comrade Kim Philby says: For obtaining political and operational information of exceptionally great importance for the Soviet government he is awarded the Red Banner Order.

Well this is just a little information about three people.

[Tsvetov] Is not the Red Banner Order not too small an honor? Of course, I regard it as a very major award but, all the same, with such words on the award bulletin and then the Red Banner Order.

[Dozhdalev] Vladimir Yakovlevich...

[Tsvetov] Excuse me, let me just say that (Vladimir Nikolayevich Malkov) from Mytishchi is simply indignant. Will justice triumph, and will Rudolf Abel be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union?

[Dozhdalev] Vladimir Yakovlevich, I think that from what I have said about Rudolf Ivanovich the viewers will have understood that I personally have great respect for Rudolf Ivanovich. There is no doubt that Comrade Abel is an outstanding Soviet intelligence agent. He accomplished vast useful work. This work was given worthy recognition by the homeland. He was presented with the highest state awards. That is well known. But as far as concerns awarding to Rudolf Ivanovich the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, you know that this is outside my competence but I would be the first to be very happy if that happened.

[Tsvetov] You know, Comrade (Yuriy Konstantinovich Arsenov) from Moscow has pointed out my omission. He has just phoned in and said: Please explain what posts are occupied by and what are the duties in the KGB of the people at the roundtable. So, could you, yourselves, say briefly what areas you work in.

[Bondarev] I work in the cadres apparatus, in the cadres directorate of the KGB, as one of its heads. [Dozhdalev] I work in intelligence, at present in cadre training.

[Kislykh] I work in investigations.

[Karbainov] I am one of the heads of the directorate to defend the Soviet constitutional system.

[Ugarov] I work in the counterintelligence area.

[Tsvetov] So let us go on with replies to other questions. Here is a rather specific question but I think a rather interesting one. It is addressed to Gennadiy Vasilyevich. (Volodichev), a school pupil from Moscow asks: Can a KGB official use combat weapons in carrying out operations? Why was it that when militiamen killed a KGB officer, which I read about in NEDELYA, he did not shoot?

[Kislykh] I see. Well weapons are obviously issued to officials of the KGB so that they can be used when required. Naturally, when it is a question of using firearms, this use must be strictly in accordance with the law. The law on this is spelled out in our legislation according to the principles of necessary defense and extreme necessity. But as the question has been asked by a school pupil and perhaps my reply was couched in excessively professional language, let me say that in our state the principle of necessary defense is based on the military statute of Peter I. In that statute this principle was defined as follows: It is not necessary to wait for the first blow from the opponent, as the first blow could result in our quite forgetting to resist. It seems to me that this puts it quite precisely and clearly.

Now, on the matter of the killing of our officer. This is a reference, evidently, to Officer Afanasyev, who was indeed killed. This question, probably, would be better addressed to officials of the USSR Procuracy as the case was investigated by (Kalinichenko), the senior investigator for particularly important cases under the procurator General. He wrote the article in NEDELYA which is referred to here. But as we took part in the search for the killers and helped in investigating this case, I shall give a reply to the second part of his question. Afanasyev was killed while off-duty and was unarmed.

[Tsvetov] I see. Viktor Aleksandrovich, here is a question for you. Not long ago in IZVESTIYA I read a roundtable about the protection of secrets in our country. It was stated there that many of the requirements on protecting secrets would be altered. Do we have many secrets and what is the position of the KGB?

[Ugarov] First of all, I would like to cite a few facts. Recently in one very respected organization I came across a photograph album in which I saw photographs of various tanks used by our army in the 1920's. This album still bears, or did until recently, the stamp "state secret". Moreover, let me relate a quite anecdotal fact, as one might call it. In one equally respected organization I saw documentation on a three-line rifle, a heavy-duty rifle of 1891-1930. You can probably only come across it now in the Soviet Army museum. But until very recently the documentation on it was secret. I can see, Vladimir Yakovlevich, that you are smiling. We in the collegium also smile.

I think that these examples of mine will have caused some of our viewers to smile, too. But I must say that this would be funny if it were not so sad. Behind this lie wasted human efforts, large and unnecessary material expenditures, human and moral losses. In order to avoid this, in accordance with the decisions of the party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, in the past 12 - 18 months ministries and departments, with our participation, have carried out a large amount of work to declassify outdated information. There has been declassification of reports on accidents, explosions, and disasters. There has been declassification of information on the influence of radiation on the human organism and the environment—most such information. There has been declassification of information on crime and you know of this from our press. There has been declassification of information on a number of models of military equipment; and the technology for manufacturing them has been handed over to the national economy which has considerably facilitated the raising of the competitiveness of a whole range of models of products of the national economy on the world market.

I must say that by our joint efforts we have managed to reduce considerably the volume of secret information in our country. In some ministries and departments this reduction reached 35 - 40 percent. This work is continuing and we are actively participating in it.

[Tsvetov] You mentioned trade there, and there is a question here on the same theme. An increasing number of our enterprises are obtaining the right of direct access to the external market and enter into relations with capitalist firms. And these firms, apparently, in order to conclude contracts which are advantageous to themselves but on conditions which are unfavorable to us, try to bribe our specialists. How do the organs of state security regard this issue?

[Ugarov] This question is, of course, a fundamental one. The organs of the KGB have, of late, uncovered a whole range of crimes in the sphere of foreign economic activity connected precisely with such facts. The paradoxical position occurs: on the one hand we see an acute shortage of foreign currency but on the other hand the increasingly extensive development of foreign economic ties leads to enterprises and many of their officials having access to the external market, and because of a lack of awareness in a number of cases, many of them who start to receive gifts which foreign firms generously bestow enter onto the path of easy profit and give them information which is officially secret. These crimes become possible not just because of the low moral qualities of these people but as a consequence of the fact that some of them while occupying quite a lofty official position have created around themselves a situation of total lack of control where all is permitted and where there is mutual protection.

I can cite some examples. There is a former senior official of a chief directorate of capital construction—(Sushkov), there are former heads of the Foreign Construction Import All-Union Association—(Prosolov), (Mikhaylov), (Lykhov). There is former Deputy Foreign

Trade Minister (Sushkov); former officials of chief directorates of capital construction—(Pavlov), and (Smelyakov). For example, (Prosolov), (Mikhaylov), and (Lykhov) alone received bribes of R500,000. And former deputy foreign trade minister (Sushkov) received over R100,000 and the total sum of property confiscated from him was over R1.5 million. Of course, criminal charges were made against all of these. People should not be so naive as to think that they did not come under consideration from the special services of the imperialist states. Moreover, it has been reliably established that these special services were involved in the bribing of these officials and drawing them into these crimes.

[Tsvetov] Anatoliy Petrovich, here is a question for you from Comrade (Bednov) from Moscow. The CIA puts advertisements in the newspapers for job vacancies. Why does the KGB not insert such advertisements?

[Bondarev] Yes, indeed, the CIA uses advertisements in the process of selecting its cadres. But this does not at all mean that they do not study people, that they do not check them for loyalty, and so on. We, however, do not make use of advertisements. We, ourselves, seek out and find the people we need. In this we make use of the help of labor collectives where we find these people. The comrades we need are recommended to us. And so there is no necessity to advertise, to write in the newspapers and use that method to invite people to work in state security organs.

I should note that many comrades display initiative, themselves. They write letters to us; they come to the KGB and we work with them in just the same way as with others whom we find.

[Tsvetov] I see. I have here a letter from Comrade (Petr Nikolayevich Lazan) from Novoannenskiy rayon. He has telephoned from (?Kazaltakh). My son is on active military service in the KGB troops and he asks what the rules are for entry into the KGB Higher School. I do not know why he asks his dad and does not ask you who are in charge of cadres.

[Bondarev] Yes, it would have been more appropriate to address such a question to me. I must say that we in the state security organs select young workers, servicemen who have completed their compulsory service, and we send this category of candidates who do not have higher education to study in the Higher School of the KGB.

Well, the rules for being admitted to the KGB School are the same as apply to other military educational establishments. Comrades who have, as it were, undergone vetting and who have been recommended to us by military or labor collectives are then allowed to sit an examination. They then have to pass entrance examinations I can say that these involve the Russian language and literature, history, and a foreign language. Those who have passed this examination and who have gone through the competition, commence studies at the committee's higher school.

[Tsvetov] So, comrade (Gennadiy Kilkin) from Leningrad is apparently somewhat mistaken, because this is his question: Why is it that the KGB recruits people only with 10 years of education and the best ones at that?

[Bondarev] Well, I have already answered this question. In the main we take the candidates who have undergone work training within labor collectives, who have done their army duty—and that is why it is already some time ago that they completed their 10-year education.

[Tsvetov] It is well back in their past.

[Bondarev] Yes, far into their past.

[Tsvetov] (Aleksandr Nikolayevich Sayantsev), building engineer from Sumgait, telephoned and this is what he said: KGB operatives took part in organizing the disturbances in Sumgait. I know this precisely.

[Karbainov] Well, I would say that the question is as incorrect as it is categorical. The point is that this can be said in another way. If the KGB operatives had not taken part in Sumgait [as heard] in the capacity in which they should take part, proceeding from what they have to do, then one cannot know how Sumgait would have ended up. More serious, broader consequences could have ensued. I have already mentioned the role of the KGB operatives in the Fergana events. Operatives actively took part in the Sumgait events and, all in all, it is, to a considerable extent, thanks to them that the troops were brought in in good time, in a timely fashion; well, in what was more or less a timely fashion—this is how we shall put it—and that the orgy that had begun in the town was stopped. Subsequently, once the events were over, the KGB's operatives, investigators, operations staff took an active part in the investigations in order to bring criminal charges against the guilty.

If the author of the note has precise knowledge and there is a specific fact than he can turn to the KGB's bodies and we shall endeavor to get to the bottom of this.

[Tsvetov] Viktor Aleksandrovich, to what extent is the threat to the lives of the country's leaders, protected by the KGB ninth directorate staff, real? Anatoliy Yevteniyevich Demidov, from Riga.

[Ugarov] Well, I haved already mentioned the existence both of international extremist terrorist organizations and their attempts to extend their activities to the territory of our country. Let us recall recent pages of history—Olof Palme and Indira Gandhi, and let us recall events of a more distant past the Kennedy family. And, of course, as long as such a threat exists, the state security bodies must and will protect our leaders.

[Tsvetov] There's another question here, although I don't know how far you [Ugarov] or perhaps you [Bondarev] are competent to answer. What are the staffing levels in the ninth directorate?

[Bondarev] I would probably put this question in a wider way, since it may evidently be of interest to many

viewers. The point is that the staffing levels, the staff numbers, and the budget of the Committee of State Security are not yet being published, for well-known reasons. But if the legislators or the government decide that such data should be published, we shall do it with pleasure, and then people will know how modest are the resources and means we have at our disposal and get by on.

[Tsvetov] Vasiliy Alekseyevich Yakovlev from Moscow asks whether we really have intelligence men abroad and what they do and how they live. Well, you have already mentioned this. It transpires from your reply that there are. The question is what they do and how they live. People are concerned most of all with how they live.

[Dozhdalev] Yes, what do they do? They live as people do. Primarily they are concerned with matters of a service nature and with tackling the tasks that they face. I have referred to these tasks, the duties of the Committee of State Security in the provision of intelligence back-up for the adoption of foreign policy decisions. The subject-matter is well-known. All these tasks are performed through specific people, specific intelligence people. That is quite natural.

[Tsvetov] There's a question from Valentina Ivanovna Zaviyalova, and I think that you will also, no doubt, reply to this question. What do our intelligence men—that is, you sitting here—know about Soviet prisoners of war—she evidently means Afghanistan POWs. There was a report that the first group was supposed to leave for the Soviet Union, but there's been no sign of them.

[Dozhdalev] You know, you've put me in an awkward position there. It's difficult for me to say anything on this. I have no information on this matter.

[Tsvetov] You don't have any information? I understand that you no doubt have nothing to do with this. No doubt the Red Cross and the Ministry of Defense are involved in this.

[Dozhdalev] No. Of course. There are special channels for this.

[Tsvetov] I see. There is the following question to Aleksander Nikolayevich. What measures is the KGB taking against the direct and blatant incitement of anti-Sovietism by the fascist Pamyat organization, and how long will the KGB put up with the incitement of anti-Semitism? [Sovietism and Semitism, respectively, as heard]

[Karbainov] I'd like to begin my reply by saying that the KGB bodies as a whole do not get involved with public groups, but if individual representatives of these groups transgress the law—you know that today we have a law, Article 7, which was affirmed at the Congress of People's Deputies, covering violent calls for bringing down and changing the Soviet state and social system—then the KGB bodies do have an interest in people of this sort and in individual groups. As far as the Pamyat society is concerned, there are and have been elements of incitment of interethnic discord there. That is not the domain of the KGB bodies, but of the investigative bodies of the procuracy, but the KGB bodies base their overall work and concentrate their attention on the prevention of all kinds of offences concerning matters of maintaining state security or abutting on state crimes. Our main task in preventive work is not to struggle against people, but to struggle for people—in other words, to save them and prevent them from embarking on the path of committing a state crime. On the Pamyat society, specifically, last year—this was published in the papers—one of its leaders, Vasilyev, was the object of preventive measures at the KGB, that is a precautionary conversation was conducted with him on the subject of preventing actions inciting interethnic discord.

[Tsvetov] Gennadiy Vasilyevich, here's a question. Article 250 of the criminal code of the State of New York—this is from Aleksandr Alekseyevich Yegorov, a Moscow lawyer: I'm not acquainted with the criminal code of New York State, so I take this on trust, so to speak—Article 250 of the criminal code of the State of New York affirms that a citizen has the right to obtain information on himself from the FBI, in other words to get his personal file. Can we in this country get our own file from the KGB?

[Kislykh] Vladimir Yakovlevich, I'm not familiar with that state's criminal code, either. If the questioner has in mind a criminal case, the question of acquaintance with a criminal case is strictly outlined in our legislation governing criminal procedure. I have in mind the parties to a criminal trial. If he's talking about files, let me say that we do not keep any files on our citizens.

[Tsvetov] I see. Another question to you [Kyslykh]. Andrey Albertovich Kostyanovskiy from Moscow asks: Is anything known about the circumstances of the death of Masherov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party [as heard]

[Kyslykh] This question should also probably be addressed to the USSR Procuracy, which instituted criminal proceedings following the incident at the time and carried out the investigation. But let me reply because in the first few hours I arrived at the site of the incident, I was on the spot, and I know the situation well overall. Petr Mironovich Masherov, together with the driver of his official car and one of our guards, died in a road accident. The situation was that the person responsible for the tragedy, a dump-truck driver, who contravened the traffic regulations—not deliberately I might add—pulled out into the lane carrying oncoming traffic and there was a collision.

[Tsvetov] I see. Vasiliy Alekseyevich Kozlova from Moscow has a bone to pick with you. She says that if the information of the intelligence service coincides with the information of the Foreign Ministry, why have the intelligence service?

[Dozhdalev] If the information of the intelligence service conflicts with the information of the Foreign Ministry, if it completely and fundamentally conflicts with it, then no doubt something...

[Tsvetov—interrupting] Then a question does arise.

[Dozhdalev] Yes, a question does arise. I have already had an opportunity to say that the intelligence service bases its information on information obtained through intelligence means. In other words, it also uses secret information, and thus it can go more deeply into the closed processes and the secret areas of a foreign policy problem.

[Tsvetov] Which are inaccessible to Foreign Ministry affairs staff.

[Dozhdalev] Quite so, quite so. But that does not mean, say, that our information should conflict with, or come into conflict with, the information of some other department. They can coincide, although ours will go deeper.

[Tsvetov] You're patriotic about your organization!

[Dozhdalev] I hope I am!

[Tsvetov] Anatoliy Petrovich, Victor Aleksandrovich, here are some questions, they are similar ones. I don't know which of you is going to answer. Tatyana Sergeyevna Magdey, a Leningrad housewife, asks what the KGB budget is, and what income it makes. Petr Mikhaylovich Buturlin from Gorkiy asks how the KGB bodies are reducing their spending on the maintenance of the apparatus and secret services...No, that's another question, excuse me. So, what is the KGB budget, and does it earn any revenue?

[Bondarev] I have already said that the budget and the establishment strength are figures which are not yet being published.

[Tsvetov] I see. Then Petrosyan from Moscow has the following question. What do KGB employees earn? Does it have special retail points? Do KGB employees use coupons to get sugar?

[Bondarev] I can name the salary of the basic grade of our operational personnel—authorized operatives [operupolnomochennyy] and senior authorized operatives earn a salary of R170-190. They are officers, so they also draw a salary based on their military rank. They are also entitled to all the benefits that apply to servicemen of the Soviet Army. As far as the special retail points are concerned... we, or to be more precise our wives too, as well as other Muscovites, go to the shops and buy groceries there... if they are available, of course.

[Tsvetov] What about the coupons for sugar?

[Bondarev] Yes, and we use coupons too, like other people.

[Tsvetov] You know, comrades, when I went to the KGB building on Dzerzhinskiy Square to discuss the program with you, on my way out I saw your staff taking chickens out of the canteen. And judging by the glee on the faces of your staff, I realized that they did not enjoy such good fortune every day!

[Bondarev] I should like to add in this regard, Vladimir Yakovlevich, that we do get certain food selections just like other enterprises—they are very ordinary ones, and we take advantage of them just like other working people.

[Tsvetov] Apparently a KGB employee decided to adopt this method of asking you a question. Perhaps he was too shy to ask you, himself. Will the pay of KGB officials be increased and will brigade contracting be created or organized?

[Bondarev] We do not yet know whether there will be a pay rise for KGB officials. If there is, we won't object. As far as brigade contracting is concerned, some of our production collectives are working on brigade contracting and also use some other progressive methods of work organization.

[Tsvetov] Gennadiy Vasilyevich, is the KGB leadership confident that organized crime can be eliminated?

[Kislykh] Well, it is difficult for me to speak for the leadership of the committee. I shall tell you my own personal opinion. This confidence does exist. And this confidence is based in particular on the fact that in conditions of a sharp increase in crime in the country, the KGB in particular is helping considering more energetically than it did before—and in the past, too, we helped the internal affairs bodies and the procuracy to uncover and solve the most serious and operationally significant criminal cases and crimes.

But in replying to this question I should say that probably if one talks of only the participation of the law enforcement bodies in the struggle against crime, then we shall not resolve this task. I am deeply convinced that in order to lower the crime rate and then, perhaps, to solve the task of eradicating it in the country, it is necessary for the whole community to bring all its weight to bear on crime. And from my point of view, a very large role should be played by the organization of educative work among the population. It is necessary to organize things in such a way that every one of our citizens does not pass by on the other side when crimes are being committed but should take action against them.

[Tsvetov] Well, something from another area. Aleksandr Nikolayevich, does the KGB admit that it participated in the repressions against followers of the Hari Krishna movement in the USSR, Sergey Mitrofanov, Moscow.

[Karbainov] The state security bodies do not concern themselves with any religious movements, they never have and probably never will. As far as Hari Krishna is concerned, some time ago—some 5 or 10 years ago—this movement was not officially registered in our country

and for that reason many active participants in the movements went in for various forms of protest and sometimes committed extremist actions, so to speak. The internal affairs organs cut short these actions in the appropriate manner.

[Tsvetov] Well, here is a rather similar question. Is it true that the KGB hinders telephone conversations between different towns and therefore it is impossible to get through to the "View" television program by telephone?

[Karbainov] Well, I think that does not at all correspond with reality. By the way, at times we, too, cannot get through by telephone to the View program. That probably indicates the great popularity of the broadcast. That is probably the reason for this.

[Tsvetov] That is clear. Gennadiy Vasilyevich, (Petr Kolomeytsev) from Leningrad asks the following question: When the KGB arrests a spy who is a foreign citizen does the KGB have the approval of the procuracy?

[Kislykh] Any arrest takes place only with the approval of the procuracy regardless of who this is.

[Tsvetov] You know I've just adjusted my tie, and I'll tell you why, because Comrade Pidayev, Vladimir MIkhaylovich, from Rostol-na-Donu, rang in and said that Tsvetov's tie has slipped. We doubt whether its's going out live—so let him adjust it. I've adjusted it, Comrades. And then to continue the first question, (Kolomeytsev) from Leningrad asks: Is it possible for a foreign advocate to be present during the questioning of a foreign spy?

[Kislykh] Being present at questioning is esentially taking part in the investigation and our legislation governing criminal procedure does not provide for that.

[Tsvetov] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, (Klimov), from Moscow says that it's known that the fifth directorate of the KGB was linked with psychiatric establishments and in that way fought those who thought differently and people who were not to their liking. How do things stand now in the new department for the defense of the socialist constitutional system?

[Karbainov] The Soviet constitutional system?

[Tsvetov] Yes, the Soviet one, yes.

[Karbainov] Here one has to say the following. The fifth directorate was never linked with psychiatric establishments or hospitals. When the issue of sending anyone to a psychiatric establishment for compulsory treatment was being decided it was a decision of the court and the court brought in the appropriate medical expert opinion and so on. So, KGB bodies, whether the fifth directorate or any other, had nothing to do with this. As far as the situation today is concerned, all the less so. There cannot even be any question of this.

[Tsvetov] Then let's go on: Who in the Committee for State Security was personally responsible for the actions taken against Academician Sakharov, and the Nobel prizewinners Solzhenitsyn and Brodskiy, and many other outstanding personalities?

[Karbainov] Well, what can one say here? Those actions which did take place with regard to Academician Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and Brodskiy proceeded or stemmed from the legislation which was then operative, and also, as I see it, as I now think, they were determined by the atmosphere which existed in the country as a whole. It would no doubt be wrong to speak of anyone's personal responsibility for these actions. The bodies of state security no doubt share this responsibility overall as a body.

[Tsvetov] Listen to this question! It's a question more for me. Where is state television and radio correspondent Mikhail Leshchinskiy now? He hasn't been heard for 4 months. I don't think that he's with you? Mikhail Leshchinskiy has returned from a lengthy assignment and has now started work at state television and radio as a political observer. He is in the process, so to speak, of preparing some big new and interesting programs, I hope.

Now a question for Viktor Aleksandrovich Ugarov. How much is your pay? Comrade (Smetanin) asks from the village of Alekseyevka in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

[Ugarov] Well, Anatoliy Petrovich has already talked about the pay of the operational staff. I receive somewhat more, of course, than do the operational staff. My official salary is R280. In addition to that, there is the appropriate pay for my military rank.

[Tsvetov] Not all that much, I won't be joining you! Are there any women in the KGB? And if there are any what percentage to they make up and in what jobs do they work?

[Bondarev] There are women in the State Security Committee. In some sectors they are simply irreplaceable. But as far as the percentage of them is concerned, it is difficult for me to say now, I simply did not expect this and I did not get those statistics.

[Tsvetov] There are very many questions here—we don't even know which to take. Yes. Here is one from Borisov, Gennadiy Ivanovich. He says: I'd like to know what happened to Glenn Michael Souther and George Blake—yes, Blake.

[Dozhdalev] George Blake is alive and well in the Soviet Union. He is working. All is well within him and his family. As far as Souther is concerned, Michael Souther, I believe that many television viewers are aware that he committed suicide. There were reports about this in the press. So he did this on personal grounds because a complicated situation had arisen around him because he left the United States because he was threatened with arrest and such serious circumstances were arising around his name—all of this imposed a burden upon

him. He himself was a very emotional person, easily wounded, and he was unable to stand it all and he ended his own life.

[Karbainov] I would like to note...

[Tsvetov] Yes, yes.

[Karbainov] He wrote a very illuminating letter to his little daughter and to the leadership of the State Security Committee and this shows, so to speak, several reasons, that is how I would put it.

[Tsvetov] Two more viewers put questions directly to me. (Tatyana Sergeyevna Magdi), a housewife from Leningrad, and (Vyacheslav Yuriyevich Rogozin) ask whether or not Tsvetov himself is a member of the KGB? Esteemed (Tatyana Sergeyevna) and esteemed (Vyacheslav Yuriyevich), they didn't take me. You remember we had a question about why they only take those graded excellent into the KGB? I was a long way away from the excellent category. If I am to be absolutely honest, on conduct it was with difficulty that they gave me a 3. Perhaps that is the reason why I don't work for the KGB. Well, we have an enormous number of questions. I think we would hardly be able to answer them all even if our "Repercussions" program went on for 3 or 4 hours. I think we will meet on another occasion, if not with you in person, then with other leading members of the staff of the Committee for State Security. As a souvenir of our first meeting I would like to give you these badges which I ordered specially from a cooperative.

[Karbainov] This isn't exactly in accordance with our legal status.

[Tsvetov] Nevertheless, I do hope of course that you will wear them, as a souvenir, at least, of our program. [video: Tsvetov passes to participants badges inscribed "Agent KGB"]

You're welcome. When we have our next program I will ask our intrepid cooperative people to make something else. They responded very willingly to my request. And so, comrades, in ending our meeting today I want to say that evidently we have taken the first step toward ensuring that people will ultimately begin to regard the KGB not as something terrible, secret, and terrifying, which would be strange under the conditions of the law-governed state which you and I are creating. I think that the time will come—and evidently it is already quite close—when interest in the KGB as a normal state structure will be perhaps somewhat higher than, say, the interest in a republican state agro-industrial complex but incomparably lower than the interest in, say, the personal life of Alla Pugacheva. With that I would like to say farewell and to thank you from the bottom of my heart. We will await the reaction of television viewers to our program.

[Voices] Thank you.

[Tsvetov] Goodbye.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet 3 Nov

Work Outlined

LD0411024589 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Here is (Solta Malicha) with a commentary on today's session of Lithuanian Parliament.

Two important laws were adopted today at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania: The law on Lithuanian citizenship and the law on the referendum. Several constitutional amendments were also adopted. Tomorrow promises to be a hard day for the parliamentarians as well, because a group of Soviet people's deputies from Lithuania have put forth a suggestion to set up a parliamentary committee on working out a program on re-establishing the independence of Lithuania.

Today the session began with a discussion of the bill on citizenship. The bill was already discussed at the previous session. The chairman of the commission on working out the bill, Pranas Kuris—who by the way is minister of justice here in Lithuania—formulated three most controversial issues. First of all, what should be the relationship of the Lithuanian citizenship with that of the Soviet Union and that of prewar Lithuania? Next, what should be the ways of granting citizenship to most of the residents of Lithuania? And what should be the conditions of granting citizenship by means of naturalization? The wording that was suggested by the commission and later on approved by the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania runs as follows:

During the period while Lithuania has not yet recovered its complete statehood, Lithuanian citizens use passports of the Soviet Union. This regulation should not be regarded as citizens' commitment to another state or another citizenship. According to Pranas Kuris, such wording should allow Lithuanian citizens to use Soviet passports in other republics of the Soviet Union and foreign countries during her transitional period. The law on citizenship does not mean that prewar Lithuanian citizenship has become invalid. The Supreme Soviet has decided that everybody who at present resides in Lithuania does not have to take an oath of loyalty to Lithuania, but those who will be granted citizenship in future by means of naturalization will have to take this oath. The text of the oath includes only the minimum of basic duties of each citizen to Lithuania. Besides, the law determines a 10-year census [as heard] of residing in Lithuania for future immigrants. Two years are provided for the law on Lithuanian citizenship to come into full force from the moment it was adopted, that is from 3d November.

After prolonged discussions, the law was adopted at 1600 sharp by an overwhelming majority of votes: 265 MP's voted for the law, 3 voted against, and 8 abstained.

Three hours before that, the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania adopted a new wording of the 57th Article of the present Lithuanian Constitution. It runs: All citizens of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] must observe the Constitution of Lithuanian SSR and its laws. The previous article stated that they should observe the Constitution and laws of the Soviet Union.

A law on referendum was also adopted at today's session. A referendum should be carried out if 50 percent of the Lithuanian MPs or 300,000 citizens of Lithuania having the right to vote demand it. The law on the referendum was adopted unanimously. According to Romualdas Ozolas, an MP of the Lithuanian Parliament and a member of the Seimas of the Lithuanian reform movement, Sajudis, the moment the law on citizenship was adopted the era of order will begin and that of chaos will end.

The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has also adopted a constitutional amendment on the freedom of conscience. This is a very important amendment. Thus we'll read you its full text:

The Lithuanian SSR guarantees the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Everyone has the right to profess, individually and in groups, his or her beliefs and express them by peaceful means. Nobody can be made or make others act against his or her conscieace or beliefs. All state bodies and establishments are secular. These institutions cooperate with the church and other religious organizations on basis provided by the laws of Lithuania. The church and other religious organizations are granted a legal status and the right to take care of their internal affairs themselves.

Adopts Citizenship Law

LD0311201989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1925 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Vilnius, 3 Nov (TASS)—A law on Lithuanian citizenship was adopted today at the session of the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of this Soviet Baltic republic.

As Soviet television announced in a report from the session, the deputies decided after lengthy debate that all persons who, on the day the law comes into force, are living permanently in the territory of the republic and have their permanent place of work or their permanent lawful livelihood here are citizens of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. The deputies supporting this formulation believe that this will promote the consolidation of the inhabitants of the republic, who are of many different nationalities.

The deputies are also discussing draft laws on a referendum and on the election of people's deputies to local soviets. It is also intended to make changes to individual articles of the republic's Constitution, and to consider other topical issues.

The session of the Lithuanian Parliament will continue its work on 4 November.

Implications of Citizenship Law

PM0611121189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy report: "After Heated Debate"]

[Text] Vilnius—A portentous event: The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet session has adopted the Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR.

Hitherto the citizenship of each of us has been something that has gone without saying, as it were, and we have easily moved home and moved about the state, not dreaming that our rights would be restricted in some other places. Now, it seems, different times are coming...

The draft law on citizenship was undoubtedly the chief item on the session agenda, and some people had been awaiting its adoption with enthusiasm and hope, others with misgivings and a certain suspiciousness. The heated arguments and debate during the discussion of the draft law clearly drew a dividing line—it followed inconceivable zigzags, dividing the population along national lines. The path to the final version of the law was a long and very difficult path of compromises, mutual concessions, and attempts to hear the voice of common sense and to take account of the realities of contemporary society. This path led to the so-called zero option—a term borrowed from the diplomatic vocabulary of disarmament. In my view, it reflects very accurately the essence of the result obtained, which consists in the following: All citizens now living on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR have the right to acquire citizenship. All who have ancestral roots in Lithuanian soil but who, because of various circumstances, live outside it possess the right to citizenship.

It has to be said that the search for the optimum solution continued up to the last moment. Unanimity among the deputies was seldom to be observed during the article-by-article vote.

Once, a situation even arose which obliged the Supreme Soviet chairman to declare a second vote. With 134 votes against, 132 deputies advocated adopting Article 17—"Oath of Loyalty to the Republic." Neither side achieved the necessary majority. The deputies once again had to weigh the importance of the article, and in the end they decided that there was to be an oath....

Since swearing the oath was one of the "hot points" of the discussion, I must say that Article 17 has no bearing on present inhabitants of Lithuania. It must concern primarily those who decide to move to Lithuania in the future. A new resident will have to undergo so-called naturalization—that is, get used to life here and grow into it. And only after 10 years of permanent residence,

having studied the fundamentals of the Constitution and mastered the Lithuanian language, can he aspire to citizenship. On obtaining citizenship he will swear an oath of loyalty to the Lithuanian state and of respect for the culture, language, customs, and traditions of the people.

The law contains a very important exception: Three categories of persons cannot obtain rights of citizenship in Lithuania. These are persons who have committed a crime against humanity and carried out genocide; persons convicted for serious premeditated crimes; chronic alcoholics and drug addicts.

On receiving a Lithuanian passport, the population now living in Lithuania will undertake a written obligation to observe the laws of the Lithuanian Republic.

The new law has been given 2 years to acquire full force. During this time every inhabitant will have to make an important decision—is Lithuania for him the motherland with which he will share joys and sorrows, or simply a place of residence?

The Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR not only ensures a certain legal comfort, if it is possible to designate civic rights thus, but also imposes definite duties on the citizen. I will not take the bread out of legal experts' mouths and argue the merits and shortcomings of this act. But I will emphasize the chief point—for the citizens of Lithuania its interests assume priority significance. This is the essence and main point of the law.

Several provisions of the new law are for familiarization and information. Citizenship of another state is not recognized for a citizen of the Lithuanian SSR. The adopted law cannot be interpreted as an obligation by a citizen of the Lithuanian SSR with regard to any other state. A citizen of Lithuania cannot be extradited to another state. There was a lengthy and stubborn debate over the point whether citizens of Lithuania can simultaneously be citizens of the USSR. The argument ended in favor of a compromise decision—until Lithuania has restored full state sovereignty, citizens of Lithuania use the passport of a citizen of the USSR.

In order to avoid delusions and misunderstandings, what is meant by "other states" and "different states" is not overseas powers but any union republic of our federation. These words grate upon the ears. And they will, perhaps, elicit at first an adverse reaction, but it is necessary to get used to them....

The 14th Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Session also examined a number of other questions. In particular, the Law on Referendums was adopted, which is a kind of continuation of the Law on Citizenship—only citizens of Lithuania are given the right by means of a referendum to decide the question of self-determination, to approve the Constitution, and to ratify and denounce the most important international treaties.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet 4 Nov Session

Adopts Referendums Law

LD0411121689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1130 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Vilnius, 4 Nov (TASS)—The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which is now in its second day in the republic's capital, today unanimously adopted a law on referendums of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. The new law recognizes the right of all citizens of Lithuania who have reached the age of 18 to take part in referendums. A referendum, the law states, may be called upon the demand of no less than half the deputies in the republic's Supreme Soviet, or no less than 300,000 Lithuanian citizens who have voting rights. The most important questions of state and public life are to be decided by referndum.

The Supreme Soviet session also adopted a law on amending Article 50 of the Lithuanian Republic's Constitution. The new wording ensures that inhabitants have freedom of thought and freedom of conscience, as well as the right to express and disseminate their convictions and views in peaceful ways.

The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which yesterday adopted a law on citizenship in the republic, is now considering a draft law on the election of deputies to local soviets in Lithuania. It is expected that the session will also examine other matters.

Referendums Law Explained

LD0411212289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1508 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Text] Today the 14th session of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet ended its work. Over to our correspondent, Elena Kurklietyte.

[Kurklietyte] The session lasted 2 days, and I will single out two main issues which the deputies discussed. They debated for a long time, even lasting two sessions, and passed by a majority of votes the Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR and a Law on Referendums. I asked Pranas Kuris, deputy of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, and Lithuanian minister of justice, to comment on the main provisions.

[Begin recording] [Kuris] As is known, the USSR Constitution and the union republics' constitutions also previously recognized the existence of citizens of union republics. However, the specific content of this institution and the order and conditions for granting that citizenship were not defined in any law. All these issues have been resolved in our law. Who is to be recognized as a citizen? In our republic a so-called zero option has been passed. Practically all persons living on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR who have permanent residence and legitimate means of support are citizens of the Lithuanian SSR.

This issue is being resolved, and the social and ethnic tension is being removed. In this sense, our article will, for the first time, really have a consolidating significance. I would like to say further that the main means of acquiring citizenship is outlined in (?two) articles—it is citizenship by birth—and all persons who are born on the territory to citizens of the Lithuanian SSR are considered citizens—and after the law comes into force, naturalization is envisaged, i.e. an order for acquisition of citizenship by those who have settled in the republic. And I would like to draw your attention to Article 35, which envisages that this law will come entirely into force in the space of 2 years, and to the fact that citizens of the Lithuanian SSR—and the real legal and political situation of the Lithuanian SSR is taken into consideration, the fact that it is a member of the federation—that citizens of the Lithuanian SSR also use the passports of citizens of the USSR.

[Kurklietyte] Now I ask you to comment on the Law on Referendums.

[Kuris] This law is too limited, consisting of 34 articles. More than half the articles concern the very process of a referendum. Decisions on holding referendums is made by the Supreme Soviet, and 300,000 citizens who are eligible to participate in elections—or half of the composition of the Supreme Soviet, half of the deputies—have the right to submit an initiative for holding a referendum, given these two conditions. Then, under this initiative, the Supreme Soviet makes a decision and a referendum is held. Well, the law establishes a series of issues which are decided only by referendum. This is something new in Soviet constitutional legislation.

[Kurklietyte] What precisely is that series of issues?

[Kuris] I would say that there are three such main issues. First, Lithuania's right to self-determination. That may be resolved only by a referendum. Then there is the affirmation of a new constitution of the republic. And third is ratification or rejection of international treaties which the republic will sign. It is also said that other issues, too—important questions of state and (?public life), for example the adoption of laws—can likewise be solved by a referendum. [end recording]

Lithuanian Party Conservatives Issue Resolution

LD0411021789 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] In advance of the extraordinary party congress which is to claim sovereignty for the Lithuanian Communist Party [CP], the conservative wing of the party is closing its ranks. A meeting of party activists from 112 organizations took place in Vilnius. Plainly speaking, it represented the Committee for the Protection of Soviet Power in Lithuania. The meeting unanimously passed a resolution, a part of which I shall quote:

Under the guise of discussion on the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party, revenge-seeking forces press for the line for breaking away from the main Soviet party. The outline of the party program and statute recently made public seek to turn the Lithuanian Communist Party into a national party hostile to Marxism-Leninism and to divert the republic from the road of socialist development. Unquote.

This is what a meeting of the Committee for the Protection of Soviet Power in Lithuania has decided.

PRAVDA on Medvedev Visit to Moscow Plant

PM0611090189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Nov 89 Second Edition p 5

[Report by S. Bogatko, Yu. Kazmin on 2 November visit to "Kauchuk" Plant in Moscow by V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, under general heading "Encounters with the Capital's Labor Collectives"]

[Text]

"Kauchuk" Plant

This meeting was unusual in many respects. As a rule party and government leaders used to visit big, modern enterprises equipped with model technologies and producing the latest output. The "Kauchuk" plant, widely known in the country, is not one of them. It was built before the revolution. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that the leading enterprise of the "Kauchuk" association is not the darling of the surrounding population. The production unit is located in the heart of a residential district and greatly contributes to the pollution of the environment. In short, an extremely difficult situation has developed both for the collective and the city. Suspending production is impossible—the plant produces industrial rubber goods without which motor vehicle and aviation plants and other industrial giants would immediately revolt.

This is why the news that V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR people's deputy, was coming to visit the enterprise was received with great interest in the collective.

I will be honest, M. Yermolov the plant's party committee secretary admitted, and say that I am hoping that this meeting will prove decisive as regards the plant's fate. Here at the "Kauchuk" we have all the problems which are currently besetting the country. All with the exception of one—the problem of interethnic relations...

Repeated appeals to the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry and the Moscow City Soviet requesting permission to build a module to update production have remained fruitless. The question is still open. Foreign currency has been

spent on the acquisition of modern technological equipment which would make our production process ecologically clean. However, these assets are lying around unused.

We became acquainted in the course of a frank, comradely conversation in the office of V.K. Chopov, the association's director general. The Central Committee secretary asked the plant's Communists many questions. The upcoming elections to republic and local soviets and the next, 28th, CPSU Congress were discussed.

The discussion was continued at work stations in the "Kauchuk" plant production shops. Plant veterans A. Poloskova, G. Kukuyeva, and R. Skopintseva, who described herself as a "quota worker" although she has been working at the plant for more than 11 years, and working very well, and also young press operator L. Yeliseyenko spoke with pain about the problems besetting the collective. The Central Committee secretary listened with great concern to the workers expressing indignation at the obsolete technology and low production standards.

For objectivity's sake it must be noted that the Moscow "Kauchuk" plant contrives, even in these conditions, to produce goods including high-precision goods. The plant is profit-making, but the lion's share of this profit is scooped up by the ministry which distributes it as it sees fit. In order somehow to make ends meet a cooperative has been set up here which operates a second shift on overtime. The collective is carefully preparing for a crucial step—a switch of the whole association to leasing relations. But that is not enough. Practical restructuring is possible only on condition that at least 60 percent of profits is retained by the association. In that event production, social, and ecological problems will be resolved successfully.

After the end of the shift this honest discussion shifted to the conference hall of the "Kauchuk" laboratory complex. On behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, V.A. Medvedev congratulated the collective on the upcoming 72d anniversary of great October and wished them success in their work and well-being in private life. The Central Committee secretary dwelt in detail on the present period and described the situation in the country, the progress of the political reform, and the main spheres of the improvement of the economic mechanism and the social reorientation of the economy. And today here, within the walls of the "Kauchuk" plant, the Central Committee secretary said, your director and party committee secretary told me about real facts which indicate that your collective is to a considerable degree already operating in the new fashion in economic terms.

Sharing his impressions from meetings in the association's production shops, V.A. Medvedev noted: Radical changes are needed, it is impossible to carry on working like this. Everyone needs to do some hard thinking. This applies in equal measure to the collective, the director, the party organization, the party rayon and city committees, and the ministry.

A heated debate is under way in society, V.A. Medvedev said, opinions vary widely, extreme views are arising. They try to use perestroyka itself as an explanation for the difficulties which we are experiencing and pit public opinion against it. We cannot agree to this under any circumstances. Our main difficulties are a legacy of the past, they are rooted in the previous system of management, in the way we organize our life, in insufficient democracy, in the distortion of the principles of socialism. Perestroyka has only brought these phenomena to light, and glasnost has made them public knowledge. Naturally, even perestroyka is not perfect; mistakes have been made. However, it is our only chance to put an end to the shortcomings of the past and to lead the country onto the broad road of social progess and people's well-being. Therefore it is absolutely impossible to agree with the conservative moods which are dragging us backward; on the contrary, it is necessary to move forward.

Another extreme is when people say that perestroyka is not being conducted decisively and radically enough, when they advocate that everything that has been created over decades be destroyed at one fell swoop, when they go as far as to advocate a revision of the very foundations of the socialist society. All-out criticism of socialism, Lenin, and October is being developed. Our fundamental social values are subjected to revision. We can neither agree to this nor tolerate it. Socialism has nothing to do with our troubles. It is deviations from socialism which are to blame, rather than socialism.

The extremes, the Central Committee secretary noted, are often in agreement. They are proposing a return to a "firm hand" in order to resolve our complex problems. It is indeed true that there is not enough order, organization, and discipline. However it is impossible for us to give up democratization and glasnost. In the past it was conservative elements which were proposing a return to the former path, to a "firm hand." Now such calls are also coming from out-and-out liberals. The only difference is that while the former are proposing a "firm hand" in order to put an end to democracy and glasnost and return to the authoritarian methods of leadership, the latter are advocating it with a view to disposing of the so-called "apparatus," that is our party and state systems and forms. This is not our path. Our path is perestroyka, its deepening and consolidation, and the development of democracy based on growing faith in people.

V.A. Medvedev spoke about the specific measures which are being adopted by the party in order to resolve the urgent tasks facing society. The Central Committee secretary gave detailed answers to questions about solving the food and housing problems, and the function of the mass media.

After the meeting we asked Vadim Andreyevich Medveyev to share his impressions.

"I have greatly benefited from the visit to the plant and the meeting with its collective," the Central Committee secretary said. "The meeting revealed how many problems we have yet to resolve in the course of perestroyka. The people's mood is correct, they see everything, they understand everything, and they are making great demands on themselves and those who manage them and set the economic norms of work. They are seeking a way out of the situation through switching to modern methods of management and are planning to lease the enterprise. This is a very responsible step.

"I would like to say furthermore that it is not enough to pin our hopes to some kind of one-shot revolutionary changes, it is also necessary maintain order at those production capacities which cannot as yet be taken out of service. The meeting with the collective gave me pleasure. At a time when political life is at a high pitch, it passed in an exacting, businesslike, and amicable atmosphere.

Medvedev on 'Ideological State' of Society

LD0310070189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Oct 89

[Interview with Vadim Medvedev, member of Politburo and secretary of CPSU Central Committee, by D.D. Biryukov, USSR State Radio and Television political observer, on "Topical Interview" program—recorded]

[Text] [Biryukov] The intention of our "Topical Interview" slot is to bring you meetings with party and government leaders. My interlocutor today is Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Vadim Andreyevich, with every week that goes by, we acquire new political experience. In your opinion, what is the ideological state of our society today?

[Medvedev] We could say that the situation is contradictory. On the one hand—and this is perhaps the most important thing—we are getting deeper and deeper into the process of perestroyka; we are going on and on and on. New bodies of state power are being formed and starting to operate. These are taking upon themselves the functions of state leadership of the country. They are growing in strength.

We are also progressing further along the road of economic reform. I think that right now we are reaching its very essence—reorganization, very significant, deep reorganization of the relations of socialist ownership, without which the reform could probably no longer develop successfully, which would mean that conditions for a cardinal solution of the country's economic problems would not be created.

The process of our society's political involvement is also continuing to grow, people's interest in all problems, the keenness of perception of every solution. More and more new public organizations and movements are appearing. I think all this is very important and very significant.

On the other hand, in this peculiarity of development at this stage of perestroyka, all these deep positive processes that extend perestroyka are at the same time accompanied by certain social tension, we could say, by growing difficulties. All this, of course, has a profound effect on the state of social awareness, on the moral and political situation in the country.

[Biryukov] In this context is the concept of ideological differences applicable to us? Do we have them?

[Medvedev] I think that against the general background of this excitement, the intensifying debates and passions, against this general background there indeed is a growing, strengthening influence of certain extreme positions, of certain views that, all in all,' present an extreme representation of our reality, and with which we cannot agree. I include here the strengthening of certain conservative feelings and tendencies, the underlying cause of which is that perestroyka is guilty of all of today's difficulties and disorders, that that is where it has all come from, that our life used to be neither good nor bad and, all in all, we used to make do with what there was, so to speak, and now, in a sense, everything has started moving, everything has changed, everything ails, everything is in a state of some uncertainty.

I should say that this is a much more serious question. It is all but alleged that perestroyka has been planted on us by the West, that it means an abandonment of socialist values and ideals. We, of course, cannot possibly agree with that. Perestroyka is an imminent need of our society, achieved through suffering.

It has indeed discovered many unsolved problems and brought them to the surface, but perestroyka is the only way of solving equally those problems that have arisen over decades and came to light only now and those issues that have arisen over the last few years, including those connected with some slips and some errors in the course of perestroyka itself.

[Biryukov] These are the right-wingers' accusations. What are the left-wingers' accusations?

[Medvedev] Well, there you get the other extreme. They appear to be in favor of perestroyka but it allegedly is not going completely as it should and not completely where it should. They say that everything should be demolished with a single blow, that an end should be put one day to the command-administrative system, the old methods, the old structures. The extreme expression of this position says that we should, they say, altogether reevaluate our main premises, our main values, that socialism has not come up to expectations, that for 70 years we have been going the wrong way and no one knows where we have been going, and that these years have been lost for

our society, that all these decades were filled with nothing but errors, nothing but failures, nothing but crimes. That kind of position is unacceptable. In essence, it is also antiperestroyka by its nature.

[Biryukov] In all discussions concerning perestroyka—and they are going on all the time, if two or more men get together they immediately start talking about it and everyone has his own view and opinions—one inevitable key question is that of the party, of its place, its internal state, its interrelationship with other organizations, other sectors of society. What are your ideas on this question?

[Medvedev] Obviously, first of all, we have to resolve the most critical social issues, eliminate the sources of social tension, and first and foremost solve the problem of the consumer market, its normalization. In this respect, the Supreme Soviet is currently discussing the proposals prepared by the Council of Ministers and included in the state plan for the development of the national economy, in its draft for next year. Among such measures is also the problem of normalizing interethnic relations. The decisions of the plenum and the party platform on nationalities policy issues create the necessary basis and foundation for this, a foundation in principle, of course, which also makes it possible to solve the practical problems in appropriate state forms, because these are issues that lie within the competence of state bodies.

Among these urgent or main, shall we say, problems that need solving is also the problem of the party. That is why I regard as principally important—and I think everyone understands this - the decision of the September plenum of the party Central Committee about the early calling of the regular 28th party congress. The time when the congress is to be held is brought forward by nearly 6 months, or approximately 6 months, and this reflects public feeling; it reflects the feelings in the party itself, too. The necessity to hold the congress is determined by the fact that the process of perestroyka is proceeding very fast, transformations in various walks of public life are growing rapidly, and the party cannot lag behind them.

[Biryukov] Vadim Andreyevich, while you were answering my last question, two others occurred to me, one minor, concerning procedure, and the other one a bit more serious.

Is this congress simply going to be held earlier, so to speak, or is this an extraordinary congress? This too is one of the subjects of debates. Many people say that they have been running things such that now they have to hold an extraordinary congress. Others say it is good that it will be held earlier.

[Medvedev] Indeed, there were quite a few proposals along the lines of holding an extraordinary congress and then almost immediately, but what does holding an extraordinary congress mean? After all, it is meant to resolve not just some current issues and not just elect new party central bodies. It is meant to analyze the situation in-depth, provide serious answers to the questions posed by life. We essentially have to rework the party rules; we have to determine the party program objectives, at least for the immediately visible period. Therefore, after numerous discussions and exchanges of opinions in the Politburo, it was precisely this decision that was presented for consideration to the Central Committee plenum—to hold a regular party congress, a full-scale and full-blooded party congress, in a manner of speaking, but to bring its date forward in consideration of the requirements of the time, in consideration of the need to react more quickly to questions posed by life.

[Biryukov] You mentioned that there was criticism from the right and left. In many respects, of course, this is a relative division, but there is a group of publicists who persistently press the same argument over and over again, that the party is the basis of the command-administrative system, and they maintain that no changes will enable us to get rid of this situation. What could you say on this issue?

[Medvedev] I think that indeed major changes, serious changes are needed equally in the nature of party activity, in its functions, in the internal life of the party. Indeed, if we look back, we could say that essentially the party used to be built into the administrative-command system, it used to be the nucleus, as they used to say, of all state and public organizations; in practice, it directly managed every process that took place in the country. Admittedly, its decisions were legalized by appropriate decisions in the state bodies, but largely this was formal in nature. Now we are talking about a strict delimitation of state and party function, freeing the party from direct management of economic and other processes. That's right.

The state should carry out its functions, the administrative bodies their functions. The party, as we see it, should be the political vanguard, that is, it should work out the political line, it should carry out ideological, organizational work, the objective of which is that this line, the tasks and aims of the party should become known to the masses at large, so that their practical implementation is ensured. This of course does not mean that the party ceases to be the ruling party, but the party should carry out the implementation of this function in the context of a law-governed socialist state and affect the activity of state economic bodies and pursue its policy through communists who are elected to state bodies, who are in public organizations, in economic organizations, and so on.

Did you want to clarify something in this respect?

[Biryukov] Well, one of the arguments, described earlier, is that they cite the article in the Constitution about the leading role of the party in our society. What is your attitude to this? Does this article stay with us in the new system of relations or are those who are demanding its removal from the Constitution right? Is this a formal factor or is it a fundamental factor?

[Medvedev] No, of course this is a very important, vital factor. My personal view on this issue could be summarized as follows. I consider that there should be this kind of article in the Constitution, in contrast to those who propose removing it. However, there are also other proposals and they come from more or less the same people. On one hand, they propose that Article 6 be removed from the Constitution; on the other hand, they propose that an entire law about the party be created. Creating a law about the party to my mind would be unlawful, because the party, just like other public organizations, is guided in its work by its own rules, by its own documents. It is another matter that the party, just like other public organizations, should operate within the law, within the Constitution....

[Biryukov interrupting] Within the system of laws that determine the life of our country.

[Medvedev] That's right, and it should unconditionally ensure the observance of all the laws, starting with the basic law, the Constitution. This provision, by the way, is established even now in Article 6 of the Constitution. For that reason alone, Article 6 is necessary in the Constitution. It is another matter that considering the new realities, considering what is now taking place—the separation of functions, the changes and restructuring in party work—editorial elaboration of this article is also necessary.

[Biryukov] But that is within the powers of the Supreme Soviet.

[Medvedev] No, it is within the powers of the Congress of People's Deputies.

[Biryukov] The Congress of People's Deputies. That is, it won't be the party itself that is going to determine its status but the Congress of People's Deputies when it comes to amplifying the provisions of the Constitution?

[Medvedev] Yes, of course, in accordance with its powers as the supreme body of state power in the union. Of course, the article should reflect the true state of affairs.

[Biryukov] One more inevitable question. Many people in the debates about our future, about where we are heading, say that all our troubles follow from the one-party system and the solution, the absolute panacea for all of our problems, is a multiparty system. What could you say about this issue?

[Medevdev] Indeed, this is noticeable, this enthusiasm for debating problems of transferring to a multiparty system.

[Biryukov] An interesting thing is that here many people say let's make it so. That is again from above—through directives we will make a multiparty system. To my mind, that is a completely unwarranted approach, historically.

[Medvedev] Indeed, of course, of course. Parties are not created through decrees, but that is not the point. The point is that the restructuring of our party is precisely directed at creating such a political system in the country as would operate on a profoundly democratic basis. I am completely convinced that the issues normally linked to the need to introduce a multiparty system can be resolved by transferring to a law-governed state, by creating a system that would perceive the interests, opinions, and needs of various sections of our society, classes, nationalities, peoples of our country, all manner of public and professional groups. For that, we need a truly serious process, also in the party itself, so that it can fulfill that role.

First of all, we need a clear delimitation of functions between the party, as a political organization, and the state, and of course a most serious, profound alteration of the mutual relations between them. Second, we need a serious alteration, an equally serious alteration, in the mutual relations between the party and the whole system of public organizations, equally traditional organizations and those that have been created recently. We need dialogue, we need constant discussion of problems that arise; we need to take into consideration the problems that these public movements, public organizations are taking to society.

Finally, we need cardinal changes of internal party relations themselves. In the party, too, there should be a pluralism of opinions, a confrontation of positions, the putting forward of alternative proposals of the solution of this or that problem and respect for the views of every communist, even if he is in a minority, but, of course, with obligatory submission to party decisions once they are adopted.

[Biryukov] In other words, the system of democratic centralism is unshakable?

[Medvedev] Yes, of course, but the whole point is how you interpret democratic centralism. In the past, there were also proclamations of democratic centralism, but it frequently transmogrified into bureaucratic centralism. That's right. We are talking here about a profound development of democracy in the work of the party itself. Of course, the party should be controlled by the people. How? Through periodically held elections, elections to the supreme and other bodies of state power, to the leading bodies of public organizations. The communists should fight at these elections for popular support and thus get public evaluation, so to speak. Therein lies the crux of the matter.

[Biryukov] Vadim Andreyevich, is it possible to determine some kind of limit of ideological differences that still makes it possible to remain within the CPSU or is that a formal factor?

[Medvedev] How could it possibly be a formal factor? The CPSU is an organization of like-minded people....

[Biryukov, interrupting] So how....

[Medvedev, interrupting] ... and being in the CPSU presents certain requirements concerning views, concerning ideology. It couldn't be any other way. Otherwise, the party falls apart, as a union of like-minded people.

[Biryukov] At this point of our discussion, we have reached a question that simply cannot be avoided. It is the question of our mass media. First, our mass media are showing pluralism in every possible manifestation. Second, there are two probably antipodal evaluations. Some people say that today the mass media are the prime movers of progress in the process of perestroyka. Others say that it is precisely the mass media that today is the greatest evil.

[Medvedev] That's right. I consider that in this case we do get extreme positions among the views. In principle, we have completely abandoned the former methods of the permitting-prohibiting procedure, when essentially complete control was exercised, when for every more-or-less noticeable contribution some kind of approval was sought from the party central committee and its departments. We have abandoned this. This, of course, raises the responsibility of the managers of the press, the television, the radio, but this gives them enormous rights and they are entitled to decide about all issues. I don't mean here, of course, the publication of official documents, official materials. There's no issue here.

[Biryukov] No. I have something from a different field here. Those who knew I was coming to interview you instructed me to ask how the publication of the reprint from [A REPUBBLICA came about. Was it done on instruction?

[Medvedev] I should say that our attitude toward mutual relations with the press applies to a full extent also to all party papers, including PRAVDA. We do not interfere in the day-to-day activities of the press, relying on the responsibility and rights given to the managers and editorial boards. In this instance, too, there were no recommendations and no instructions given to our press.

Furthermore, I can tell you that some papers had sought advice from the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee concerning possible publication of that article. We expressed a negative attitude toward it. That is how I could briefly reply to this question.

We have not yet finished our discussion on the preceding question. I agree with the view that a great number of serious problems have indeed arisen in our press, television and radio. I could perhaps describe it as a kind of Gasson disease, when the men, the journalists find themselves in completely different conditions, with prohibitions lifted, administrative restrictions lifted, and no interference in their creative process. Not all of them have turned out to be ready for this, not all of them make equally responsible use of the weapon that has been placed in their hands with the right for its unlimited use.

This fascination with errors of the past, I do not want to say that this work has been completed, that we have completed it and settled the accounts with our conscience. Certainly, this analytical and critical work on rethinking what has been happening in our country during preceding decades should continue, but it should proceed so that historical truth is not violated. The most important thing is to realize that through constantly looking at the past, through self-flagellation and through criticism of the present and the past alone it is not possible to achieve positive solutions to the problems. They also have to pay attention to our present affairs, our present concerns. There are a great many of these; they are rich in content. These too need—and here it is of extreme importance—the sharp vision of journalists, reporters, cinematographers, actors, to dispose people toward positive work, toward solving constructive problems.

[Biryukov] Vadim Andreyevich, I will not conceal from you that very often in the debates questions are also discussed concerning you personally. Who are you, the man who at this complicated phase in our life has been entrusted with such a responsible sector? Narrowing the question somewhat, I would like to ask what your sources of information are, where you get information for your considerations.

[Medvedev] Now the problem of information is rather, let's say, specific. I don't think it is a question of a lack of information or even a shortage of information, but of its abundance and how to cope with this abundance of information, how to digest it all. Anyway, every working day begins with familiarization with all manner of sources of information, information from employees of the party Central Committee who are in charge of this or that work sector, sociological information—which is becoming ever more extensive, more specific and more detailed—and permanent contacts with a wide circle of employees. We get scientists and cultural figures visiting here all the time. Lately, I have been meeting practically all our major writers, irrespective of their sympathies, of their, let's say, positions, public positions.

[Biryukov] So what do they come here for? To have an arguement with you about something?

[Medvedev] Yes, of course.

[Biryukov] Or to get instructions?

[Medvedev, laughing] No, what instructions? They come to ask advice, to have a chat. Sometimes I invite comrades and many come to see me themselves. Unfortunately, time contraints make it difficult to meet everyone and that is why sometimes meetings that comrades ask for are delayed.

There are meetings with work collectives. For instance, speaking at the Integral Production Association, I received some 200 questions on all manner of problems of party life. That, of course, is a cross-section of public opinion. So information is plentiful and it goes to all Politburo members, including the CPSU Central Committee general secretary.

[Biryukov] The very last question, Vadim Andreyevich. I don't like the word hobby, but do you have a liking for anything, some special interests? Do you have time for some special passion? What is it, literature, history?

[Medvedev] Well you see, professionally I am an economist, a political economist. That is what determines my hobby, my former profession, which I continue to engage in whenever an opportunity permits, although these are very few. I am continuing work on a textbook on political economy, in which some very authoritative and knowledgeable economists are involved. Basically, it is a collective work. Our work is going quite well and smoothly. We have written a one-volume work and now we are working on an expanded textbook. All in all, it introduces a significant element of newness into political economics as a whole, including the political economy of socialism, taking into consideration the restructuring processes that are taking place in the country. So I have to use any bit of time that becomes more or less free for that.

Of course, one needs something for the soul and for relaxation. Whenever I can manage, on Sundays, I go for fairly long bicycle rides around outlying towns, around Moscow.

[Biryukov] Well, that's an unexpected element.

[Medvedev] That's right.

[Biryukov] Thank you very much for the interview. We have taken up quite a bit of your time. I hope that this will enable our viewers to get a better view of you and to satisfy their interests in a number of urgent problems of today. Thank you.

[Medvedev] Right. [video shows Biryukov interviewing Medvedev in his office throughout]

Strukov, Medvedev Cited on Gdlyan Case

PM2010133189 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 89 p 2

[Interview with R.A. Medvedev and N.A. Strukov, cochairmen of Congress of People's Deputies Commission for verifying materials connected with the activity of the T. Gdlyan Group, by "our correspondent" I. Sichka under the rubric "At First Hand": "Still a Long Way to Results"; date and place of interview not stated; first three paragraphs are KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Recently the Congress of People's Deputies commission for verifying the materials connected with the activity of the T. Gdlyan group has started to allow journalists to attend its hearings. The curtain of secrecy around its work has thus been lifted and the shroud of reticence has disappeared. Now instead of rumors and stories we can rely on absolutely accurate first-hand information.

So far the commission has drawn conclusions only on the case of V. Smirnov. In the very near future an opinion will probably also be formed on the case of Khint, whose hearing will begin next week. The commission's work is so structured that an overall assessment of the activity of Gdlyan's investigatory group over a specific period of time should gradually emerge from the sum of local conclusions on individual criminal cases.

Of course, the commission members cannot always be unanimous in assessing particular facts. That is why today our correspondent talks with the commission's cochairmen, People's Deputies R.A. Medvedev and N.A. Strukov.

N. Strukov: "We Shall Report First Conclusions to Congress"

[Sichka] Nikolay Alekseyevich, interest in the activity of the Gdlyan and Ivanov investigation group is now more than close. The Congress of People's Deputies has decided to bring complete clarity to this matter. But the information reaching the press from your commission is rather contradictory. For instance, I form the impression that the commission has not yet fully sorted itself out.

[Strukov] That is in part the case. Or rather was the case. And I would like our public to treat this with understanding. A certain amount of time went on various organizational shakeups and setting up work. The task set us by the Congress was too complex and unusual—for our country at any rate. At the same time the congress did not define the volume of work or its main avenues or, most important, the commission's precise powers. We had to look into this while we were already on the move.

Since early August specific frictions have begun to emerge within the commission.

On 4 August the commission established the institution of cochairmen. I shall note that we did not thus go against the will of the Congress inasmuch as we were given the right to form our own leading organs independently.

[Sichka] To judge by the fact that you describe all this in the past tense, the commission's work has already entered a normal channel?

[Strukov] Yes, by the start of the Supreme Soviet's second session we had found our position on the main thing. A work plan had been compiled, the main avenues had been singled out, specific people had been assigned to them, and a group of independent experts had been formed. But... Here we were faced with the main problem: the lack of information for processing. Formally we seemed to have full powers but in reality it was very difficult to use them. We immediately felt the lack of interest on the part of certain organs, including the law

enforcement organs. In this connection we have prepared what is already our second request regarding the USSR Prosecutor's Office's failure to supply the documents we are asking for.

[Sichka] Nonetheless you have already had time to familiarize yourselves with many materials. And you have probably already formed some kind of general impression.

[Strukov] I would not make any generalizations now. I can merely note that Gdlyan's group had compiled an enormous case. It was a harmonious system from which there emerged a picture of mass bribery, embezzlements, overreporting, and corruption. Very large sums of money were confiscated from the accused. And now we have come up against what Gdlyan calls the "breakdown of the case"—the fact that instead of an overall structure criminal cases have appeared individually for each of the accused. And the sums of the bribes have declined from millions to tens of thousands of rubles. As for instance in the case of Khudayberdyev: About R5 million (in reality) was confiscated; yet, according to the court sentence the sum of the bribes has been set at several tens of thousands of rubles.

We have expert figures about how in 1978 through 1983 over R.25 billion was embezzled just through overreporting in the cotton industry. And according to some estimates give a figure of up to R4 billion. Gdlyan's group confiscated R44 million. Where is the rest?

[Sichka] You want to say that the commission intends to go beyond the framework of the investigation conducted by the Gdlyan group?

[Strukov] Yes, we intend to study not only the circumstances connected with the activity of the Gdlyan group but also to ascertain in general how the struggle against organized crime has been set up. The public must know how successfully the apparatuses of the Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] and KGB are performing this work, and not just from their own reports.

[Sichka] Nikolay Alekseyevich, the commission has reached the conclusion that the case of V. Smirnov, former second secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, has been halted prematurely. Could you explain what this conclusion is based on?

[Strukov] In general this is not our conclusion alone. Back on 19 May this year the USSR Prosecutor's Office collegium decided that the investigation into Smirnov's case had been conducted in a poor-quality manner and first we must ascertain the reasons why about 20 of the accused in this case retracted their evidence.

[Sichka] Are you or other members of the commission experiencing any pressure?

[Strukov] To a certain extent yes. Many members of our commission say this. Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev is particularly affected. At a recent sitting he described how he was visited by a quite high-ranking person and an attempt was made to influence him in a particular direction. Apart from anonymous threatening telephone calls I have received nothing so far.

[Sichka] And how are Gdlyan and Ivanov behaving with regard to your commission?

[Strukov] They are not doing anything. They have adopted the stance of onlookers. They come to the hearings when we call them and severely answer the questions asked of them. They refused our request to help us investigate certain key elements of the case.

[Sichka] How justified are T. Gdlyan's statements that his group was broken up by the leadership of the USSR Prosecutor's Office?

[Sichka] We cannot yet draw definitive conclusions about this today. We know that of over 200 investigators about 70 were removed from work by the leadership of the USSR Prosecutor's Office. What were the reasons for this? They are not given in the Prosecutor's Office orders. We must establish why specifically each of these investigators was removed.

[Sichka] And a last question, Nikolay Alekseyevich. When is it planned to complete the commission's work and present the final conclusions?

[Strukov] We have not set such deadlines for ourselves. We plan the gradual issuing of information. We have planned as a first stage for ourselves the study of the Gdlyan group's activity through early 1988, then the activity of the Dukhanin group from December 1988 through May 1989, and then the circumstances of the dissolution of the Gdlyan group and so forth. I think we will be able to present our conclusions on the first stage to the forthcoming Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

R. Medvedev: "I Want to Hear Both Sides"

[Sichka] Do you completely share the conclusions of the commission on the results of the hearing of the Smirnov case?

[Medvedev] Yes and no. Because the Prosecutor's Office and investigator Dukhanin are preparing replies. And as an objective man I must listen to everything. Of course I believe the commission members but since I have been notified that the opposite side is preparing a reply and the reply will in their opinion be very convincing, I must also hear them before drawing a definitive conclusion.

[Sichka] So the commission's conclusion is not final?

[Medvedev] No, it was a discussion. Dukhanin spoke and Strukov, the cochairman of our commission, read out his reply. Dukhanin said that he was seeing our information for the first time but I replied that we were also hearing his report for the first time, he had not presented it to us in advance. That is why the commission decided on Strukov's information that the investigation had been halted prematurely. I also spoke and

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY published my speech almost in full. Dukhanin said that he would give a reply and he also telephoned me and said that he was preparing it and asked us also to consider this reply. I said: "Of course, but give us the reply in advance so that we can prepare."

[Sichka] In connection with the fact that there are several views among the commission members regarding the "most-favored status" for your work, do you believe that there are difficulties in obtaining information and documents from the USSR Prosecutor's Office and other state organs?

[Medvedev] You must understand that an evolution is under way here. That is, at the first stage of the work the Prosecutor's Office did indeed place very serious obstacles to the work of the commission, but now M.S. Gorbachev has appointed a special oversight prosecutor, Comrade Martinson, who does not belong to our commission (that was the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium). They have not refused to issue the documents he has requested.

It is another matter that individual members of the commission conducting some investigations at their own initiative are going to the Prosecutor's Office and demanding a particular document and are sometimes not given the document. Because that is contrary to the law, because it is a secret relating to the investigation. There is a procedure whereby they do not have the right to issue cases which are being prepared for trial to anyone except a lawyer. Gdlyan and Ivanov frequently insist to the commission members that we should view precisely these "living" cases as they are called. But we are waiting for the trial. So the Prosecutor's Office had its reasons and perhaps even its pride but now this question has been resolved by a decision of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

[Sichka] Do you feel any outside pressure?

[Medvedev] I feel pressure from all sides. Unfortunately. I feel pressure from the numerous committees to defend Gdlyan and Ivanov. I am being insulted. People telephone me with threats against myself, my wife, and my family. I feel pressure from Gdlyan and Ivanov, who insult me publicly, in the presence of other deputies. And we will raise this question at the Supreme Soviet. I have until recently also felt pressure from Uzbekistan. They are also an interested party. In various forms. For instance, a woman comes to us and demands that her husband be released. I say: "I cannot decide that question." "We will set fire to ourselves on Red Square," is the reply. That is also a form of pressure. From state officials there has been the expression of something like "dissatisfaction" over the examination of the Smirnov case. That is not pressure—it is dissatisfaction. It has also been reflected in the fact that information about our sitting has been published in only three newspapers: ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, and a brief report in IZVESTIYA. The other press organs have not published it.

Prosecutor's Office Meeting

PM31l0164089 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 Second Edition p 2

[N. Demidov report: "Important Lesson: Meeting at USSR Prosecutor's Office"]

[Text] The mafia, organized crime, corruption—terms that only a few years ago were virtually absent from our daily vocabulary and jurisprudence are today in everyone's ears and on everyone's lips. A torrent of information has poured down on people (who, let us note, are not always ready for it). Bribes of thousands of rubles, stolen millions, cotton, embezzlers, the "Uzbek case," open trials, the high echelons of power infected with the plague of corruption. It is enough to horrify people. The "Cosa Nostra" is nothing to this! The "Yakuza" is nothing to this!

However, along with the torrent of information came waves of rumors, half-rumors, and murmurings. It cannot be denied that not all our press was up to the task, and it reported "hot" facts which later turned out to be inaccurate or simply untrue.

And when two names—Gdlyan and Ivanov—began to appear in reports, the attention of millions of people focused on them. First in brief reports, then in reportages and interviews, and then in newspaper pullouts with color photos, these two investigators really did look like fine professionals engaged in a battle with a giant octopus. But then... but then—a new wave of rumors. "Gdlyan and Ivanov in disgrace!", "Gdlyan and Ivanov out of favor!", "The Central Committee puts pressure on the investigators!", "It seems they themselves are lawbreakers!", "A criminal case has been brought against them!", and so forth. Then came a new (or rather, another) flareup prompted by the case of V.I. Smirnov, former sector chief at the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Party Work Department. There was a detailed discussion of this case at a meeting held recently at the USSR Prosecutor's Office.

Let us state at once that we do not seek to apportion blame, to accuse or to vindicate. But thus far only T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. Ivanov have had the opportunity—from as high a platform as the Congress of People's Deputies—to express their view, to influence public opinion, if you like. Those with whom, in many people's view, they are in confrontation have had no such opportunity. Therefore, we will give them the opportunity to express their views too. In legal terms, we will ensure the adversarial rivalry of the sides.

So, those present were: A.S. Dukhanin, USSR KGB investigator—as a member of the investigating group headed by Gdlyan, he personally conducted the investigation in the Smirnov case and later submitted the application for the case to be dismissed; I.K. Titov, prosecutor of an administration of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, who supervised this case; A.V. Shoyev, chief of an investigation section at the USSR Prosecutor's

Office; L.F. Kosmarskaya, deputy chief of an administration at the USSR Prosecutor's Office; Yu.N. Shadrin, member of the USSR Prosecutor's Office collegium and chief of the administration for supervision of the examination of criminal cases in the courts.

By law, an investigator is an autonomous procedural agent who has the right to adopt a decision himself.

A.S. Dukhanin and nine of his colleagues were brought into the USSR Prosecutor's Office team in December 1988.

Investigator A. Dukhanin was the first to speak.

"After an initial study of the materials," A. Dukhanin noted, "and the testimony given by many people while they were in custody, a great many questions arose, patent contradictions were revealed, and it became obvious that the investigation was substantially incomplete." There were so many gaps that "as early as December I had to ask Gdlyan about the need for a repeat interrogation of all those who had made statements. The reports did not define or indicate the motives, the purposes of the commission of the crime, or the sources from which sums of money figuring as bribes were received, and other evidence was lacking."

A.S. Dukhanin cited numerous examples of contradictions in the testimonies of the accused: discrepancies as to the sums of the bribes allegedly given to Smirnov and the times at which they were handed over. He stressed in this connection that he was disturbed by the completely incomprehensible system, the method by which the investigation was divided up. Some investigators worked with those who had given bribes to an official now in custody, others only with the recipients of bribes. In the absence of overlap or access to all the materials of the case, the investigators were often working blind and had no opportunity to form an integrated impression of the person under investigation or to establish the circumstances of the commission of the crime comprehensively, fully, and objectively.

"As we investigated the criminal case against Smirnov, accumulated factual data, and evaluated them on the basis of a comprehensively conducted analysis, we eventually saw before us an elegant system that formed the basis of the whole of the so-called 'Uzbek case,' and as early as mid-May of this year it was obvious that we were witnessing a political machination, a scheme launched by investigators T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. Ivanov," A. Dukhanin stressed. He went on: "Certain much-publicized cases were in effect created artificially by the investigators themselves, that is, fabricated." Gdlyan and Ivanov committed "numerous manipulations of testimonies, used the investigation as an instrument of personal power and a way of settling scores" with troublesome people, and were guided in their actions by "careerist and political motives." This applies, for instance, to the testimonies against former Uzbekistan Prosecutor Buturlin when he got in the way of the crimes being committed by Gdlyan and Ivanov, against former USSR General Prosecutor Rekunkov, against his deputy Soroka, and many others.

Continuous psychological pressure, A. Dukhanin said, was brought to bear on the accused who were being held in custody. They were entirely under the control of the investigators and were constantly threatened. They would, for instance, "be housed with common criminals, and they were threatened that if they refused to provide the testimonies necessary to the investigation 'they would be shot' and their relatives and families arrested."

"The accused were initially set the task of confessing to having received a sum specified by the investigators. A man would falsely accuse himself. In the course of searches, frequently no valuables were found. To explain the physical absence of the financial resources allegedly received by way of bribes, the accused were instructed to give false testimony to the effect that they had given bribes to people named by Gdlyan and Ivanov.

"On the other hand, it was promised that they would be released from custody if they gave the required testimony. People were literally paralyzed with fear. Each of them was set the task of giving false testimony against specific individuals, including leaders of union ministries and departments, workers at the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Party Work Department, and certain Central Committee secretaries. The investigators acted according to current circumstances, and their approaches changed, as did the individuals against whom there was a need to obtain false testimony.

"And that is how cases were fabricated.

"This is confirmed by the materials from the criminal cases, and it is easy to see this if you study them. After Smirnov's arrest," A. Dukhanin went on, "to secure the maximum psychological influence on him, confrontations were organized one after another. In a short space of time, 10 such confrontations were organized, with the main defendants. One detail is striking: Before each confrontation, Ivanov spoke in private with everyone who had made a statement on giving a bribe to Smirnov, after which they went in and repeated their testimony like schoolchildren repeating their lessons, or even read out texts prepared beforehand. If they were asked a question arising from what they had said, they became lost and started showing signs of nervousness, or else suddenly became stupefied and fell silent.

"With a view to establishing the truth, efforts were made to discover objective evidence. The search for money and valuables named as bribes and the study of the material position of his family and various other important circumstances highlighted the fact that Smirnov had never had any additional source of financial assets."

As a result of interrogation of all the accused who had formerly made statements that they had given bribes to Smirnov, it emerged that a single system of lies, self-incrimination, and mutual incrimination was imposed

on all of them by Gdlyan and Ivanov. Some cases, including the Smirnov case, "were created artificially." "It became quite clear," A. Dukhanin noted, "that such fabrications were aimed at compromising the Central Committee as the party's leading organ and undermining the authority of the party itself. I do not think I am mistaken in my conclusions, and there are sufficient materials in the case to confirm this with unconditional certainty."

I.K. Titov, supervising prosecutor in the Smirnov case, took the floor.

He participated in all the interrogations connected with this case. This is what the prosecutor had to say on the subject: "At the interrogations all the accused, without exception, talking about the false testimonies that had been foisted on them, sketched a pyramid, the same as Gdlyan and Ivanov had drawn for them. At the top was 'the CPSU Central Committee,' below that 'the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee,' then senior officials of the republic party Central Committee, then first secretaries of oblast and rayon committees, and so forth. These unsubstantiated testimonies, rather than proven and investigated facts, of bribery were obtained by the investigation in the period 1984-1988 and formed the basis of the charge. The changes in these people's testimonies did not occur instantaneously, as Gdlyan and Ivanov now assert. In 1987 and 1988 more than 10 people wrote to the general prosecutor and other bodies saying that lawlessness was being perpetrated and they were being forced to incriminate themselves and others. But all these statements fell into the hands of Gdlyan and Ivanov."

The time originally allocated for the meeting had long since expired, but the discussion continued. Yu.N. Shadrin now joined in. It was, after all, largely on his findings on the question of the correctness of dismissing the case against Smirnov that the position of the USSR Prosecutor's Office leadership, and perhaps the fate of the case, depended!

"L.F. Kosmarskaya and I had to play the part of experts, so to speak, to express our opinion, on the basis of a study of the case, as to the completeness of the investigation carried out, its future prospects, and the validity of the decision to dismiss the case. The case can be divided into two parts. The first consists of the materials prior to 1989, when the case was looked into by investigators from Gdlyan's group. And then there are the materials collected by KGB investigators. The materials collected prior to 1989 are basically not evidence, but brief statements and records of interrogations on statements by people who were kept in custody for a long period concerning the giving of bribes to various persons, including workers on the party Central Committee."

These statements and records of interrogations, Yu.N. Shadrin noted, are stereotyped, unspecific, and contradictory. The size of the bribes snowballed from one interrogation to the next. Sometimes they increased tenfold.

All this could not but cause concern, and it demanded a correct legal evaluation.

"In 4-5 months KGB investigator Dukhanin did a tremendous amount of work. Dozens of people were interrogated, all the accused were reinterrogated, confrontations and searches were organized. A large volume of documents with the force of evidence was added to the case. And we entirely agree with Dukhanin that the case against Smirnov was falsified. Well, I ask you, is it possible to believe the testimony of Turapov, former first secretary of Kashka-Darya Oblast Party Committee, to the effect that in late 1984 and early 1985 he gave Smirnov two bribes in his office at the CPSU Central Committee—one of 10,000, the other 15,000. But from July 1984 Smirnov was working as second secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, was not living in Moscow, and had no office at the CPSU Central Committee. There are plenty of similar contradictions. Conversely, there was a lack of irrefutable evidence.

"We believe that the dismissal of the case was entirely justified."

The journalist Borin asked a question, saying that he understands from what he has heard that Smirnov is not guilty of bribe-taking and the case was dismissed correctly, but that when it comes to Smirnov's unethical conduct, there is a silence, and he looks as pure as the driven snow, so that public opinion forms the impression that Gdlyan and Ivanov are probably right on the whole. Someone is protecting Smirnov.

Yu.N. Shadrin replied.

Under this case, the circumstances surrounding Smirnov's acquisition of various objects and souvenirs were examined very scrupulously. These actions, although they deserve official moral condemnation, are at the same time on the right side of the criminal law.

Has the USSR Prosecutor's Office brought a criminal case against Gdlyan and Ivanov? A.V. Sboyev answered that question.

A.V. Sboyev explained that a case has indeed been brought, not against Gdlyan and Ivanov, but in connection with instances of violations of the law, about which there are literally hundreds of complaints. This case is under investigation, and while it is being investigated it is not appropriate to discuss it, because there is such a concept as confidentiality of investigation. "I realize that this question is of concern to the mass media and to citizens. People say that Gdlyan and Ivanov's hands are tied. In fact, the USSR general prosecutor is obliged, in accordance with legal requirements, to investigate the

authenticity of these complaints. No one has released him from this duty, and he is acting strictly in accordance with the Constitution."

But all the same... whether we like it or not, for many people the names of Gdlyan and Ivanov have become synonyms for the uncompromising struggle against crime and corruption. Furthermore, their work produced results: Money, valuables, and pots of gold were found. We have seen all this for ourselves, with our own eyes.

"You are talking about millions," Sboyev went on. "But do you know that by no means everything is as it should be with regard to those millions? Gross violations of the law were perpetrated in confiscating these assets. There were cases where the money was not counted on confiscation and jewelry was not described, but piled into a heap and then taken to Moscow, set out on a table, and offered to journalists for inspection. Of course, it was a striking spectacle. But what then? What do you suggest should be done with these necklaces, rings, and pendants? It is not known what belonged to whom, the individuality of the articles has been lost. And here is another curious thing...."

A.V. Sboyev described how these millions had appeared on the television screens in the course of Gdlyan's and Ivanov's election campaigns. "These sums still require considerable examination. They mention 43-44 million, but we have counted up 33 million, including the value of the property described, investments, and so forth. Of this, 15 million was confiscated by KGB workers even before Gdlyan. But where is the rest? This is food for thought, and I cannot rule out possible abuses.

"I would like to draw your attention to the following. Bribery exists in our country, of course, and an uncompromising, aggressive struggle must be waged against it, which is what we at the prosecutor's office organs and other law enforcement organs do. The USSR Prosecutor's Office, in conjunction with state security organs and internal affairs organs, is investigating cases in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and other parts of the country. A case has now been sent to court against Askarov, former first secretary of Chimkent Oblast Party Committee. The investigating section of the USSR Prosecutor's Office is completing the investigation of the case against Khasanov, former first secretary of Kulyab Oblast Party Committee.

"We are working actively with people arrested for bribetaking in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, that is to say, we are completing the case that was taken from Gdlyan.

"I have to report that cases against 10 people have already been submitted to the USSR Supreme Court to determine jurisdiction, in the cases of 7 officials under arrest the accused are being familiarized with the materials of the criminal cases, and the other cases are in the final stage of investigation. As you can see, the case is not 'collapsing,' as Gdlyan and Ivanov claim in numerous speeches at rallies, but is being investigated in accordance with lawful procedure.

"But it should be added to this that along with those who patently did take bribes, some people turned out to have been arrested without justification. It will be possible to give more details on this when the investigation is complete. All the same, it can already be said that in almost every case Gdlyan artificially exaggerated the volume of charges.

"This question must be studied in great depth, first and foremost from this angle: What kind of prosecution supervision was there of the investigation of this case? I think one can say that the supervision was not up to the proper standard. This was revealed very clearly by the USSR Supreme Court in its examination of the criminal case against Churbanov and others.

"After studying that criminal case I raised the question of removing two of the accused from the case, namely Khaitov and Mukhammadiyev, but for a long time Gdlyan stubbornly refused to agree to this, insisting that they would 'go in with the crowd.'

"I insisted on separating these individuals from the common criminal case because there was insufficient evidence against them. How did it all end?

"Khaitov was fully acquitted by the court, while Mukhammadiyev was released from custody, and the case against him dismissed for purposes of rehabilitation.

"I would like to remind you that while supporting the indictment in the case against Churbanov and others, I was forced to reject nearly half of the indictment submitted. This is also significant.

"I should add that at the beginning of 1989 USSR General Prosecutor A.Ya. Sukharev formed a group of 12 prosecutors to assume strict prosecution supervision of this case, and facts then began to emerge which ultimately led to the removal of Gdlyan and Ivanov from investigation of the case. That is the logical outcome."

So we received detailed information, at first hand, so to speak. The meeting was an attempt to clarify the true state of affairs. But for all the counterarguments, the situation is clear: Whatever the results, this whole story is an important lesson—both for investigations, and for supervision, and for us journalists; for everyone who seeks what we call a rule-of-law state, in which only one thing can reign supreme—the law.

Official Holds News Conference on Export Plans

LD0411153789 Moscow TASS in English 1459 GMT Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS—The Soviet Union has begun to establish an open economy that will develop according to growing competition with the world economy.

For this the country will need new powerful export resources. Ivan Ivanov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' Foreign Economic Commission, told journalist at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Press Centre today after a two-day confernce on the subject "perestroika and the development of Soviet export resources".

The conference was organised on the commission's initiative.

By the year 2000 the Soviet Union intends to bring the percentage of finished products in its export up to 50 per cent, freezing the delivery of raw materials to the world market at the 1985 level, the Soviet representative said.

It is essential to chose an optimal export for specialisation of the country and ensure balanced foreign-trade settlements, Ivanov said.

The Soviet Union has worked out an extensive export development programme for the next five-year plan period. But in view of the country's difficult financial situation, the amount of capital investments in this sector will probably be less than planned.

Therefore emphasis will be laid on non-fiscal export development leverage: Incentives through an increase in currency allocations to exporting enterprises, the application of a new currency rate, and others.

Joint enterprise plays an important role in the development of the country's export potential, Ivanov said. As many as 1,050 joint ventures with foreign partners have already been established with an aggregate capital of 2.5 billion roubles. The drawn capital in freely convertible currency has amounted to 1.4 billion roubles.

In the near future the Soviet Union intends to conclude a cooperation agreement with the European Economic Community. Following that, it will be possible to begin talks on cooperation with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Talks about GATT could begin soon.

Moscow Party Takes Action on Freight Backlog

PM2510161189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 Oct 89 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "The Capital's Transport Conveyor Belt"]

[Text] A tense situation has arisen in connection with freight shipments on the Moscow railroad network. The point is, as PRAVDA has reported, that a large number of containers has accumulated at container depots and on railcars. A series of measures intended to resolve these problems was examined at a session of the Moscow CPSU City Committee [Gorkom] Secretariat held on 23 October.

It was noted that, as a result of the increased volume of freight coming into the capital, road transportation material and technical backwardness, and the lack of proper coordination in the operation of all links in the transportation system, rolling stock has been wastefully standing idle.

The situation is being exacerbated by the irresponsible attitude of recipients of the freight in regard to the smooth functioning of the transportation system.

It became clear at the session that the main cause of the prevailing acute situation was alienation between departments. The Moscow Main Administration of Motor Transport, set up at the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee [Gorispolkom] to coordinate efforts, is failing to carry out the functions entrusted to it. Rayon soviet executive committees have distanced themselves from the organization of freight operations, and monitoring by rayon party committees has gotten slack. The Moscow CPSU Gorkom Secretariat instructed communist leaders of Moscow Gorispolkom, Moscow City Transport Administration, the Moscow railroad, the Main Administration for Trade, and the Moscow City Agroindustrial Committee to increase by 50 percent the daily volume of freight handled by railroad transport and to ensure smooth acceptance of freight by the customers and the unloading of large freight containers right on the sidings, which will make it possible to use transport facilities more efficiently and speed up turnaround. Among top-priority measures needed to relieve the strain rapidly, it is planned to bring in at least 500 vehicles from ministries and departments to work on the network.

As for long-term decisions, it was planned that trade, purchasing, and supply depots under union republic jurisdiction would be moved out of the city, freight traffic transiting Moscow would be reduced, and road transportation enterprises and transportation workshops would be developed further.

A session of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Control and Auditing Commission Presidium also focused on questions connected with delays in shipping freight from Moscow railroad stations.

The Moscow CPSU Gorkom Control and Auditing Commission presidium imposed party penalties on a number of leaders of transportation, industrial, and trade associations and enterprises for serious shortcomings in organizing freight shipments.

Impact of Politics on Workers Viewed

PM2410132789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Oct 89 Second Edition p 1

[Viktor Shirokov article under the "Political Diary" rubric: "Thick Layers"]

[Text] The readings and hearings of new draft laws at our Union's Supreme Soviet session have really been reaching dramatically new highs in the last few days. This is the nerve center of the state's political life today; this is where key questions of our future life are being

solved. Television cameras bring close to us the faces of people's deputies emotionally and at times furiously fighting for every line, for the spirit and letter of the new laws. Big-time politics on a large scale...

There are, however, occasions when many of us are actually the "makers" of politics without even realizing it, be it in the course of an argument which has developed at a labor collective council, a trade union committee sitting, or a rayon soviet session, during verbose debates at a session of an institute department or scientific council, or in a sharp skirmish between "informals." The pulse of political life can be felt everywhere.

And the greatest joy is caused by the fact that the working man has now made a powerful entry, like a proper master, into politics. I am so sorry now, while writing these lines, that I failed to note down the name of that Kazakh miner who, looking the minister of the coal industry squarely in the eye, said:

"There were times when I groveled before any boss, and my heart used to beat faster whenever I had to address them. Now I have grown out of my servility and I am telling you: It is we workers who pay for your ministry, it is we who are keeping you, and therefore you must work for us!"

We all recall how the miners' strikes shook the country, the school of political self-organization that strike committees had to graduate from. As a matter of fact, the entire country was taught a lesson in political struggle, and one of its important results was the "Law On the Procedure for Settling Collective Labor Disputes (Conflicts)" adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Wildcat strikes are henceforth taking the regulated and civilized "tracks" of normal economic relations.

But these strikes did produce another result, a specific one—USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No 608 on the implementation of those of the strikers' demands which were accepted. L. Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said that there were 717 questions awaiting solution, each one involving a colossal amount of work. I would add: and considerable funds as well . By way of an example, the wages fund has had to be supplemented by an annual amount of R568 million just to provide additional payments to miners for the time taken to move from disembarkation points in the mine to the face and back.

This commission's [not further identified—FBIS] work can legitimately be described as a kind of study course in economic management from which miners graduated in a hurry. It became clear, for example, that the demand to grant autonomy to grassroots enterprises is not all that easy to implement: Given the current profitability level at some of them—3 to 5 percent—some collectives will simply fall by the wayside.

Just a few months have passed since the strike, but much has already been done.

In my view, the main point has been achieved: Working people's minds, initiative, and creative energy have been awakened, and they are more firmly convinced that they can really influence the state of affairs.

The situation is reminiscent of a mine's sharply inclined seam and the vital necessity to drill and go through it. We have arrived at the thick layers of perestroyka by ourselves, and it is up to us to work them.

...An elderly cleaning woman growled during meal break in the canteen: "Clear away your own dirty dishes, you strikers..."

I thought to myself: We have already accumulated a fair quantity of "dirty dishes" in the heat of political clashes. Now it is up to us all, and us alone, to clear them away so as to finally sit around a clean table and get back to normal work.

Party Control Committee Issues Reprimands

LD2110105389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Oct 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast: report by Correspondents V. Golubev and I. Galperin—recorded; correspondents not individually identified]

[Text] In Moscow today, there was a sitting of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee.

[Correspondent] For the first time ever, a "Vremya" program film crew is reporting from the hall where the Party Control Committee is in session. [Video shows meeting in progress]

Under examination is the issue of the slackening attention by leaders, communists, and party organization secretaries in a number of Volgograd Oblast enterprises to matters of labor and social discipline. The state of affairs at the Volgograd tractor works association causes particular alarm. The losses of work time here increased by 10,000 man-days over the past year. At the same time, the output of tractors fell from 75,000 to 69,200, and by a further nearly 2,500 in the past 6 months.

Having rid themselves of operational inference in production, the association's party committee and Comrade (Babakov), the party secretary, failed to find a way to politically influence the primary organization and its subgroups. The worker, his working and living conditions, left the party committee's field of vision. As before, commands, bellows, and pressure continue to be the main means of working with people.

Recognizing the fairness of the commission's conclusions, Comrade Butko, general director of the association, noted, however, that the dictate of the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine-Building lives on, and that the practice of unjustified appropriations of the association's profits for the state budget continues. This

does not allow opportunities for financing reconstruction and the development of the social sphere, which ultimately affects the working person.

[Boris Karlovich Pugo, chairman of the Party Control Committee] Today, we find ourselves in new conditions in which the principles of democracy clearly are playing their role. Democracy is entering our lives, and no one can negate that. Today, it probably is completely the wrong approach to speak of discipline—that discipline to which we became accustomed in the past and which, perhaps, was created only by bellowing, by some kind of swoop, by some sort of what we sometimes refer to literally as the aid of a stick. Today, matters of discipline also are comprised of matters connected with giving every work collective the opportunity to work at full strength under conditions of econoic reform. [Video shows Pugo addressing session]

[Correspondent] Boris Karlovich, one cannot forget, after all, that we all are communists, and that we entered that organization voluntarily. Thus, we have a party membership card and we share the rules in which party discipline, after all, is laid down in a certain way.

[Pugo] In my opinion, you have touched on to a very important theme, which is connected precisely with the attitude of communists. Communists possess an additional...]

[Correspondent, interrupting] Burden of responsibility?

[Pugo]...Responsibility, an additional duty. They have to understand this. I think that people also share this view and are making more heightened demands on all communists, both the rank-and-file and the leaders. We must take this into consideration, as well. [Video shows Pugo being interviewed by correspondent]

[Correspondent] By a decision of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee, Comrade Butko, general director of the association, and Comrade (Babakov), party committee secretary, were given reprimands. [Video shows Butko, (Babakov)]

News Conference Held on Soviet Legal Reforms

LD2410212189 Moscow TASS in English 1944 GMT 24 Oct 89

[Text] Geneva October 24 TASS—Soviet Minister of Justice Veniamin Yakovlev, Member of Parliament Konstantin Lubenchenko, Interior Ministry chief expert Vasiliy Ignatov and Deputy Chief of the Investigation Administration of the National Procurator's Office Vladimir Nenashev addressed journalists at a news conference held today at the Geneva Palace of Nations.

The speakers were members of the Soviet delegation who arrived in Geneva to present a Soviet report to a session of the Human Rights Committee.

The Soviet minister of justice told the news conference about the basic trends of legal and court reform in the Soviet Union and the work to improve Soviet legislation and the practice of its application.

He called special attention to the renovation of Soviet election laws, the new bills on inter-ethnic relations and the improvements of economic legislation.

Yakovlev paid special attention to a package of laws on the right to leave and enter the country, the press and other mass information media, the bills on the freedom of conscience and religious associations, public organizations and other matters.

The Soviet minister stressed that rapid large-scale changes in the field of human rights in the Soviet Union are a result of Soviet society's long-ripe internal need for legal guarantees of these rights. Deputy Lubenchenko and other participants in the news conference replied to numerous questions about Soviet political reform, the Soviet law-making procedure and changes in the court and law-enforcement system in the Soviet Union.

State Labor Committee Head Interviewed

PM1910090989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with V. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, by V. Romanyuk: "Equalizing Opportunities, But Not Wages"—date and place unspecified]

[Text] [Romanyuk] Vladimir Ivanovich, most people are dissatisfied with the way they live. Shortages, inflation, and the fruitless expectation of change for the better in the near future all engender a lack of confidence in tomorrow. During your confirmation as chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems [Goskomtrud] you advocated placing social considerations at the center of our plans. So what is being done—or in the pipeline!—to ensure social protection and social guarantees for Soviet people?

[Shcherbakov] I would divide that into two questions—on social protection and social guarantees.

I am convinced that social policy should be based on scientifically substantiated social normatives which will make it possible to finally overcome the "residual" principle in the allocation of funds to the social sphere. Previously things were done simply: All requirements in the production sphere were covered, and then the remaining funds were used for social purposes. Now we must take the exact opposite approach. But this is just a strategy. Each family has its own problems. Our committee has worked out and submitted for the economic council's examination more than 60 social normatives covering the minimum material provision for different population groups. On this basis we will try seriously to orient planning toward social problems—and highly specific problems at that. There is at least an emerging

opportunity to define in cost terms a level in the social sphere below which people should not be allowed to drop.

[Romanyuk] And what is that level?

[Shcherbakov] It is common world practice to calculate living standards on the basis of a "basket of consumer goods." But these "baskets of goods" are different in different countries. Our situation is unique: We have to calculate our "basket of consumer goods" even though we...don't have the goods. And then—what prices should be used to calculate the value of the "basket?" Whereas in Moscow, Leningrad, and certain other cities meat can be bought at state prices, in most regions the main hope is on the market, where prices are 2-3 times higher. This means that the cost of the "basket" will be different. And it is not as if this only applies to meat! But we are simply obliged to orient the plan to ensure that the minimum material guarantees are provided to absolutely everyone and that nobody should live below the minimum level.

[Romanyuk] Yet the property differences between population groups and whole regions are becoming more and more noticeable...

[Shcherbakov] We have to make clear what we want to do—eradicate the rich or eradicate the poor. It is not a question today of providing everyone with social protection from the influence of market forces—such a goal would be too complex. The system of strong social support for individual sections of the population is a different matter. These sections—not all the population—would be protected through indexation of pensions and welfare payments, and increased cash disbursements. As for the Soviet people's social protection, this is now so high, you see, that people have stopped reacting to the social situation. A more tangible impact of market forces on the economy could substantially alter the situation. But it is not entirely clear just what its impact would be on the behavior of the able-bodied section of the population. At any rate, the lack of social protection...

[Romanyuk] Should be reduced?

[Shcherbakov] No, geared to increasing people's interest in the results of their work. Of course, we will not leave people unprotected in the face of the vicissitudes of the market. Social guarantees will remain, but the conditions ensuring growth in people's prosperity must change. For many years emphasis was placed on boosting social consumption funds, with the result that they spread through many channels. But since people were to all intents and purposes given free housing, medical services, and sanatorium vacations, the incentive to work hard was inevitably reduced. Even today certain citizens exploit our free benefits. We propose setting up a mechanism that will make it possible to increase the impact on the able-bodied section of the population through the market, using the market to give the population an incentive to work more effectively. Socially weak sections of the population must be brought into closer contact with social benefits, which, being distributed "according to work," are least accessible to the very sections of the population which need them most. We are not used to talking about such things, but social policy in the sphere of distribution is so distorted that poorer families are almost four times less likely to use sanatoriums and leisure centers, and large families are four times less likely to use children's institutions.

[Romanyuk] But does all this mean that socially "protected" sections of the population sweat blood? After all, in our country—and not without the Goskomtrud's assistance—any job is remunerated, which gives rise to apathy and a sense of "social protection." The view has even been expressed that under the conditions of socialism it is impossible to overcome this evil of wage-leveling.

[Shcherbakov] To sum up the existing ideas, the task is as follows: On the one hand, we must not allow people to make money they have not earned (through a market monopoly) while, on the other hand, we must give them an opportunity to make money in general (without artificial limits on their pay).

[Romanyuk] Isn't that a contradiction? After all, you yourself have repeatedly campaigned for wages growth to be restrained. I can even quote you: "If we permit uncontrolled wages growth, I can think of nothing more likely to overturn our reforms—both political and economic."

[Shcherbakov] It is no secret that incomes are growing considerably faster than social labor productivity. Virtually all central departments interfere endlessly in this process and only harm matters. I was recently approached by two deputy ministers who asked me to increase incentives for timber shipments. They asked me to make the wages of timber procurement and reforestation workers dependent on the pace of timber shipments. That is a way of pushing up wages while doing nothing to preserve the forests.

In general our system of earning money often fails to coincide with our system of spending it. Since a great deal of money is usually issued, restrictions are immediately introduced. This is tantamount to running around with a cloth after a leaky barrel—we should mend the holes, but we keep on wiping the floor instead. In our case "mending the holes" means taxing wages properly.

[Romanyuk] This kind of taxation has been introduced, albeit as a temporary measure. Many specialists admit that it has extremely severe features.

[Shcherbakov] We have been forced into it. Had we not taken this step now, all our other actions would have been pointless. If there is a fire in a house, there are various ways of putting it out. For instance, we can first work out a plan for putting the fire out, so as to spend as

little as possible. Or we can start putting it out straightaway, perhaps spending extra, but saving the house. In this case we have resolutely decided to put the fire out straightaway!

[Romanyuk] However, this has not stopped social organizations—in particular the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU]—from substantially increasing pay scales. And there is a reasonable explanation for this: The restructuring of the remuneration system in the material production sphere gave rise to the distortion that it became difficult to choose highly qualified specialists for work in social organizations. We are increasing the wage rates for workers at social organizations, while talking about putting a fire out... And it's not as if this were the only "fire" burning in our economy!

[Shcherbakov] Are you thinking of social conflicts?

[Romanyuk] Exactly!

[Shcherbakov] I hadn't been in my new job a week before I found myself at the center of these acute events.

[Romanyuk] The discussions about who is to blame are still going on. I've heard that the main causes of the strikes have been local. It suits officials with the central authorities to think that. How about you?

[Shcherbakov] I toured many mining towns and personally received around 100 strike committee delegations in Moscow. In all, the Goskomtrud and the AUCCTU received more than 2,500 demands from strike committees. Indeed, four-fifths of the demands could be met locally, not least with the participation of the ministries. Only one-fifth of the issues apply at the union level—these related to working practices, vacations, aid for poorer families, and pensions. Although labor collectives can do a great deal even without the government. After all, they have been given extensive rights in spending the funds they earn.

It seems to me that there are general deep-rooted reasons why local problems are being poorly resolved. Unfortunately, the new economic mechanism has not properly penetrated the labor collectives. There has been movement at the top, but the guy at the machine tool has felt hardly any change. The overwhelming majority of strike committee members have never even seen the Law on the State Enterprise and know nothing of the rights it gives to labor collectives. For instance, they have been demanding the right to set their own work norms and job prices. Yet the law gave them those rights back in 1987!

This is an emotional area. But if you look at it from the standpoint of the depth of the problem, it is possible to see another aspect too. Why, for instance, has the problem of pit independence become so acute? Many ministries—not just the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry—have been using the restructuring of the management of sectors in their own interests and have begun to limit enterprises' rights instead of expanding them. The idea of perestroyka is to create a mechanism for the free operation of any economic cell. Yet the ministries, striving to reduce the number of "management units," have started hammering plants and associations together in their dozens, depriving them of their legal independence. The number of independent pits under the Ministry of the Coal Industry has fallen by a factor of 3.5, the fall has been even greater in other sectors, while in some sectors there has been up to an 11-fold decline.

At one pit I tried to explain why there was no money for material aid. A miner had died and there was no money to help his family. Up to 60 percent of profits should remain with the collective—where was this money? But this money does not reach the association or the pit. In each oblast there are 10-15 such associations, and above them there is another territorial administrative organ set up by the Ministry of the Coal Industry at the behest of the local authorities, which thus find it easier to issue orders.

[Romanyuk] Vladimir Ivanovich, as a person who has given many years to production, you clearly sympathize with workers. But as a representative of the government, it strikes me that you must be disappointed to see crowds of strikers, a collapse of production, economic damage...

[Shcherbakov] An extreme protest measure is an extreme measure. People suffer and the state suffers losses too. The Supreme Soviet recently adopted what was, in my opinion, a rather well-balanced law on permitting collective labor conflicts.

[Romanyuk] It had an ambiguous public reception, to put it mildly: People can be fired for taking part in an "illegal" strike.

[Shcherbakov] Those who carry out illegal actions must bear the full consequences. That is the case worldwide. And under existing legislation if people are to blame for not working they don't get paid. Who was to blame in the Kuzbass? It's hard to say. So the government commission decided to pay 100 percent of the tariff rate.

[Romanyuk] So you think it should not have been paid?

[Shcherbakov] In a legal strike people should be paid. The question is: from what source? The state, as under normal conditions, guarantees additional leave, pensions, and privileges. But it has to find wages out of its own funds. Perhaps strike funds should be set up. It has to be admitted that we have not yet learned to regulate such acute social conflicts, and we do not have a sufficient understanding of them.

[Romanyuk] The same could probably be said of unemployment—another phenomenon that has long been kept quiet. Admittedly, temporary unemployment in our country does not have the social stigma that it has in the West, and people sometimes do not work because of the slipshod approach and professional incompetence of production organizers at different levels. But unemployment is unemployment, and we need to study it, reflect it

in statistics, and take corresponding measures. Yet we have no available figures in this area.

[Shcherbakov] We indeed have no figures available. If only for the simple reason that we have still not defined the status of the unemployed. Who is covered by this category? If it extends to those not engaged in social production, the ranks of the unemployed include individuals, family farms, leaseholders, and members of cooperatives. There are also people who work part-time or flextime. Statistically, we can only judge the level of a country's employment to a greater or lesser degree.

A Goskomtrud working group is drawing up a concept for a law on employment. In it we will provide a legal interpretation of what constitutes unemployment, introduce the concept of unemployment benefits, and define the conditions and scale of benefit payments. We will have to consider measures to create additional jobs and employment funds, and examine the entire range of social guarantees provided by society for the unemployed. Finally, the "ground rules" for the unemployed should be determined: Some may look for work, while others may dodge it.

[Romanyuk] In that case, how do you class people who lose their jobs as a result of the restructuring of investment policy—specifically, workers building the pipelines and power stations in Siberia?

[Shcherbakov] These are all difficult processes. Some 700,000 construction workers may be left unemployed. But, although we are closing down some construction projects, we are stepping up others and increasing the pace and scale of housing construction and the construction of buildings in the social sphere. There are urgent projects too. The building of roads in the Non-Chernozem Zone, for instance. Or the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. We now have to resettle many Belorussian and Ukrainian villages, but the new towns have not been built. The complexity of the situation also lies in the fact that a number of major projects are being mothballed for 2 or 3 years, after which work on them will be resumed. This means it would be sensible to retain worker collectives, equipment, and the construction industry base in this area.

[Romanyuk] Vladimir Ivanovich, you are probably familiar with the idea of creating a reserve labor army—planned unemployment in the country, so to speak.

[Shcherbakov] The instigators of this idea, based on Western models, believe that the pressure of surplus labor will prove to be a stimulus to social production. I do not think that these theoreticians see themselves and their family members as part of this "oppressive force." And they do not try to assess the social consequences of unemployment—the intensification of social pressures, rising crime, and so forth.

Nonetheless, I think that the most complex problem will not be the problem of finding work for people as such, but the problem of retraining people. The switching of cadres from the state sector of the economy to cooperatives and leasehold collectives involve the most powerful processes. Things have always been the other way around—any influx of new blood went predominantly into the state sector.

In many countries special programs are launched to create new jobs. We too will have to tackle this problem in earnest. To begin with, we must create a considerable employment fund. The sources from which it will be drawn have not yet been determined. I think that these will include state investments. And moreover, some of the funds currently used by enterprises as payment for labor resources.

[Romanyuk] Should we assume that the soviets will be in charge of the employment fund? They have a higher profile, after all.

[Shcherbakov] I still think that labor organs should control the fund—and this is why: A territory may have masses of problems and there may be a fear that money will be spent on building roads and schools and improving city facilities while the problem of retraining cadres and creating jobs for them will be set aside. This must not be permitted. This means that we must find a way of solving the problem which would give local organs of power an incentive to create and make proper use of an employment fund.

[Romanyuk] Since we are even beginning to admit that unemployment is a real fact of our reality, it should probably be clearly reflected in labor legislation. Otherwise, how can we say that people have social protection?

[Shcherbakov] We need to fundamentally reorient labor legislation—and we are working on such a concept—to take account of the new situation in the country. I have already talked about the well-known Article 33 of the Labor Law Code, which can be manipulated in any direction: either to dismiss anyone with whom the leader disagrees, or, on the contrary, to make it impossible to dismiss someone who should indeed be gotten rid of.

Incidentally, in the course of perestroyka innovations have been brought in which bring additional tension to labor relations at work. The election of directors, shop chiefs, and foremen, for instance. Should they so desire, extremist groups of people can kick out a leader at any level from an enterprise. On the other hand, neither the directors nor the shop chiefs can lodge court appeals against the actions of their own direct bosses. How can people carry out administrative functions when they are unprotected either from "below" or from "above"?

Furthermore, the same rights have been given to trade unions and labor collective councils, and they often adopt mutually exclusive decisions—sometimes merely to spite each other. Nor is there any clear demarcation of rights between labor collective councils and administrations. So workers are caught between a rock and a hard place, and issues go unresolved. For all the democratization of the situation the rights of workers themselves

have not been protected. If a team leader did not like someone they would be booted off the team. At the same time, it is hard for mothers with large families or young workers not yet able to keep up with the experts to get into a good work team. It turns out that whole social strata in our production system are not protected by the law.

All these problems should be regulated in the new labor legislation. The concept, which we very much want to submit to the government this year, will reflect alternative approaches to the most acute problems. A draft law will possibly be submitted for nationwide discussion. We are in favor of this. There are 140 million workers in the country, and the problem concerns all of them.

Constitutional Oversight Questions Debated

PM2610100589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Oct 89 Second Edition p 5

[Report on a conversation between R. Badinter, chairman of France's Constitutional Council, and D.A. Kerimov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission preparing the draft Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR, by A. Gamov: "Rights and Guarantees. Foreign Experience in Soviet Lawmaking"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Robert Badinter, chairman of France's Constitutional Council, has been visiting our country. He has had meetings with USSR Justice Minister V.F. Yakovlev; USSR Supreme Court Chairman Ye.A. Smolentsev; and USSR Prosecutor General A.Ya. Sukharev, and delivered scientific reports at the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute and the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences.

Professor R. Badinter also had a number of meetings and detailed conversations with D.A. Kerimov, who is chairman of the Commission preparing the draft Law on Constitutional Oversight in our country and a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Naturally, they discussed the revolutionary transformations currently taking place in the human rights sphere.

[Badinter] In the last few decades in West Europe we have observed processes of renewal which have changed notions of human rights. But it is not the actual broadening and effective consolidation of this concept that are the most important gains of the last few decades, but the affirmation of the principle whereby the real substance of human rights lies in guarantees rather than proclamations. Many people had developed the art of composing most elegant declarations on this subject in the past, but they had had no chance of bringing them to practical fruition.

The situation has now changed, above all owing to the constitutionalization of human rights. I am referring to the creation of a mechanism of constitutional supervision that would not allow governments, or parties, or parliaments, whatever their majority, to violate human rights in any sphere. This defense mechanism is only possible when an independent body for constitutional oversight is in operation.

[Kerimov] We are also endeavoring to reinforce the guarantees of Soviet people's rights, which is illustrated by the steps we have recently taken in this direction. Common human values, which center on the individual and his needs, aspirations, and aims, also exist in the world along with group or class interests. Elaborating new legislative acts, we are proceeding on the premise that freedom of the individual will only be fully guaranteed on condition that there is a ramified system of juridical guarantees.

What role are organs of constitutional oversight designed to play in this? What can you say in this connection about the activity of France's Constitutional Council?

[Badinter] In our country this institution arose relatively recently—during the years of the Fifth Republic. I must point out that the idea of setting up this body did not fit in with the tradition of French democracy at first, since it was thought that parliament expressed the will of the people and no one had the right to doubt the correctness of its decisions, and especially to abrogate any legislative acts. But this concept did not take into consideration the fact that a state's constitution, which reflects the interests of the people, is its fundamental law. Parliament must also base its work on this.

Our council's activity is also based on the principles formulated in the Human Rights Declaration, which were indeed reflected in the constitution. On this premise our council reliably defends the basic rights and freedoms of the country's citizens. By means of principled decisions on these questions, in its 30-year activity it has made efforts ensuring that it now holds an important place in France's political system and helps to strengthen the foundations of the rule-of-law state.

[Gamov] How do you personally perceive the fact that vigorous work is currently under way in our country to prepare a draft Law on Constitutional Oversight?

[Badinter] Considering the Soviet state's federative structure, the creation of such an institution may be said to be an urgent necessity for your country today. Because the USSR Committee of Constitutional Oversight will not only ensure that legislative acts produced by representatives of the authorities guarantee the rights of the union republics but also that the union republics themselves consider the interests of the entire federation and strictly comply with its law. Moreover, this institution makes it possible to resolve political disputes that may arise between the union republics or between the republics and the union peacefully by means of juridical tools.

[Kerimov] Juridical problems cannot indeed be resolved in isolation from political problems. I am above all referring to such a topical question for us as the improvement of Soviet federalism in the era of perestroyka. We

must correctly translate subtle and delicate political problems into legislative language.

R. Badinter has succeeded in gaining a detailed view of the work of the commission of deputies preparing the draft Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR. What is his opinion of it?

[Badinter] I would first like to note the supreme competence of the members of your parliament's commission on this question. We did not conduct comparative theoretical studies in the sphere of state law but devoted our meetings to practical problems of constitutional oversight.

I will dwell on one element that concerns the age limits for the election of committee members. It is a question of ensuring that this body is made up of people who possess great experience of life, politics, and the law. At the same time, in view of the dynamism of our time, I voiced the idea that it would be advisable for the draft law to provide for an age limit for election to the committee.

[Gamov] Well, what will be the nature of the Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR?

[Kerimov] I do not want to talk in detail about the main legal amendments and statutes in this document, since it is still being worked on. I can only note that this matter proved rather more complex than we at first supposed. This is probably due not least to the fact that this is the first time that this kind of document has been established in our lawmaking practice. That is why we began by studying the content, structure, and operating mechanism of socialist and capitalist countries' organs of constitutional oversight and supervision. I must not omit to point out the great assistance we were given by R. Badinter, chairman of France's Constitutional Council.

At the same time I must note that we cannot mechanically copy other countries' experience, because we have our own special features, legal traditions, democratic and political development. Constitutional oversight in the USSR is being established with a view to ensuring that the the union and autonomous republics' constitutions and all state organs' and public organizations' acts correspond to the USSR's Fundamental Law. Its activity will be geared to safeguarding the democratic foundations of Soviet society and the rights and freedoms of the individual. A concept draft law is being elaborated in accordance with this. It incorporates sections given over to general provisions determining the main aims and principles of constitutional oversight along with the composition of and procedure for electing the committee, its powers, and status. We hope that the adoption of this law will help form a rule-of-law state in our country and strengthen socialist legality and law and order.

'Local Organs' Decide on Calling in Troops

PM2510143389 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 89 p 1

[V. Prokopenko report: "How Are Things, Internal Troops?"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA question [to Colonel General Yu.V. Shatalin, chief of the Internal Troops Main Administration of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs]: Who makes the decision to send in internal troops, and how are their numbers determined?

[Shatalin] Such decisions are adopted by the USSR minister of internal affairs, but only at the request of the local organs of soviet power. They also determine the number of the troops being sent in. The withdrawal of the attached subunits is carried out in the same way.

Sakhalin Oblast Party Committee Holds Election

PM2510140989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 89 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 24 Oct—A Sakhalin CPSU Oblast Committee [obkom] plenum was held today. An organizational question was examined. V.S. Bondarchuk was relieved of his duties as first secretary of the party obkom in connection with his transfer to other work.

The aktivs of the city and rayon party organizations and expanded bureaus of party committees with the participation of the secretaries of primary party organizations held the day before had named 17 people as candidates. After a comprehensive discussion, the plenum participants decided to place on the secret ballot paper the candidacies of party obkom secretary V.N. Zhigaylo, CPSU gorkom and raykom first secretaries V.N. Yelizaryev, B.M. Melnikov, and Yu.M. Kuts, and oblast soviet executive committee chairman I.P. Kuropatko.

V.N. Zhigaylo was elected first secretary of the Sakhalin CPSU Obkom by a majority of votes.

V.N. Krikhunov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadres Work Department, took part in the work of the plenum.

New Masally Rayon Party Secretary Appointed

NC2510103689 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 23 Oct 89

[Text] The Masally Rayon Party Committee has held a plenum to examine organizational questions. The plenum relieved Khodzhamuratov from his responsibilities as first secretary of the Masally Rayon Party Committee and member of the party committee bureau because of his appointment to another post. Mamedov, current chairman of Masally Rayon People's Deputies

Soviet Executive Committee, was elected first secretary of the Masally Rayon Party Committee by secret ballot.

Tel'man Orudzhev, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the plenum.

Vladimir Oblispolkom Elects New Chairman

PM1810135189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by own corresponmdent A. Yershov: "Session Decision"]

[Text] Vladimir—A session of the oblast soviet has been held in Vladimir to examine an organizational question. When G.F. Kondryukov was elected first secretary of the Vladimir Oblast Party Committee [obkom], his former post of chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee [oblispolkom] fell vacant. The numerous candidates were vigorously discussed in the oblast newspaper, PRIZYV. Four candidates were put forward for the post of oblispolkom chairman at the oblast soviet session: V.V. Dolgov, chief of the oblast internal affairs administration; M.I. Zvonarev, deputy chairman of the oblispolkom; V.I. Fedoseyev, first secretary of Murom City Party Committee; and N.S. Yegorov, first secretary of the Kirzhachskiy Rayon Party Committee.

V.V. Dolgov was elected Vladimir Oblispolkom chairman by a majority of votes at the session. He has worked for a long time in party and soviet bodies and has been in charge of the internal affairs administration for the last 5 years.

PRAVDA on Publication Plans for 1990

PM3110160789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 89 Second Edition p 6

[Message from PRAVDA editorial collegium to the readers: "PRAVDA-90"]

[Text] Esteemed Readers!

Subscription for the periodical press is coming to an end. We would remind you that in order to obtain PRAVDA in the new year, you have to fill out a subscription form no later than 31 October

Our newspaper will continue to be a reliable friend, adviser, and assistant in daily affairs, an equitable and confiding interlocutor for the broadest social and professional strata of society.

The newspaper invites workers, peasants, party and soviet workers, scientists, and young people—everyone who wants to share their thoughts about the progress of revolutionary perestroyka—to engage in frank and detailed discussion of acute problems of concern to their contemporaries in the capacity of authors.

On the threshold of the 28th CPSU Congress the newspaper will hold a concrete discussion about party affairs and plans and will regularly publish detailed reports about the work of all party components—ranging from the "primary party organization" to Central Committee departments and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

The newspaper's special correspondents will tell how most important fundamental documents and resolutions associated with the implementation of the key tasks of perestroyka are prepared and discussed. Party members and statesmen of the highest rank together with PRAVDA employees will help the readers to gain a deeper understanding of and assess the wide-ranging and disparate processes and changes taking place in the country.

Following numerous request from regular readers of our newspaper, **it has been decided to publish in PRAVDA "Sketches of CPSU History" prepared by the CPSU Central Committee Commission under the leadership of M.S. Gorbachev.** The chapters will be printed as a discussion so that scientists, specialists, and representatives of the broad public can voice their comments and amendments and help the publication's authors reflect the Communist party's whole complex path—from its origins to the present day.

PRAVDA will regularly publish material about the activity of law-enforcement bodies—the prosecutor's office, militia, and the KGB—events in the sphere of science, culture, education, and other problems of important social significance.

As always, our newspaper will provide extensive coverage of international life and questions relating to the development of culture and art.

Migranyan: Dictatorship Necessary for Change

PM2410081689 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 22-23 Oct 89 p 11

[Interview with USSR Academy of Sciences Problems of World Socialism Institute 'political scientist' Andranik Migranyan by Ezio Mauro; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[Introductory passage omitted] [Mauro] Professor Migranyan, you have written that the road to democracy passes through dictatorship. Why?

[Migranyan] Simply because history records no instances of a direct transition from totalitarianism to democracy. It has never happened. Transitions are possible only from authoritarianism to democracy. However, there is no authoritarianism here in our country: In that kind of regime, first and foremost, private ownership exists and in any case there are elements of civil society that are almost entirely absent in the USSR.

[Mauro] So has the nature of the USSR not changed, despite perestroyka and glasnost?

[Migranyan] Many things have changed in recent years. But our country remains basically totalitarian and in the

economy there is complete totalitarianism. It is enough to consider that only 1.1 percent of GNP comes from the cooperatives, whereas all the rest belongs to the state. This is why when I call for a transfer to an authoritarian stage I am proposing not a step backward, but a resolute step forward toward democracy.

[Mauro] But for the first time for 70 years perestroyka has introduced elements of democracy, albeit partial and contradictory. Would the authoritarianism that you propose not destroy them?

[Migranyan] It is now a matter of salvaging the country and the very hope of reform, which are in danger of being overwhelmed by chaos, together with the elements of democracy that you mention. Perhaps it can still be done—but only through a modern authoritarian system, with a strong political authority capable of limiting the excesses of the extremist forces, with the presence of private ownership and a market, and with a cultural and economic sphere independent of the state.

[Mauro] Why do you believe perestroyka cannot work without what the Russians call a "strong hand"?

[Migranyan] Because the transition from a traditional to an industrial society, the establishment of elements of pluralism, and the introduction of the market create a sharp differentiation in society, a real conflict of economic, political, social, and national interests that the nascent democracy cannot harmonize or govern through consensus. Thus we are witnessing a progressive paralysis of government.

[Mauro] Is this what is happening in the USSR today?

[Migranyan] Exactly. Liberated and divergent interests are clashing—between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus and between Russians and Estonians in the Baltics—and one strike follows another, while the state authorities stand still, are unable to put forward solutions, and are incapable of creating a consensus. All the state can do is stand aside.

[Mauro] Why?

[Migranyan] Because we have a power vacuum. The Soviet discusses but does not legislate or control; the president lacks executive power; the government lacks the legitimacy and authority to act; and the Politburo is no longer the center of command that it once was. This is proven by Gorbachev. He now controls the Politburo, but ultimately his actions are as though paralyzed. Amid this vacuum there lies a trap, because this country's authorities, having for 70 years used force alone to assert their decisions, cannot use it now even in those instances in which any western democracy would do so. Behind this impotent wait-and-see attitude I perceive the threat of a Soviet Tiananmen. Sooner or later all the tensions and nationalisms that are stirring will believe that government no longer exists in the USSR.

[Mauro] Could the answer to the crisis not be an acceleration of the reform to surmount this phase of deadlock?

[Migranyan] Really accelerating entails establishing the market. But let us consider the fate of the two fundamental laws of the reform—that on ownership and that on self-management. They are before the Soviet but both blocked. Because you cannot establish a market through democratic means. And if you do establish it, at least initially you cannot regulate its conflicts democratically.

[Mauro] Are you saying that it is necessary to suspend however much democracy exists in the USSR in order to move onto a kind of reformist dictatorship?

[Migranyan] Yes. I propose temporarily concentrating power in the leader's hands so as to enable him to make the essential radical decisions. The Congress must give him a mandate to dissolve all the other state bodies—the Supreme Soviet, the government, and even the Politburo—in order to form a single body: a Central Committee for national salvation, which will embody all the institutions of the state, by reforming it, and of the party, at last reforming its organization through the direct election of its first secretaries.

[Mauro] Is it not contradictory to assign to the new authoritarian government the task of reforming the party and society?

[Migranyan] No, because the strong central authority will enable this closed society to open up at grassroots level, thus averting a destabilization. This is impossible now, as shown by the nationalities crisis. Just as it is impossible now to destroy the structure of the nomenklatura, because all its powers of interdiction remain active.

[Mauro] In your opinion, should a dictator Gorbachev use an iron fist even in social conflicts?

[Migranyan] His power should be respected, but also feared. In the past 5 years we have brought fundamental discredit onto the government, and paradoxically this applies more to perestroyka than to Brezhnevism. It is a result not only of glasnost but also of the impotence of a leadership that wants to smash th old mechanisms but is unable to do so. This is why it is necessary to restore the government's authority.

[Mauro] Why, in recent years, has an authority of democracy not grown up, as perestroyka has advanced?

[Migranyan] Because perestroyka has not achieved any successes in the economy or in improving daily life, while there has been a spectacular rise in the crime rate and a major disintegration of morale. A weak government cannot reconcile opposing interests, so it cannot last.

[Mauro] How do you believe that radicals and intellectuals would respond to a authoritarian swing?

[Migranyan] The reasons for it would have to be explained. I believe tat the country would understand. In the current controversies I see that it is mainly the conservatives that oppose such a solution, because a strengthening of Gorbachev would challenge their residual power of interdiction and that of the apparatus.

[Mauro] How would the West respond, having granted the USSR its confidence precisely in order to encourage its democratization?

[Migranyan] It is necessary to consider another question: How will the West respond when it realizes that the democratization is empty and inactive because ungovernability dominates the country? Even now when we meet with experts from Europe or the United States they ask us not how much democracy there is in the USSR but whether Gorbachev is stable and has a future.

[Mauro] In your opinion, can Gorbachev erase his image as the great reformer in order to become a dictator?

[Migranyan] There are signs that Gorbachev is thinking about it. On 2 October when he proposed to Parliament declaring a state of emergency, it was a kind of dress rehearsal. Except that there is not much time: we are up to our necks in chaos and the government cannot control it. We are living through another 1917, from February through October. To those who ask me whether Gorbachev could become the reformist dictator that we need I say: It depends on whether he feels more like Lenin or Kerenskiy.

[Mauro] What if the dictator were someone other than Gorbachev or were not a reformist? Do you never fear such an outcome?

[Migranyan] I do, which is why I propose a time limit on the special powers—a year or 15 months, no more. But I am more afraid of this waiting, whereby people pretend that democracy already exists, and meanwhile totalitarianism is not dying, everything is going to ruin, and the ground is being laid for the worst possible outcome.

Economic

Shmelev Argues for Freeing Market Forces

PM0211130189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Deputy N.P. Shmelev, chief of a department at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the United States and Canada, by V. Romanyuk under the rubric "A Deputy's Stance": "A Working Market Is the Beginning of Everything"—date and place of interview not stated]

[Text] The final phase of debate on the draft State Plan and Budget for 1990 has begun in the USSR Supreme Soviet. For a whole month passions have flared in committees and commissions and alternative drafts have been submitted and rejected. It was proposed, in particular, that a social minimum be provided for the majority (by regulating and legalizing the rationing system) and that other goods be made available through a network of commercial stores. Others saw the answer in a sharp reduction in the volume of financing for capital construction. The more so since its material and labor resources provision barely reaches 70 percent. According to that draft's authors, this would make it possible to balance the investment market. Another alternative version is connected with the financial improvement of the economy and a revival of the socialist market, with the help of radical, nontraditional methods.

Our conversation was held in the intervals between sittings of the Soviet of the Union Planning, Budget, and Financial Commissions. Deputy N.P. Shmelev, chief of a department at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada, made some suggestions on the draft plan and budget whose implementation, in his opinion, could decrease the budget deficit or even eliminate it altogether.

[Romanyuk] Nikolay Petrovich, I understand from what you said that you see some alternative option for improving the economy, different from the one proposed by the government, even in conditions of a disorganized market, devaluation of money, and failing plans.

[Shmelev] The country is in a difficult position, and today is perhaps the time not to discuss why this is so but to look for a way out.

[Romanyuk] And yet many people connect the exacerbation of economic and social problems with restructuring processes, miscalculations, and mistakes made by the government in very recent years.

[Shmelev] To put it the Chinese way: "Two misfortunes and four mistakes are our undoing." The misfortunes are well known to everyone—the Chernobyl disaster and the Armenian tragedy. As regards the mistakes, the first is the antialcohol campaign, which was not thought out properly. Then, the Regulation on Unearned Income, which clearly had a harmful effect. The state of the market was affected in a negative way by reducing purchases of imported consumer goods. And, finally, I cannot explain it in any other way than—I am sorry to put it so bluntly—through blatant unprofessionalism, that is, the fact that we allowed the budget deficit to reach R120 billion without any good reason.

[Romanyuk] However, the draft plan for 1990 entails reducing the deficit to R60 billion; the volume of emissions is restricted to a sum of 10 billion.

[Shmelev] Today it is important that we determine the degree of seriousness of the disease and the medicines we intend to treat it with. I believe that it is not too late, that we can still grab the last handrail at the end of the last car of the leaving train and... escape the crisis situation. Embarking on the path of strict distribution of everything means putting a stop to the restructuring of the

economy for a minimum of 5 years. I propose that it is possible to take a different path. Provided, of course, that we are ready to take extraordinary and, I stress, nontraditional measures to which we have not previously resorted.

[Romanyuk] But a package of measures for the financial improvement of the economy has already been proposed to the government. This involves both a reduction in investment in industrial construction and the use of the spare resources of working people and collectives by issuing 5-percent and interest-free loans, as well as a stabilization in emission processes.

[Shmelev] It seems to me that the government is concerned with only one problem: How to avoid aggravating an already difficult economic situation. The current situation is taken as read. Only let it not get worse! But such hopes are illusory: It will get worse. It is assumed that the population's income will increase by 9 percent and volume of goods by 10 percent. Fine. But whom are we kidding, I wonder? After all, this 10 percent includes a minimum of 6 percent inflation. This means that the figures are different: The same 9 percent of growth in income compares with only a 4-percent increase in the volume of goods. Tell me, are you sure that in 1990 industry will produce goods to exactly fit the structure needed in the market? It is very doubtful. We can produce, for instance, an enormous quantity of thread but not put needles on the market, and then everyone will be shouting about the deficit of needles.

[Romanyuk] Incidentally, the new system for taxing the wages fund gives priority to consumer goods output—then wages are not taxed. As long as volume of goods increases.

[Shmelev] The assumption is that everything will be bought! But even if all the most optimistic predictions on this subject come true, stopping the situation from getting worse by applying this kind of measure is an unattainable aim, since the ruble has stopped "working." It still means something to the consumer, but almost nothing to the manufacturer.

[Romanyuk] But it could start "working" again if the market were organized....

[Shmelev] The problem is that distributive relations still operate here, and this prevents the market from developing. The fundamental principle of our whole administrative system is to distribute! We must resolutely smash this system if we really want to save the market from breaking down and keep in check the growth in income from the "black" economy which exists alongside the administrative-edict system.

We can only be saved by a resolute, detailed system of measures bringing about a sharp reduction in the vast amounts of money accumulated among the population and in enterprises. Incidentally, this mass of money is by no means an indicator of our wealth. On the contrary, we are poor. The volume of goods looks immeasurably small in comparison with the mountain of money towering precariously over the market and ready to collapse on it at any moment and bury everything.

The money supply is in a "panic situation." People are buying second and third television sets and stocking up with 5-7 years' supply of washing powder. It is impossible to stop the panic in the market by the kind of trade turnover increases that are set out in the draft 1990 plan. The panic can be stemmed by acting simultaneously from two directions. First of all, a "commodity intervention" by the state is needed: We must sell all the things that people will buy. Not just consumer articles and construction materials, but also metal, trucks, housing—with inheritance rights, and including outbuildings and livestock premises in the countryside and land in the cities—and to foreigners also. Second, we must try to redeem the population's money. It goes without saying that money can be taken away by means of monetary reform, as has been done repeatedly in the past. But this means losing the people's trust. In exactly the same way, we will have to resist the temptation to raise prices—which the country simply could not endure on a social level. Even that measure, once we got rid of the budget deficit, would not touch the basic quantity of money.

[Romanyuk] It will not disperse of its own accord....

[Shmelev] Strange as it may seem, many people are counting on that: That it will disperse! In the sphere of improving finances, too, people prefer, figuratively speaking, to cut off the secondary growths while leaving the tumor intact. There is approximately R500-550 billion of spare money in the country, held partly by the population and partly by enterprises. Of this, R150-200 billion is "ready" money. People are prepared to spend it quickly, but there are no goods. The remaining R300-350 billion is capital which people generally use for large purchases such as a car, a house, or stocks.

Right now we need do nothing about the "ready" money, but the capital must be redeemed. This must be done as cheaply as possible for the state. The first and easiest thing is to put a stop to the tribal warfare with the cooperatives. Even in an environment of general hostility, they have managed to produce R2 billions' worth of output in 1987, R6 billions' worth in 1988, and an estimated R30 billions' worth in 1989. As long as a policy of cutting down cooperatives' activity is not adopted in 1990, their output (including services) will be almost R50 billion and will practically equal the growth in the population's income forecast for 1990.

Trading in land in the cities could be very productive. It is time to give everyone who wants it the possibility of buying a plot of land in the city.

We are reducing the capital construction front in the production sphere by almost one-third. The capacites liberated must be quickly reoriented into housing construction. The state can offer housing loans. I am convinced that there are 2-2.5 million families in the country who are willing to hand over their money for

housing in advance. This measure alone will make it possible to "tie up" a minimum of R75 million.

[Romanyuk] I am not sure that the state will be able to give such guarantees. Even if it does so, it will probably be by freezing a section of the waiting lines for housing, which stretch to the year 2000 even now.

[Shmelev] No, the state program must not be disturbed. But since we have gotten into a crisis situation, we must get out of it in a resolute manner. A spurt in housing construction will have a beneficial effect not just on finances but also on society's morale. I also see as a good prospect the issuing of interest-free loans for the output of goods in short supply, to mature in the period through 1992.

More imagination should be shown in the issue of securities in general. After all, bonds could be issued both for 5-10 years and 20-30 years. Or differentiated rates could be introduced on investments: For current accounts 1 percent interest would be enough, whereas term accounts need a sliding scale. If you make a commitment not to touch the account for 2 years, you receive 6-7 percent, for 5 years you get 10 percent. Artificial restrictions slow down the development of the joint stock economy. We have been shouting about it for 18 months now, and we have sold only R100 millions' worth of shares.

[Romanyuk] Nikolay Petrovich, your name is also linked with the proposal to obtain credits worth many billions from the West, which could be secured by... further credits. To tell you the truth, I am an opponent of this idea. You should not enter into a commitment if you do not know how you are then going to get out of it. Are you still insisting on your proposal for such credits?

[Shmelev] I was able to defend my position until July of this year. Since the powerful wave of miners' strikes, and since the exacerbation of the interethnic conflicts, the situation has changed. I do not think that it is out of the question that the private banking world will transfer us to the category of politically unreliable debtors, so we must not count on substantial loans.

[Romanyuk] Does this mean that we have no substantial external sources of finance?

[Shmelev] Yes, we do, but on different terms. On the security of our gold reserve, which, incidentally, is basically almost untouched. Why are we saving it? In case of war? But if nuclear war breaks out, we won't need anything any more.

[Romanyuk] The American banker Wayne Angell recently made a proposal on the pages of IZVESTIYA (No. 281)—to give the ruble the value of a fixed gold weight content and guarantee its convertibility into gold based on that content—at first for Soviet citizens, and later for the rest of the world. In that way we would obtain, so to speak, a stable monetary standard, which is a prerequisite for developing healthy market relations.

[Shmelev] Theoretically that is possible. But not in the current situation. In practice, such a step would lead to all the state's assets being simultaneously bought up. During the 1920's Sokolnikov and Yurovskiy brought in the gold coin to supplant the worthless ruble. But exchanging the ruble for gold? No security is adequate for that.

[Romanyuk] Perhaps we should make greater use of the experience of China, where the reform was started by saturating the consumer market? Twelve million small collective enterprises literally flooded the counters with goods.

[Shmelev] China has taken steps in the right order in carrying out reforms. Starting with the consumer market, the Chinese made the yuan work. Now they have started restructuring the system of price formation and earnings.

But first of all there has to be a working market!

Economist Urges Opening Up of Foreign Trade

PM0211164389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 5

["IZVESTIYA Interview" with Vladlen Arkadyevich Martynov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations, by IZVESTIYA correspondent B. Ivanov: "This Is Where We Will Be Tomorrow"; first paragraph is editorial introduction; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Vladlen Arkadyevich Martynov has been elected the new director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The overwhelming majority of its staffers supported his candidacy at a general meeting. He is 59 years old and has spent the last 18 years working as deputy director of the institute. He is a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and an economist. It is not surprising therefore that it was economic problems that were the focus of an IZVESTIYA correspondent's recent conversation with V.A. Martynov.

[Ivanov] Vladlen Arkadyevich, you probably have your own view of the current state of our economy, its place in today's world, and the possible ways of further developing it. How do you see our country's place and role in the international division of labor, say, in 10-15 years time?

[Martynov] The USSR's position in the international division of labor in the future will be determined, above all, by our ability to produce high-quality goods capable of competing on an equal footing with the best of Western producers' output. The key to creating the requisite production capacities for this lies in our incipient perestroyka. If we are unable to smash the old, outmoded forms of development, in the future we will slide down to the position of a developing country, although it must be admitted that at present we are already no different from most states of that kind in terms of the structure of our exports (energy sources and raw materials).

Everything will depend on how successfully we succeed in smashing the old economic model of socialism and creating a new one. We first of all need to eliminate monopolies in our economy. The 60 years of virtually unchallenged development that came in the wake of the destruction of New Economic Policy gave birth to supermonopolies in the form of ministries, state committees, and main administrations with absolute power over production and consumption. In any sector of our economy one or two main producers work to their own rather than the consumer's advantage. That is the reason why the quality of our goods is falling while prices are rising. We are only now beginning to seek ways to overcome the anomalies that have taken shape, notably by means of the laws we are elaborating on ownership, land, the lease, the state enterprise, and taxation.

[Ivanov] We have begun to talk about the problem of ownership. The success of the transformations we have initiated depends in many respects on how this question is resolved. What is your attitude to the disputes currently under way about the possibility of various forms of ownership in our country?

[Martynov] The question of ownership is an exceptionally important one. The point is that whole echelons of the state apparatus grew excessively rich and corruption flourished before our eyes on the basis of state ownership, which we declared social ownership. Thus the problem is not so much the form of ownership as the aim and nature of its use. The main thing is to ensure that this or any other form of ownership does not become a source for people to feather their nest without restraint—which does not accord with the principles of a socialist society. Incidentally, these principles easily permit the existence of private or, to use K. Marx' definition, individual ownership. I reckon that this kind of ownership can and should have its place in a socialist state based on pluralism of forms of ownership. Primarily, say, in the service sphere.

However, neither cooperative nor other forms of ownership per se will be able to revive the economy if the nature of the relations between people and property is not changed. The current attitude to tools, machines, land, and natural resources, as if they belong to no one, has resulted in a situation where we are simply not interested in effectively utilizing and preserving the country's natural wealth: We just "eat" our way through them.

[Ivanov] According to the most optimistic forecasts, the economic transformations that have now been initiated will obviously only begin to work fully in around 5-6 years. Nevertheless some steps must be taken today to stabilize the internal market and halt the destructive centrifugal processes in the economy. Without doubt, foreign economic ties constitute a definite reserve in this sphere. How, in your opinion, should we change our policy in the sphere of imports and exports to transform it into an effective means of economic recovery?

[Martynov] First, we have to carefully analyze the import structure for those goods which are utilized irrationally under current conditions of economic activity and which we ourselves could produce in the requisite quantities. This applies to purchase of rolled ferrous metals, piping, certain agricultural goods (grain, meat, wool, raw textiles), lumber, and pulp and paper goods. Purchases using centralized appropriations and administrative distribution procedure resulted in a situation whereby all these resources were "free" for the end consumers and hence gave rise to indifference and a devil-may-care attitude to them. The procurement volumes of many of these goods have long exceeded the bounds of rational and effective use. It is, frankly, shameful to spend hard currency on buying soap, washing powder, and other similar commodities. According to our calculations, we could quite feasibly save up to 2 billion foreign currency rubles and use them for the needs of the consumer market by mobilizing internal sources of raw materials and semimanufactures and reducing imports alone.

At the same time purchases of machinery and equipment could be cut back, squaring this with withdrawal from major import-intensive projects such as the creation of Siberian oil and gas chemical complexes. There is another reserve of 2-2.5 billion foreign currency rubles here.

On the other hand, clear priorities must be determined in making foreign purchases in order to relax the strain on the internal market. Thus, in my view, a green light should be given to purchases of medicines and a number of foodstuffs, shortages of which are undermining social stability. Moreover, audio and video equipment, automobiles, including second-hand automobiles, and some types of consumer goods whose sale would considerably ease the state's task of extracting excess money from the population and help retard the growth of inflation, could be imported. This is clear to the majority of scientists and practical specialists. But the problem can also be looked at differently. The availability of costly goods in the stores will in itself certainly stimulate labor motivation. The possibility of spending honestly earned money as one pleases will reinforce labor discipline more reliably than dozens of slogans or reprimands.

I want to stress that imports of production goods for cooperatives and individual labor activity deserve special attention. Purchase of these goods allows us to expect an influx of consumer goods from these sectors of the economy onto the internal market. It would be worth giving cooperative workers industrial equipment under the most preferential conditions. In that case the following condition would seem reasonable and just: Output obtained using this equipment is sold at prices close to state prices or via the state trading network on a contract basis.

The geographical points of origin of the supplies also plays an important role in this connection. Until very

recently we were also imprisoned by administrative-edict methods: Import agreements were very often concluded without any consideration for market conditions, timed to coincide with high-ranking Soviet delegations' visits abroad. If we analyzed existing agreements from the viewpoint of their advantageousness, the conclusion would be depressing. Most of them should have been concluded with quite different partners and above all with the developing countries of Southeast Asia and Latin America. At present we are proceeding along a familiar path: We are purchasing consumer goods from the same countries, from the same firms at very high prices. Although we could have acquired output of approximately the same quality but immeasurably cheaper from so-called "new industrial countries."

We must act more boldly in the spirit of the new thinking and abandon the old taboos and dogmas. Thus, in my view, we could obtain particularly favorable import conditions from states which are today interested in developing political relations with our country—South Korea and Israel.

Now a word about exports. The export structure must also be revised urgently. We often export goods now that we need ourselves, without taking internal consumption into consideration. Last year alone we sent 37.5 percent of the washing machines we produced, 27 percent of our light automobiles, 21.5 percent of our domestic iceboxes, approximately 14 percent of radio receivers, and almost 13 percent of our televisions abroad. The overwhelming proportion of these commodities go to socialist countries. Their competitiveness is extremely low on Western markets and is, as a rule, shored up by subsidies.

The rationalization of imports and exports must be, moreover, tied up with changes in the forms of management of foreign trade operations. Economically accountable foreign economic associations, which should be removed from the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, should set about concluding import-export transactions. We are now incurring quite heavy losses in conditions of rigid administrative planning and regulation. Here is a typical example. We even supply foreign countries with oil and gas—our long-standing exports—without elementary consideration of fluctuations in demand: 60 percent of the deliveries take place during the spring and summer months when the prices of these products fall on the world market.

[Ivanov] International experience shows that considerable industrial potential can be created within a relatively short historical timeframe by attracting foreign capital. I am referring above all to the aforementioned "new industrial countries," whose rapid economic progress is in many respects linked with plentiful foreign capital investments in the form of the creation of numerous joint enterprises and various special economic zones. Will such forms of capital investment be effective in our country?

[Martynov] I believe that it is now becoming increasingly important in conditions where we intend to restrict imports and save hard currency to buy consumer goods to attract foreign production capital.

So, joint enterprises. Without doubt, this is a promising area. However, direct investments are proving difficult to find today, and as yet only approximately $100 million has been invested. Considering the size of our internal market, this figure is a paltry one. But we can even understand our Western partners: We have a cadre shortage, we are unable to manage, we have no knowledge of the market, and in addition we have plenty of bureaucratic obstacles.

Our nonconvertible ruble (a foreign businessmen who invests money in an enterprise in the USSR does not know what to do with profit in nonconvertible rubles) and Western firms' lack of confidence in the success of the reforms we have initiated and in the success of perestroyka are still the main obstacles holding back the influx of foreign capital.

As for free enterprise zones, notwithstanding their economic attractiveness in our country, which lacks a supercheap work force or a well-developed infrastructure, in my view their economic advantage will be much smaller than, say, in the PRC. The government is now considering proposals regarding the creation of a number of such zones in the areas around Sochi, Vyborg, and Nakhodka and in Estonia. The progress of this experiment will also answer the question of whether it is advisable to develop such zones in the USSR and on what scale.

In my opinion, concessions could be another means of attracting foreign capital to the USSR. We could quite easily give foreign firms (naturally, provided they observe rigid environmental conditions without fail) forest workings, mineral and fuel deposits, raw material extraction and processing facilities, nature and environmental conservation areas, spa centers, individual enterprises, hospitals, hotels, and tourist complexes for long-term use—say 30, 50, or even 99 years.

[Ivanov] When will we be able to convert the ruble? Are the economists right when they propose putting so-called "gold rubles" into circulation following the example of the "gold chervonets" of the twenties, without waiting for the situation on the internal market to be put right?

[Martynov] This is a complex problem and the subject for a separate discussion. Without going into details, I would say that ruble convertibility cannot be introduced by decrees. It requires many conditions, particularly much greater discipline than is now the case in issuing money and credits. I am stressing this since financial discipline is the reverse of the convertibility coin. Now our top-priority task is to normalize our money and consumer market. We need to see specifically which currency measures can resolve this task and which can only impede it.

So I believe that the idea of putting "gold rubles" into circulation is at the very least a flight of fancy. It would mean squandering our gold reserve. There is no "gold" money anywhere in the world now. All countries prefer to regulate their money supply using interest rates, various normatives, and operations on the money market—a market that effectively does not exist in our country, incidentally. Moreover, gold is our second export commodity after oil, and we should treat it in the appropriate manner. I am on the whole opposed to introducing any parallel currency. That step would only prevent our restoring trust in the existing ruble while that is still possible.

In conclusion I would say: We have embarked on the path of radical economic reform; we must now proceed along it boldly and consistently. We have no other choice.

Defense Plant Conversion Detailed

LD0211175389 Moscow TASS in English 1713 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] Kishinev November 2 TASS—The Alfa military plant here has stopped manufacturing military hardware. It has been regeared to produce new generation TV sets. Their output will reach 400,000 sets next year.

"The Moldavian defence industry will double the output of consumer goods in 1990," Petr Shapa, vice chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers, told TASS. "Whole shops have been assigned at all defence enterprises to produce consumer goods. Foreign partners are being invited to take part in their regearing. TV sets of the Alfa plant, for instance, will be manufactured in cooperation with Yugoslavian firms."

The conversion of defence enterprises to "peaceful" production is an important element of Soviet perestroyka. It is expected to fill Soviet shelves with consumer goods.

Plants in Votkinsk, Volgograd, Petropavlovsk and Sverdlovsk, where medium- and shorter-range missiles were formerly produced, now turn out civilian products. The Votkinsk plant manufacturers programme-operated machine tools and equipment for the dairy industry.

As many as 250 military plants and more than 200 military research institutes and designing bureaus are involved in the effort to modernize and re-equip enterprises for processing agricultural raw materials.

The military industry today produces about 2,000 different cultural and household goods. Civilian production accounts for about half of their total output. It includes TV sets, refrigerators, washing machines, vacuum cleaners and other household appliances.

The defence industry plans to master the production within the next few years of over 140 other types of household equipment, including laser digital recorders, video cameras, video players and personal computers.

The reduction of armaments and of their production, carried out in the USSR, are also beneficial for civilian sectors of the national economy. The projected decommissioning of 10,000 tanks, 800 aircraft and large quantities of other hardware will annually save the country 1.8 million tons of steel, 0.5 million tons of aluminium, and 1.8 million tons of different fuels.

The use of some of the machinery, decommissioned from military units, in the civilian economy, is expected to substantially boost production.

Conversion of Omsk Defense Plants Noted

18010014 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 31 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by E. Chernyshev:"The Course of Conversion"]

[Text] A partial conversion of military production is currently going on at the defense enterprises in Omsk. Already 35 types of consumer goods have been produced. These include washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and equipment and machinery for agriculture, and for the light, food, processing and shoemaking industries.

The transportation machine building plant association, for example, is producing lines for packaging potatoes, transport equipment, and automatic dishwashers. The Baranov production association is beginning production of equipment for shoemaking.

The Polet production association has begun series production of the "Sibir-6" washing machine. Using the opportunities which conversion has given it, the plant has established a business relationship with a French firm and has decided to organize joint production of automatic washing machines, superior to similar products on the world market. The plant for hoisting machines is developing technological documentation for the output of passenger elevators, which are in great demand for housing construction. The Elektromekhanicheskiy Plant association is currently producing stereo equipment.

Abalkin Cited on Revised Exchange Rate

PM0211115589 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 89 pp 1-2

[Interview with L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by V. Rastorguyev under the "Topical" rubric: "How Many Rubles to the Dollar? View From Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The decision on the new exchange rate for the ruble is commented on by L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers:

"Because of the difference in the cost of consumer goods, particularly household electronic items, the existing official exchange rate does not reflect the real relationship between currencies.

"The government prepared and adopted this decision in the light of this situation. The new ruble exchange rate operates in both directions. If foreign citizens or Soviet specialists arrive in the Soviet Union and hand over currency, they will receive R6.26 per dollar. That will enable us to attract large sums of currency, which can be used to purchase foodstuffs, industrial goods, disposable syringes...

"This exchange rate also applies when departing. A person going abroad on official business, a tourist trip, or by invitation of relatives will be able to obtain the set amount of currency at the same rate. Of course, this does increase travel expenses, although it also partly curbs the flow of travelers. As far as tourists are concerned, they usually have guaranteed accommodation, food, and money for everyday expenses. But if a tourist does exchange his rubles, he will still bring in no fewer goods."

Official Assesses Economic Effects of BAM Railroad

PM0311145589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 89 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Article by Ye. Basin, deputy minister of transport construction and chief of the "BAMtransstroy" Association, under the rubric "Perestroyka: Time for Action": "Baykal-Amur Main Railroad: On Line Soon"]

[Text] The Baykal-Amur Main Railroad [BAM] will be handed over to railroad workers for operations in November, in time for the Great October holiday, and this will put an end to all the talk about it being "superfluous." This will enable the overloaded Transsiberian Railroad—hitherto the sole route to the Pacific Ocean—to breathe a little more easily; it will open access to the Far East, and dollars in payment for Eurasian transit shipments will start flowing into the exchequer.

Essentially, BAM is a sensible step into the next century. This is the country's first ever transportation system created with a view to the future in the vast taiga region as a bridgehead for development. It is our gift to coming generations. It represents partial compensation for the plundering of West Siberia's mineral wealth, for the dug-up or flooded fertile fields and forests. It is a chance to prove that we have learned from past mistakes to show solicitude when colonizing the country and ecological awareness when working underground deposits. also, to give some breathing space to the smoky Donbass, Magnitka, Kuzbass, and many other environmental disaster areas.

There are, however, many outstanding questions on both sides of the steel tracks. There are alarming shortcomings in the implementation of the long-awaited Far East Program, including the economic development of the BAM zone. This program was also drawn up hastily, and it was ratified without nationwide discussion. No account was taken of the sectors' transition to cost recovery and self-financing. The major initial expenditure scared ministries and departments away from the region—it was found disadvantageous. They proved unwilling to get in at the beginning and make long-term investments.

This is where the main miscalculation occurred: It was attempted to squeeze a statewide program into a regional framework. But surely the Far East's revival would be beneficial for the entire country? The relocation of industrial centers there will ease the knot of problems in the west—economic, transportation, ecological, social, and therefore demographic and ethnic problems. The wealth is still "lying fallow." The South Yakutsk territorial-production complex was the only one to materialize out of all the territorial-production complexes planned for the BAM zone, supplying millions of tonnes of coal for export and earning considerable profits thanks to the small BAM—the coal line.

Sector-funded investment today is, for all intents and purposes, a brake on the progress of outlying regions. Rejection is the only answer unless immediate benefits can be guaranteed. How can this situation be remedied? Possibly by creating a state coordinating organ under the USSR State Planning Committee for the implementation of the "Far East" Program, making it incumbent on it to act with due consideration for the opinion of the population and the local soviets. It would channel participants' efforts into the development of the BAM, the Amur-Yakutsk Main Railroad [AYAM], and other promising investment locations. This would put an end to economic mismanagement, penny-pinching departmental savings, and divergence of the interests of the indigenous population and the center.

It may be late in the day, but it is necessary to organize a comprehensive discussion of the Far East program. To spotlight its strong and weak points.

In my view, state capital investments will pay for themselves many times over. Other forms of finance are also possible: Joint stock companies, business participation, and joint ventures with foreign firms. Cooperatives can do a great deal in the services sphere. In order to prevent state budget difficulties delaying the pace of development, it is necessary to increasingly base development less on centralized funds and more on actually earned funds.

In its polemical excitement our press clearly overlooked the process of the formation of the powerful BAM construction complex, which already employs over 60,000 people. The "BAMtransstroy" Planning-Industrial-Construction Association is today capable of carrying out feasibility studies, preparing blueprints, and erecting on a "turnkey" basis any industrial and civilian projects. The firm's brain is the "Giprozheldorstrov" and "Irkutskgiprotrans" Institutes. Whereas 80 percent of all materials were brought in from far away in the first few years, nowadays virtually everything is manufactured locally.

How has this been achieved? The levers of radical economic reforms were used. Radical restructuring of the economic management mechanism helped to sharply

increase labor productivity and cut costs. "BAMtransstroy" is now profitable instead of making losses. Its profits have enabled it to autonomously solve pressing problems. Of course, we still have quite a few of them, especially social ones. To this day we are trying to overcome the consequences of the former "strategy" of using temporary workers: We'll build the railroad and then go away, and meanwhile we'll make do with temporary accommodation. But life has proved that the railroad is not a goal in itself, it is a development tool. People themselves are unwilling to move away; after all, the pace of housing construction has increased ninefold in 4 years.

Inhabiting a region means being able to feed yourself. "BAMtransstroy" is actively developing its own subsidiary farming. By year's end we will be producing 15 kg of meat and 50 liters of milk per capita. A considerable achievement for northern regions. Measures to consolidate the social sphere were not long before they produced an effect. We now have the lowest cadre turnover in the kray.

Of course, the "BAMtransstroy's" experience can prove useful to other participants in development. But for the time being, alas, we find ourselves in splendid isolation. Taking advantage of the period of "disfavor," ministries and departments pulled out en masse and the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council for BAM Problems disbanded itself. Nonetheless, we are completing the through railroad. Without any fanfares, but at a good pace.

The handover schedule, despite being so tight, gives no reason for doubts from the technical point of view. People are working with the utmost dedication, just as they have always done. We are coming up against different problems. Supplier enterprises have started behaving in a downright selfish manner. Many of them have set their hearts on obtaining a tasty morsel from the construction project. They are trying to make direct contracts apply to planned deliveries which were confirmed a long time ago, turning the whole process into outright robbery. Suppliers in Spassk, for example, requested a crane truck in exchange for 1,500 bathtub mixer faucets. Chelyabinsk Oblast's Kusinskiy Machine Building Plant intends to "snaffle" three machine tools which our own depots need. Evidently some people are trying to steer the reform in the wrong direction. They confuse things by their dishonest methods, trying to transform the incipient socialist market into a "black market."

What will the BAM be like? A modern railroad from Ust-Kut to Komsomolsk-na-Amure. With a full package of engineering backup services: Locomotive and car depots, maintenance stations, and a power supply base. Settlements with all amenities—well-equipped schools, trade and social centers, housing—have been built every 50-60 km in the taiga.

The new cities of Tynda, Severobaykalsk, and Urgal have become the region's business, cultural, and social centers. They came into being with help from Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia. On behalf of all BAM workers I express ardent gratitude to all our sponsors—republics, krays, and oblasts. They have completed, or are in the process of putting the finishing touches to, attractive and convenient cities and settlements. The emissaries of the Baltic republics, Central Asia, and the Caucasus are kindly remembered in Siberia. A journey along the railroad will be like a tour of our entire motherland for train passengers. Our sponsors strove to give the population centers the familiar features of national architectures.

A contribution was made by 70 nationalities. There has not been a single manifestation of ethnic dissension all these years. The strength of friendly bonds lies in mutual respect, businesslike cooperation, and social justice. Many sponsor collectives intend to remain here and develop the main railroad zone.

The BAM construction complex, which has now gathered pace, will be unable to exist without a solid workload. Otherwise we will have to close down subdivisions and lose experienced cadres who have adapted to the conditions. We cannot afford this—up to R20,000 has already been spent per capita on facilities. The time has now come to expect returns.

No mistakes should be allowed. Otherwise we would have to restaff the collectives and incur the expenditure afresh. Would it not be more sensible to effect development on a balanced basis, making effective use of the construction workers' potential?

To be or not to be? This was the question encountered by the builders of the 800-km long AYAM. It is vitally necessary for Yakutia and the entire Northeast. Everything is delivered there by river, sea, or motor vehicle transport. Annual losses are in excess of R2 billion.

It has been estimated that the AYAM will have paid for itself in less than 3 years and will then generate profits running into millions. Meanwhile, the project's financing has been suspended on 15 occasions! The USSR State Planning Committee has now set up an expert commission to examine the expediency of construction. Incidentally, possible mothballing would swallow as many resources as would be needed to run the railroad track to Aldan.

Commission members recently joined us in a discussion with AYAM staff. Without beating about the bush, tracklayer G. Adamov from Yakutia, carpenter E. Akberov from Aldan, and lumberjack S. Sakharov from Solnechnyy spoke up: Closing down the construction project would be disastrous for us! We have found interesting work and well-appointed housing here. We have realized that it is possible to lead a human life in the north. Where are we going to go?

People's perplexity is understandable: There is a good chance that the tracks will reach Aldan in 1990, Tommot in 1991, and Yakutsk in 1993. The commission members reached the opinion that the construction project should not be halted but that resources should also be

sought locally. Aware of the budget's difficulties, we are seeking alternative sources of finance. The most realistic source is the credit we expect to receive in the 14th 5-Year Plan. For this purpose we will speed up returns from the railroad. We will start carrying freight even during the period when the railroad is not in constant use. The money we earn will be used to complete the AYAM's construction.

This is the approach the Far East needs today. Not to sweep aside everything that has been started but to seek real opportunities fitting in with the letter and spirit of economic reform. In our quest for funds, we are very close to the creation of joint enterprises with foreign firms. As a matter of fact, business managers abroad are showing far greater interest in the BAM zone than our own ministries. One serious sign is that they can sense there is profit to be made. The "BAMtransstroy" Foreign Cooperation Ties Administration has held talks with firms from Japan, the United States, the FRG, Sweden, South Korea, and Italy. Now we are working out in detail the prospects for joint manufacture of joinery products using production waste, the manufacture of polished granite slabs, and the technical maintenance and repair of imported equipment.

An excellent opportunity has emerged to develop the territory using money that has been earned—to start up enterprises equipped with modern Western technology for the comprehensive processing of raw material and to sell their output in the world market. This will be done not by transforming the BAM zone and the Far East as a whole into a raw material appendage but by intensively developing this rich region's national economy. Over the last few decades we have been watching from the sidelines how Pacific countries like Japan and South Korea built up their economic might. Is it not time for the Soviet Far East to join the process of acceleration? The BAM workers will not be found wanting.

Scientific

Carrier Rocket Launches to Pacific Completed

LD0211160989 Moscow TASS in English 1418 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 2 TASS—The Soviet Union has completed the scheduled launching of carrier rockets in the areas of the Pacific. Limited by a rectangle with the coordinates of the vertexes: 30 degrees 30 minutes, northern latitude, 170 degrees 10 minutes, eastern longitude,
30 degrees 45 minutes, northern latitude, 171 degrees 30 minutes, eastern longitude,
23 degrees 00 minutes, northern latitude, 173 degrees 40 minutes, eastern longitude,
22 degrees 45 minutes, northern latitude, 172 degrees 20 minutes, eastern longitude

By a circumference with a radius of 50 nautical miles with the centre having the following coordinates: 10 degrees 45 minutes, northern latitude, 175 degrees 40 minutes, eastern longitude,

TASS is authorised to state that these areas are open for navigation and air flights as of November 3.

Academician Views Technology Integration With West

90UI0079A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 43, 28 Oct-3 Nov 89 pp 1-3

[Report on interview with the vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academy member Ye. Velikhov, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent S. Pestov: "Computers at Present and in the Future"; date, place, and occasion not specified]

[Text] It would be in the interest of all humanity to incorporate the intellectual, scientific, and industrial potential of our country into the scientific and technical progress of the world, especially in a field as research-intensive as computer technology.

This is the topic of a conversation between our correspondent S. Pestov and the Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, academy member Ye. Velikhov.

[Pestov] Yevgeniy Pavlovich, many people attribute the difficult situation of our information-processing technology to its past association with our defense needs. Hence the monopoly position, the bigger-is-better attitude, the secrecy build-up, and the reluctance to cooperate with the most advanced companies which, incidentally, is characteristic of many other sectors as well. In the West it is estimated that we are trailing by 5 to 10 years. What is your view of the situation?

[Velikhov] There are several reasons for our lag. Of course, being geared to defense needs presupposes the self-sufficiency of technological facilities, and, therefore, seclusion and isolation from progress in the world. This is pernicious for the development of any modern industry. Excessive concentration and monopolization also do not promote a plurality of scientific ideas. In the West computer technology developed not only within large companies of the IBM type, and perhaps not nearly as much within them, but to a considerable degree "from below." Small enterprises prepared to take risks have facilitated the accumulation of ideas and created prerequisites for a technological breakthrough. For example, PC's—personal computers—were developed despite the prevailing opinion of large companies and scientists....

[Pestov] It is hard to imagine that our country would begin manufacturing something contrary to the will of the ministry. However, isolation and monopoly practices are not the only reasons, despite the fact that they are responsible for a lot....

[Velikhov] At one point, we had a quite decent computer, the BESM-6, a real workhorse. It is still being used

for calculations. Beginning with this computer, we set the course in the IBM direction. It was good in and of itself, but it had to be understood that this course depended on a certain microelectronic base which we had to be able to develop in the first place. This is point one. Second, we should have purchased licenses rather than done the entire development which immediately predetermined a lag of 3 to 5 years. After all, he who is miserly pays twice.

[Pestov] Science should have cautioned against such mistakes....

[Velikhov] I began to work on the issues of data processing and computer technology in earnest in late 1981. The Division of Data Processing and Computer Technology of the USSR Academy of Sciences was set up anew in 1983 because both the machinery and scientific and research institutes were at one time transferred from the USSR Academy of Sciences to industry. This was a major miscalculation as well. It could be that by itself the concept of transferring the scientific research institutes to industry was not bad, but research facilities should have been left within the Academy of Sciences as well in order for them to determine the strategy and main avenues for the development of data processing technology so that a distortion would not have occurred as it did in those years—they got carried away designing individual electronic components and lost sight of scientific and technological prospects and the infrastructure....

[Pestov] What do you include in the notion of infrastructure?

[Velikhov] Everything that precedes the assembly of computers—equipment for manufacturing, say, integrated circuits and peripherals. However, even prior to this, there are pure materials and chemicals, pure premises, measuring equipment.... In this instance, we have to have a separate industry and a science supporting it because the lag here is enormous—I believe that it is by an order of magnitude.

At one point, we believed with our well-known flippancy that all of that would be purchased abroad—there was money then due to our lively trade in oil and timber. At present, there is no money but there are COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy] restrictions, and we are in a difficult situation. We have created institutes which produce computers, major centers such as in Zelenograd in the vicinity of Moscow; however, we have no machinebuilding facilities for the production of equipment. Meanwhile, we need to switch from making thousands of computers to making millions! We need absolutely new equipment, and at issue is not just quantity, but also quality.

[Pestov] Yevgeniy Pavlovich, on the one hand, we need to have everything of our own in order not to suffer from restrictions, while on the other hand we cannot do without purchases abroad. Where is a reasonable compromise to be found?

[Velikhov] The point is that no country of the world can do it exclusively on its own. After all, the United States as well purchases a lot in Japan, in the West—equipment, peripherals, and many other things. Of course, there are key sectors within the country, but components are purchased for, say, PC's in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. PC's are just designed in the country, whereas assembly plants are located abroad; for example, the Apple company has one in Singapore.

This is what all developed countries do. At present, one may offer computer products on the market only if one uses the accomplishments of the best companies to the maximum. In turn, our current production of computers is an iceberg. At the top, there is assembly, and below there is equipment, subcontracted parts, and materials. We began to build this iceberg from the top, and we produce obsolete PC's due to the poor component base and, of course, due to imperfect peripherals. The Minpribor [Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems] flippantly undertook to develop printers and magnetic memory, and failed in all of that.

[Pestov] After all, we are capable of producing single copies of a quite high standard.

[Velikhov] Not just single copies. At present, the Academy of Sciences makes PC's which were highly praised at the Hanover Exhibition. We gave up the concept of using our own subcontracted parts only and designed a PC which is quite competitive in the Western market. We have now received good orders for it from a number of Western companies—BASF, Siemens....

[Pestov] What is the volume of orders?

[Velikhov] On the order of several thousand. Eight centers created in the USSR Academy of Sciences are responsible for the success. The division coordinates their activities. In this matter, I see my personal objective in creating the atmosphere and the environment in which everything grows by itself.

We began with the basics, with principles. At present, we also produce equipment and develop super-large integrated circuits for special uses. However, this is but a flash in the pan; we need billions in order to create a large-scale industry which will manufacture equipment. At present, a generational change of equipment in Japan, the United States, and West Europe takes merely 3 years. This is the foundation for the fabulous success in microelectronics; the volume of memory on a single GIP [expansion unknown] doubles every 2 years. The Japanese have already embarked on experimental sales of 16-megabyte crystals whereas in our country 256 kilobytes are in short supply. The Minelektronprom [Ministry of the Electronics Industry] has developed a 32-digit microprocessor, "Elektronika-32," but when are they going to begin producing it? They promise that it will be this year....

[Pestov] It appears that the Minelektronprom has never fulfilled its plans....

[Velikhov] Yes, this is the tradition they have.

[Pestov] Western scientists and businessmen are interested in our programming....

[Velikhov] On occasion we do wonderful things in this sphere; we do unique programs. However, we have nothing on which to develop programming. If we take our own subcontracted parts, which are two generations behind, and produce our own computer, which is already three generations behind, then the software for it will be three to four generations behind unless we make extraordinary efforts.

We are only beginning to master mass programming, PC culture. Meanwhile, in the West the software market for PC's is close to saturation. We may penetrate there provided we have subcontracted parts of an advanced standard.

[Pestov] Yevgeniy Pavlovich, what about more expensive computers of a higher standard—work stations which scientists and engineers need?

[Velikhov] We have good prototypes, and we produce such stations, and quite a few of them, up to 100 a month. However, once again, we use Western subcontracted parts.

As far as programming is concerned, in this sphere we have a chance to enter the world market with applied programs and also with elements of system software. This is what I am fighting for—having the uniform UHIX standard, a uniform operational environment.

[Pestov] Finally, there are the most powerful machines, supercomputers.

[Velikhov] There is a strict embargo in effect with regard to them, and not only supercomputers but also a number of elements. This is why we make our own supercomputers. We also trail seriously in this area. However, this year we will assemble computers whose speed approaches a billion operations per second. I am talking about the Elbrus in which mass-produced processors will be used. Western analogs are already approaching the speed of 10 billion operations per second. This means that in this sphere as well we are trailing by one order of magnitude.

However, this is not the only point. A center as powerful as a supercomputer requires communication networks and work stations, and all of these have to operate together. However, being geared to complete self-supply and rigid planning well ahead of time dooms us to programmed obsolescence. We should look for other patterns of development integrated with the West.

[Pestov] Specialists and businessmen in many countries are raising the issue of canceling the embargo. Hence the question: What should the West deliver to our country? Incidentally, to your mind, what has been the influence of the introduction of the embargo?

[Velikhov] I think its influence has been dialectical. On the one hand, it has accelerated our development; on the other hand, it is an obstacle to certain things. As far as the question "what should the West deliver to our country?" is concerned, I would phrase it differently. The West should not deliver anything to us. The West should first of all be interested in cooperating with us.

In designing and creating PC architecture, we have attained a world standard. We would like to (?develop equipment jointly in order to approach the micron) technology. We would like to have a free exchange of microcircuits. We can create quite competitive PC models and even the best prototypes in the world if we have a modern elements base and other subcontracted parts.

We may deliver software; we have talented programmers. We may supply algorithms and mathematical models; we have many because we have talented and enthusiastic people. All we need is greater openness by the West and the cancellation of all restrictions. This will definitely result in advantages for the West, for us, and for all of humanity.

[Pestov] What do you think about artificial intelligence?

[Velikhov] In this matter, we discern two approaches. The first approach proceeds from practice—there is a need for export systems. You introduce knowledge into a computer, and it becomes your prompter, it "thinks" together with you. We have achieved interesting results in applied expert systems in science and medicine. The development is hampered for the same reason, obsolete computers.

The second approach proceeds from philosophy—the objective is to penetrate the thinking process and take advantage of the opportunity for model thinking using a computer. The Institute for the Issues of Information Transmission has been working on it from different angles. There have been results for vision, movement, and coordination. We are designing various models just as they do in the West. There is no great lag in this sphere.

[Pestov] Still, do you see an opportunity to create artificial intelligence in the (?foreseeable future).

[Velikhov] First we have to understand what the process of thinking is about. We will not understand it until we model it because understanding means the skill of modeling and reproducing things. Understanding does not follow from observation; one needs to verify it through an experiment. Computers amount to a new opportunity for experiments.

[Pestov] Integration with the West calls for changes in many principles of organizing our work, including in the sphere of patents and copyright protection....

[Velikhov] A new law on inventions will be adopted soon. I consider its last version to be quite acceptable. All rights to a patent are assigned to the inventor, and relations between the inventor and the enterprise are the same as in the United States, Japan, and other countries. The inventor is going to be the owner of the invention now. We devised various forms of reconciling the interests of the inventors and enterprises, but they were not adopted. It may be good that they opted for the classical formula.

[Pestov] Can an inventor sell his invention to a foreign company?

[Velikhov] Certainly, unless he has previously signed a contract which obligates him to sell the invention in our country. As far as copyright is concerned, the situation thus far has been bad; we are still working on it. A law is needed; at present, programming is protected by copyright rather than a patent.

Soviet-French Space Cooperation Discussed

LD0511030289 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1023 GMT 4 Nov 89

[Summary] Paris, 4 nov (TASS)—Correspondent Aleksandr Krivykh reports:

A Soviet delegation headed by Academician V.A. Kotelnikov, chairman of Interkosmos, met a French delegation headed by Jacques Louis Lions, president of the National Space Studies Center, in the French town of Saint Jean de Luce to discuss further Soviet-French cooperation in space. The 1992 Soviet-French space flight was discussed, and it is proposed that a French cosmonaut will spend 14 days aboard the Soviet orbital station. Other joint measures concerning space were discussed, as well, including the launch of the Soviet satellite 'Granat' at the beginning of December, on board which will be the French 'Sigma' telescope. The aim of the program will be the study of cosmic gamma radiation. The French also expressed an interest in participating in the planned 1994 Soviet launch of a scientific research station to Mars. The possibility of a manned flight to Mars, which according to experts could not take place earlier than 2015-2020, also was discussed.

Cosmonauts Continue Work Aboard 'Mir'

LD3110125389 Moscow TASS in English 1236 GMT 31 Oct 89

[Text] Moscow October 31 TASS—TASS Correspondent reports from the Mission Control Centre:

Soviet cosmonauts Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov continue working on the manned Soviet space complex Mir.

Over the past few days the cosmonauts have been observing Roentgen pulsars in the Southern Triangle Constellation and the central part of the galaxy from the Rentgen Orbital Observatory, as part of a vast programme of extra-atmospheric research.

The cosmonauts also conducted a series of astrophysical experiments involving the Glazar ultra-violet telescope. They photographed several parts of the Orion and Lesser Dog constellations.

Today, the crew plans to carry out technical and medical- biological experiments, prepare scientific equipment for forthcoming research and carry out an inventory of life-support deposits.

The flight is proceeding normally. Both cosmonauts feel well.

Military

Yazov Opposes Restoring Lithuanian Units

LD0311111189 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 2 Nov 89

[Text] The Soviet Union's Defense Minister, Dmitriy Yazov, is categorically against the restoration of Lithuanian national army units, which survived in Lithuania until long after World War II. Neither did he agree to let all Lithuanian conscripts, beginning with next year, serve in army units on the republic's territory or at least in the Baltic region if they wish.

This was made clear during the meeting the Lithuanian Prime Minister Vytautas Sakalauskas and other representatives of Lithuania had with the Defense Minister and other high-ranking Soviet Army officials in Moscow.

According to Vytautas Sakalauskas the talk was constructive, businesslike, but far from easy. The Lithuanian party had to listen to a number of recriminations in connection with the actions in their republic aimed against the drafting of Lithuania's young men for military service.

However, the minister said that 8 percent more Lithuanian young men had been sent to serve in the Baltic region this year. Beginning with this autumn, married young men who have children and also orphans, will be left to do their military service nearer home. In order to avoid at least to some extent interethnic discord and nonstatute relations in the army, which have become complex of late, the minister agreed to the proposal to let Lithuania's young men serve in bigger groups, perhaps up to 100 in a regiment. A lot of other issues were discussed during the meeting. Though difficult, it is still a start.

Order on 7 Nov Red Square Parade Issued

PM0311185589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 8

[Moscow City Garrison Commanding Officer's Order No. 21, 26 October 1989, Moscow—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] On the Troop Parade to Be Held 7 November 1989

1. To mark the 72d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution a parade of the troops of the Moscow Garrison is scheduled to take place on the Red Square in Moscow at 1000 hours 7 November 1989.

USSR Minister of Defense Army General D.T. Yazov will review the troops.

I have been instructed to command the parade.

2. Commanders of combined units and units are instructed to send out guides and to bring out the troops for the parade in accordance with the approved drill at the set time.

Form of clothing—winter dress uniform with service caps.

3. Major General G.D. Bashkin, Moscow Kremlin commandant, is instructed to carry out an artillery salute in accordance with issued instructions.

4. General leadership of the maintenance of order in the Red Square is entrusted to Lieutenant General N.N. Smirnov, Moscow City military commandant.

[Signed] N. Kalinin, Moscow City Garrison commanding officer, commander of the troops of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District.

Military Chiefs Meet, Mark Revolution Anniversary

PM0511143589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Nov 89 First Edition p 3

[Report by unnamed own correspondent: "Ceremonial Meeting"]

[Text] A ceremonial meeting marking the 72d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution has been held at the Soviet Army Central Academy Theater. Generals, admirals, other officers, workers, and employees of the Soviet Army, members of their families, veterans of the Great Patriotic War and of the Army and Navy, and servicemen from the capital's garrison took part.

The meeting's presidium comprised the following: Army Generals P. Lushev and K. Kochetov, USSR first deputy defense ministers; Army Generals M. Sorokin and V. Shabanov and Colonel General N. Chekov, USSR deputy defense ministers; Admiral of the Fleet A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; and Marshals of the Soviet Union V. Kulikov, N. Ogarkov, and S. Sokolov.

The meeting was opened by Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

The report was delivered by Colonel General Yu. Yashin, USSR deputy defense minister.

Official Urges Change in Search for Deserters

PM0311133189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

["Letter to Editorial Office" from Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Burlyakov: "Who Should Seek Deserters?"]

[Text] I am alarmed that today some young men are avoiding the draft and, when they are drafted anyway, go absent without leave from their units. All of us—military men and civilians, politicians and sociologists, lawyers and physicians—must carefully investigate the reasons for this phenomenon. That is not what I want to talk about right now. I want to talk about what is in my view the pernicious practice of seeking those who go absent from their units without leave which has arisen against our will in the Armed Forces.

For people with no knowledge of the matter I shall explain that if a serviceman goes absent without leave from his unit, a search for him is organized involving a large number of personnel. Naturally, the servicemen are taken from their combat and political training and other planned measures.

These men comb the environs, the woods and firing ranges over many kilometers, and check basements, lofts, and buildings. Officers are sent to the homes of the deserters' parents and relations, their girlfriends and friends, to the places where they studied and worked before being drafted. Sometimes thousands of km away. The searchers travel at their own expense, at the expense of their family budget, because the law does not provide for payment for such "business trips." The officers and ensigns are absent from their subunits for many days. All this time their subordinates are, incidentally, fulfilling their military duty conscientiously and left without their commanders or political workers.

Those who set off on the search encounter various difficulties—in searching houses, feeding themselves, and acquiring tickets. What bitter and unjustified rebukes do they hear from some parents? Frequently couched in sharp, offensive tones.... I shall cite a few figures.

This year over 10 men went absent without leave from their unit in our garrison's units. It emerged subsequently that before their desertion no illegal actions had been committed against them.

In the first 2 days alone thousands and thousands of man-hours were spent and over 50 vehicles and drivers were brought into service to seek the deserters.

Over 60 officers traveled to the homes of their relations, close associates, and friends. They were absent from their subunits and separated from their families for 5-15 days.

The question arises: Who are we —workers of the operational search service? Or are we military men after all, with our own official duties, which do not even

mention the duty of searching for deserters? Why should officers and ensigns engage in functions which are not theirs? At their own expense, moreover?

In my view there is a simple solution to the problem. When 3 days have elapsed since a serviceman has left his unit, he is taken off its lists. The fact that he has gone absent without leave from his unit is reported to his relations, the military commissariat, and the military and local prosecutor's offices. Criminal proceedings are instituted and an all-union search is declared. If, during the period of investigation, illegal actions on the part of servicemen against the deserter are revealed (which, according to the provisions of the military statutes, he was obliged to report to his commanders and political workers), then the measures stipulated by the law, right up to bringing criminal charges, are taken against them.

Deputy Minister Shabanov on Defense Budget Cuts

PM0111104089 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Report on 30 October USSR Supreme Soviet joint session by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA parliamentary correspondents Captain 1st Rank V. Lukashevich and Lieutenant Colonel V. Kosarev: "Looking Into Next Year"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The joint session of the chambers chaired by M.S. Gorbachev on Monday began by hearing reports on the plan and budget for 1990. [passage omitted]

As for the problems of military building and defense appropriations, they were merely mentioned in the report. We therefore asked Army General V.M. Shabanov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR deputy defense minister, to comment in more detail on these provisions:

[Shabanov] I consider these sections to have been well thought out. Of course, the reduction in defense appropriations is quite large compared with last year—more than 8 percent. This is an exceptional measure. It could only be implemented in the conditions of the new political thinking and new approaches to the problems of disarmament and conversion. Yes, the reduction in the budget has been worked out. But it is extreme, and we must recognize that. We have no right to reduce it further by an iota. The appropriations are being reduced for deliveries of weapons and new hardware, for military building, and for scientific research work.

[Correspondents] How far is this correct? After all, appropriations for scientific research are increasing, but for military science they are being reduced.

[Shabanov] There is a reasonable balance here. There are reserves. We have changed the priorities of research work accordingly. I think we will be able to get by with minimal losses. Although there will, of course, be losses. That is quite clear. They would occur with any reduction, in any state. But in this case we simply had no alternative. We weighed everything up very carefully. These discussions were literally unique from the viewpoint of openness, commitment, and awareness of what is and is not possible. I think we have acted correctly. [passage omitted]